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Introduction 
The importance of financial market in modern economy is self-evident. It, on the one hand, 
serves as a platform that provides accesses for one group of market participants to invest 
surplus funds, and on the other hand, offers more opportunities for the other group with 
pressing need of money to raise capital. In an efficient capital market, prices of investment 
instruments always “fully reflect” available information.1 However, this efficiency could 
be undermined by abusive practices, such as misappropriating unreleased price-sensitive 
information, distorting the demand and supply patterns, and manipulating information. 
These practices, through disturbing the price formation mechanism, will lead to 
inefficient allocation of capital resources and undermine the smooth functioning of the 
financial market.  
Abusive practices are recognized as market abuse under EU legislation, mainly covering 
insider dealing (or insider trading) and market manipulation, which are the big destroyers 
and potent enemies for financial market.
2
Although insider dealing and market 
manipulation are commonly mentioned together given their damage to the market 
integrity and investor confidence, they share few aspects in common. Insider dealings are 
illegal practices that insiders, on the basis of precise, material, non-public and related 
information,
3
 purchase or sell one or more financial instruments or encourage other 
investors to do so. The core element is “inside information”. While market manipulation 
concludes a wider range of behaviours, which create an unfair, artificial and distorted 
appearance of a security’s price on the market.4 And compared with insider dealing, 
manipulative practices are neither discussed exhaustively nor having a widely accepted 
and clear definition.  
                                                 
1
 Eugene F. Fama, “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work”, The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 25, No. 2 (May 1970), pp. 383-417. Eugene F. Fama, “Efficient Capital Markets: Ⅱ”, The 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 46, No. 5 (Dec., 1991), pp. 1575-1617.  
2
 Emilios Avgouleas, The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 
(Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 4.  
3
 These four criteria are the basis for judging inside information in EU law. See Market Abuse Directive, 
Article 1 (1). 
4
 Emilios Avgouleas, The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse: A Legal and Economic Analysis, p. 
4.  
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Market manipulation is generally prohibited in the worldwide financial markets. Its 
regulation could be traced back to the eighteenth century in Europa, which is proved by 
relating legislation, such as the Decree of the 24 September 1724 in France, the “Bubble 
Act” in 1720 in the UK, and the Imperial Decree of 1 August 1771 in German.5 In recent 
years, given the harmonization of European financial markets, market manipulation 
regulation in EU countries has become predominantly European-based, with EU 
directives being the predominant source of the Law.
6
 As a result, an EU market 
manipulation regime is established to efficiently tackle manipulative offences, mainly by 
the 2003 Market Abuse Directive and four supporting administrative rules.  
Although the current market manipulation regime is broadly considered as a great 
success, there are still many issues concerning its enforcement and supervisory 
inconsistence in the EU. A review of this regime was carried out at the end of 2007, 
which quickly became incorporated within the wider EU crisis-era reform programme.
7
 
In 12 July 2014, the new regulatory package, Market Abuse Regulation and Directive on 
criminal sanctions for market abuse, was adopted, which will fulfil the regulatory gaps of 
the current regime, and enhance the efficiency of supervision and enforcement. The new 
legislations will contribute to a further harmonisation of the EU market manipulation 
regulation.  
The thesis focuses on the analysis of the EU market manipulation regime. Specifically, it 
examines whether the current market manipulation regulation sufficiently prevent 
manipulative practices, states the reasons why a reform of current regime has been made, 
and analyses the main refinements set out in the new regime. In addition, this thesis also 
tries to make refinements of the Chinese market manipulation regime by drawing on 
experiences of the EU regime.    
                                                 
5
 Marco Lamandini, “Handbook of European Capital Markets Regulation (An Introduction and a Reasoned 
Collection of Official Materials)”, Volume 1, (Libreria Bonomo Editrice, September 2011), pp.15-19.  
6
 Mathisa M. Siems, “The EU Market Abuse Directive: A Case-Based Analysis”, Law and Financial 
Markets Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2008, pp. 39-49.  
7
 Niamh Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 
710. 
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The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 analyzes the legal and economic 
rationales of market manipulation. The nature and damages of market manipulation could 
be explained by the theories of Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH) and 
behavioral finance. Market manipulation is hard to define, and a general review of 
definitions provided by legislators, judges and experts is made. Also, the commonly 
recognized types of manipulation, (information-based manipulation, manipulations based 
on artificial transactions, and trade-based manipulation) are described in this chapter, 
supporting by numerous typical examples.  
Chapter 2 is dedicated to examine the legal framework of market manipulation regime 
under the 2003 Market Abuse Directive. Firstly, it describes the legal resources of EU 
market manipulation regulation, which include Market Abuse Directive, second-level 
implementing directives and third-level guidelines by CESR (now ESMA). Secondly, the 
regulation of three main types of manipulative practices is analyzed in detail respectively. 
Thirdly, the liability regime, as a deterrence of market manipulation, is discussed here. A 
detailed analysis of the constituent elements of different liabilities and their justifications 
is also offered in this chapter.  
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 seeks to explore the reasons why the EU market manipulation (or 
market abuse) regulation need to be reviewed and the main changes after the reform. 
Significant changes of trading venues and financial products in the EU, divergences in 
supervision and enforcement, and lack of clarity and legal certainty are the main reasons 
that lead to the review of market abuse regulation in EU.  
As regards to the changes, they can be summarized into two facets: on the one hand, a 
framework reform is made. Regulation will take the place of directive to provide a higher 
uniform and directly binding market manipulation regime. And on the one hand, 
substantive changes are also made relating to widen the scope of the regime, to add new 
prohibition, to refine derogations, and to enhance efficiency of supervision and 
enforcement.  
        
12 
Chapter 5 provides an assessment of the balance between the prohibition of market 
manipulation and protection of fundamental rights. It points out the types of fundamental 
rights that are easily affected by the market manipulation regime, and the conditions that 
should be satisfied if limitation is made to fundamental rights.  
And Chapter 5 explains the reasons why market manipulation has been such a serious 
problem in the Chinese financial market, and the major and special characters of the 
manipulative activities. It also analyzed the main issues that existing in the Chinese 
manipulation regime, providing several suggestions that are studied from the EU 
experiences of market manipulation, to refine the Chinese system.  
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Chapter 1 A Principled Analysis of Market Manipulation 
Market manipulation could make serious damages to the capital market. It is considered as 
a basic cause of market crashes.
8
 Manipulative behaviours, however, are very complex 
and have many derivative forms. For a better regulation, it is necessary to make a good 
analysis of its nature and composition. 
1.1 Defining market manipulation 
Manipulation, in ordinary usage, is “to manage or control artfully or by shrewd use of 
influence, often in an unfair or fraudulent way”9. Commercial data, information, facts and 
figures could all be used by “manipulator” to realize his aim, no matter good or evil.10 
When manipulation is referred in capital market, practices, which exploit financial 
strength, stock holdings, information or reputation advantages, may all be considered as 
“manipulative”.11  
However, if market manipulation is simply defined so, not only harmful abusive acts but 
also social desirable conducts are included. For instance, after close study of a company, 
several economic students buy many stocks of that company in the belief that the price of 
that stock is going to raise. They may share their analysis with their friends and also 
recommend them to buy. After the price rises to certain level, these people may have a 
negative attitude towards the stock and then sell them. Yet there is nothing to blame those 
students for the profits that they made through these transactions, because this is how the 
market works.  
                                                 
8
 Comment, “Regulation of Stock Market Manipulation”, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 56, No. 3, (Feb. 1947) pp. 
509-533, p.509.  
9
 David B. Guralnik ed.-in-chief, Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, Prentice Hall 
Press, 2d ed, 1986, p. 862. 
10
 Jason Pickholz and Marvin G. Pickholz, “Manipulation, Journal of Financial Crime”, 2001, J.F.C. 2001, 
9(2), pp.117-133, p.118. 
11
 Like the stabilization made by market maker or “poison pills” “white knights” and other defending plans 
used during corporate merger. 
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Market manipulation is a concept hard to define, in view of the widely varying types of 
devices used to stimulate or to discourage the buying and selling of securities.
12
 As a 
result, market manipulation is defined differently according to the approach chosen. 
Hardly any definition of market manipulation is satisfying or popularly accepted,
 13
 
mainly for the reason that statutes normally do not prohibit market manipulation by name, 
only describing its various forms. For example, Article 397 of the UK Financial Services 
and Markets Act (FSMA 2000) provides misleading statements and practices without 
mentioning “market manipulation”.14 However, this situation changed with the coming 
into force of Market Abuse Directive
15
 in European Union (EU) in 2003. This EU 
legislation explicitly forbids market manipulation using this name, and tries to give a legal 
definition together with two implemented directives and three guidelines.
 16
  It is a great 
contribution that EU legislations clarify the concept of market manipulation.  
Despite frustrated by the unpleasant situation in legislative aspect, legal scholars, judges 
and economists have made many attempts to defining market manipulation, which helps to 
sketch a fairly complete picture of what market manipulation is. Arguably, four 
approaches are explored in defining market manipulation in economic theory and relevant 
statutory and regulatory texts: the primary two are “effects-based approach” (also named 
artificial price) and “intent-based approach”; the third one is “combined approach”, a 
combination of the former two approaches; and the last approach is “market power”.17   
                                                 
12
 Comment, “Regulation of Stock Market Manipulation”, the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Feb., 1947), 
pp. 509-533.  
13
 Daniel R. Fischel and David J. Ross, “Should The Law Prohibit ‘Manipulation’ in Financial Markets?” 
(1991) 105 Harv. L. Rev. 503, pp.503-553, p. 506; Emilios Avgouleas, The Mechanics and Regulation of 
Market Abuse: A Legal and Economic Analysis, Oxford University Press (2005), p. 104; Söderström, 
Rebecca, “Regulating Market Manipulation: An Approach to designing Regulatory Principles”, (2011) p. 9, 
available at http://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2:398256, last visited on 23 Feb 2015.  
14
 Emilios Avgouleas, The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 
p.105.  
15
 Market Abuse Directive refers to “Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse)”.  
16
 Market Abuse Directive, Article 2 and 5.  
17
 Emilios Avgouleas, The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse: A Legal and Economic Analysis, pp. 
107-108; Diego Leis, “High Frequency Trading: Market Manipulation and Systemic Risks from an EU 
Perspective”, February 2012, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2108344, last visited on 5 March 2015.  
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1.1.1 Effects-based approach 
The centre element of “effects based approach” is creation of artificial prices and/or false 
or misleading impressions regardless of the causation. Many definitions of market 
manipulation provided by commenters are based on this approach. For example, an older 
frequently cited definition of market manipulation: “any and every operation or 
transaction or practice, the purpose of which is not primarily to facilitate the movement of 
commodity at prices freely responsive to the forces of supply and demand; but on the 
contrary, is calculated to produce a price distortion of any kind in the market”.18 Another 
classic definition used by judges in the well-known case Cargil Inc v. Hardin, defined 
market manipulation as any activity, scheme or artifice that deliberately influences the 
price of a financial asset, resulting in a price other than the one that would have resulted in 
the absence of such intervention.
 19
 And this is the approach that EU legislation has 
chosen to define market manipulation.  
Two criteria are crucial in the “effects-based approach”. The first one is creating false or 
misleading impressions about the state of offer and demand or price of an investment 
instrument. The test standard employed here is “reasonable person” or “regular user”20, 
which means that false or misleading impression is made if a manipulator’s practices 
influence or change an average investor’s original perception of market conditions and 
then induce him to make the investment decision expected by manipulators. 
                                                 
18
 This definition is given by was given by A. Marsh, former president of the New York Exchange, in 1928 
before a US Senate hearing examing the possible occurrence of manipulation in the US cotton futures. See 
Emilios Avgouleas, The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse: A Legal and Economic Analysis, pp. 
105-106, note 16: 1982 Senate Hearings 503. 
19
 Cargill Inc. v Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972). Other 
judgment, like in General Foods Corp. v Brannon, 170 F.2d 220, 231 (7th Cir. 1948), judges defined 
manipulation as “the creation of an artificial price by planned action”. Same approach also could be found in 
the case United States v Regan, 937 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1991). 
20
 “Regular user” is the standard used by the UK, “the regular user is a hypothetical reasonable person who 
regularly deals on the market and in the investments of the kind in question or bids on the auction platform in 
relation to investments of the kind in question.1 The presence of the regular user imports an objective 
element into the elements listed in MAR 1.2.15 UK while retaining some subjective features of the markets 
for, or the auction of, the investments in question.” Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), MAR 1.2.20, 
01/04/2013, available at http://www.fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/MAR/1/2, last visit at 26/05/2013.  
        
16 
The other criterion used in this approach is “creation of artificial prices”. Yet this criterion 
is quite problematic. “Artificial price” is a vacuous expression and is also very hard to 
prove. It was described as the price that does not “reflect basic forces of supply and 
demand” by judges in an US case21. However, further confusion about “basic forces” (or 
“market forces”) is raised. So the US Supreme Court, by its decision in case Schreiber v 
Burlington Northern Inc.
22
 in 1985, disapproved use of the word ‘artificial’ as a legal 
standard because of the uncertainty created by its usage, even so courts in the US does not 
stop using this term.
23
  
An alternative way to exam “artificial price” focuses on “whether the trading moves prices 
are closer to or away from their correct level”, and “correct level” means that price reflects 
the long-run conditions of supply and demand.
24
  Nevertheless, this test is not perfect 
because manipulation could also happen when moving the price away from short-run 
correct level. In 2000, the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) 
tried to provide a commonly accepted definition of “price artificiality”, which it describes 
as “the divergence of price from the legitimate forces of supply and demand.” 25 
Unfortunately, there is a further trouble concerning the explanation of “legitimate forces”.  
Hence, criticisms of using the inclusive concept of “artificial price” as a factor that 
provides conclusive evidence of market manipulation are made by scholars. They argued 
that all attempts to define this concept have been proved ineffective, as courts are obliged 
to do “unreasonably complex analysis of the markets and of the prevailing economic 
                                                 
21
 Cargill Inc. v Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972). 
22
 Schreiber v Burlington Northern Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985), p. 12.  
23
 See Jason Pickholz and Marvin G. Pickholz, pp. 118-121.  
24
 Fischel and Ross, p.509.  
25
 Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commission, “Investigating and 
Prosecuting Market Manipulation”, May 2000, p. 13. (Hereinafter IOSCO, “Investigating and Prosecuting 
Market Manipulation”, 2000) 
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conditions that make the legal prohibition practically inapplicable.”26 As a result, some 
people turned from objective way to subjective method to define market manipulation.  
1.1.2 Intent-based approach  
In the “intent-based approach”, the heart of defining market manipulation is the subjective 
intent of alleged manipulators. This approach concentrates on traders’ conducts, avoiding 
the laborious job of proving the creation of an artificial price. Professors Fischel and Ross 
once claimed that no objective definition of market manipulation makes sense, so its 
definition should focus on the intent of the trader, defining as “profitable trades made with 
‘bad’ intent”. 27 Accordingly, even a trader’s practices have the effects of rigging security 
price, he should not be treated as illegal manipulator unless evidences are provided to 
prove his “bad intend”.   
“Intent-based approach” is adopted by legal definitions of market manipulation in many 
states. Proofs, which show manipulators’ intents to induce unsuspicious investors to trade 
for realizing his manipulative plan, are required, especially in the situation of imposing 
criminal sanctions on manipulators. For instance, in section 397 (2) (to some extent) and 
section 397 (3) of FSMA 2000, the approach explored is “intent-based approach”.28 
However, this approach has its own disadvantages as well. Since intent is a mental state, it 
is not easy to testify. Thus, there is a risk that conducts with “good intent” to influence an 
instrument’s price, which are illegal, could also be caught following this approach. 
                                                 
26
 Emilios Avgouleas, The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse: A Legal and Economic Analysis, p. 
112; W.C. Perdue, “Manipulation of Futures Markets: Redefining the Offense”, (1987) 56 Fordham Law 
Review 345, pp. 348,393 and 399-401. 
27
 Fishel and Ross, p. 510. 
28
 Part XXVII 397 (2): A person to whom subsection (1) applies is guilty of an offence if he makes the 
statement, promise or forecast or conceals the facts for the purpose of inducing, or is reckless as to whether 
it may induce, another person (whether or not the person to whom the statement, promise or forecast is 
made)… 
 (3)Any person who does any act or engages in any course of conduct which creates a false or misleading 
impression as to the market in or the price or value of any relevant investments is guilty of an offence if he 
does so for the purpose of creating that impression and of thereby inducing another person to acquire, 
dispose of, subscribe for or underwrite those investments or to refrain from doing so or to exercise, or refrain 
from exercising, any rights conferred by those investments. 
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1.1.3 “Combined approach” and “market power approach” 
In terms of “combined approach”, it is a combination of the former two approaches, 
requiring both objective and subjective elements. Price artificiality and intent are both 
necessary elements. This approach is the choice of US securities legislation
29
 and its 
courts. Taking the case United States v Russo for example, the jury was given the 
instruction by judges that, in order to find a manipulation, they “must find that the 
defendant intended to raise the price of the stock to or maintain the price of the stock at an 
artificial level…”30  
In terms of “market power approach”, the emphasis is manipulators’ ability to acquire 
control of a large part of the supply or demand of a financial instrument or physical 
commodity, and then to exercise his control of to “position” the price of that instrument to 
the level that best fits his benefits.
31
 “Cornering the market” and “abusive squeeze” are 
two typical forms of market power manipulation. Owning market power itself is not illegal, 
while the way how this power is used and the intent of market power owner that contribute 
to the determination of market manipulation.     
1.2 Forms of market manipulation 
The complexity of market manipulation could be proved by its various forms. Market 
manipulation could be categorized into different types according to different classificatory 
criteria, and the elements that manipulative conducts comprise also vary from one form to 
another. However, market manipulation is not an open list, and new forms will be invented 
with the development of financial products or technologies. The following types of market 
                                                 
29
 Exchange Act 1934 (SEA 1934), section 9 (a) (1): For the purpose of creating a false or misleading 
appearance of active trading in any security other than a government security, or a false or misleading 
appearance with respect to the market for any such security…; (3) to induce the purchase or sale of any 
security other than a government security, any security not so registered, any security-based swap, or any 
security-based swap agreement with respect to such security by the circulation or dissemination in the 
ordinary course of business of information to the effect that the price of any such security will or is likely to 
rise or fall because of market operations of any 1 or more persons conducted for the purpose of raising or 
depressing the price of such security. 
30
 Case of United States v Russo, 74 F.3d 1383 (2d Cir. 1996), p.10 
31
 Emilios Avgouleas, The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse: A Legal and Economic Analysis, pp. 
147-148. 
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manipulation are commonly seen, including wash sales, improper matched orders, 
painting the tape, advancing the bid, pumping and dumping, marking the close, corner, 
squeeze, and dissemination of false or misleading information. 
32
 In practice, 
manipulators prefer mixing more than one method to realize his aim, such as wash sales is 
used together with spreading false information to create a false impression of a stock’s 
price increase.  
Even though types of market manipulation are never exhausted, a good classification will 
help us to have a better understanding. One of the most popularly classification used by 
academic researchers in recent years is provided by two American economic professors, 
Allen and Gale (1992). They classified market manipulation into three types: 
information-based manipulation, action-based manipulation and trade-based 
manipulation.
33
 Another frequently used classification is stated by the UK law professor, 
Emilios Avgouleas. He categorises market manipulation into “information-based 
manipulation”, “artificial transaction-based manipulation” and “price manipulation”.34 
And “price manipulation” has three sub-forms: trade-based manipulation, market-control 
(market power) manipulation and contract-based manipulation.  
There are similarities and differences between these two commonly cited categorization 
schemes. On the one hand, information-based manipulation is an identical category, 
stating manipulation by spreading false or misleading information. On the other hand, 
great differences exist for classifying the rest market manipulation. The central issue is the 
status of trade-based manipulation. “Trade-based manipulation is the all-encompassing 
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category into which all other types of manipulation could fall”,35 therefore, it could 
comprise contract-based manipulation, in which a trader’s profits result from triggering 
contractual rights by trading,
36
 and market power manipulation, trading at the prices 
controlled by manipulators, could both fall into the form of trade-based manipulation. 
With regard to “price manipulation”, it is not proper to treat it as a separate form37, as all 
kinds of manipulation are trying to get illegal profits through influencing the price of an 
investment instrument.  
As a result, combining these two categorization schemes, this paper classifies market 
manipulations into three categories: information-based manipulation, manipulation based 
on artificial transactions, and trade-based manipulation.  
1.2.1. Information-based manipulation 
No matter true or false, complete or incomplete, information is the basis for investors to 
make their investment judgements in the financial market. Market manipulation explored 
by spreading false information or disseminating rumours is one of the earliest and 
commonly used methods, which could be traced back to the late 1600s. 
38
The information 
strewed includes but not limited to political and macro-economic situations, affairs about 
securities or issuers, which might mislead the public to take wrong actions. With the 
popularization of high technologies and internet, information could be spread in a faster 
and less-cost manner. This provides manipulators more opportunities to perpetrate 
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information-based manipulation than ever. An analysis of the main categories of 
manipulation is presented below. 
(a) Scalping 
Scalping, a typical form of information-based manipulation, means that illegal benefits 
gained from the purchase of a security by broker-dealers, investment advisers or other 
capital market professionals before they recommend customers to buy the same security. 
This practice is usually considered unethical because customers’ purchase will increase 
the security's price, thus enabling the professionals to sell at a profit.
39
 Market 
professionals, primarily broker-dealers and investment advisers, are trusted by investors in 
general thanks to the reputation of their creators,
40
 however this trusts facilitate them to 
make successful manipulation by providing untrue investment recommendations. In this 
kind of manipulation, market professionals exploit their trusted positions to enrich 
themselves at the expense of innocent investors.  
The largest number of scalping is perpetrated by investment advisers
41
. Investment 
advisers, with the help of massive media coverage of their activities, acquire significant 
influence over institutional and retail investors. Especially the latter ones who make their 
investment decision largely depend on the analyses in the public statements or advisers’ 
reports of “analyst heroes” disseminated by the mass media.42  
A significant influenced manipulation case in China, Wang Jianzhong, could perfectly 
explain how this form of manipulation is perpetrated by investment advisers. Wang 
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Jianzhong was a very famous investment adviser and also the executive director in Beijing 
Shou Fang Investment and Consulting Corporation. He had a good reputation and was 
named “golden finger” as most of the recommendation that he made on certain security 
would help investors to get a profit. During the period from January 1
st
 2007 to May 29
th
 
2008, through his own account and 8 more accounts that he controlled, Wang Jianzhong 
had bought 38 types of securities, which, soon after, were recommended to the public in 
his analyst’s reports. After the release of the reports, the prices of related securities 
increased because of investors’ purchases following his recommendation. Wang 
Jianzhong sold his securities at a higher price level and succeeded to make a profit of 
125,757,599.50 Yuan (about 12,575,760 euro). According to the administrative sanction 
made by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), Wang Jianzhong was 
confiscated 125,757,599.50 Yuan illegal gains and received an administrative-penalty fine 
of the same amount, which is also the largest fine that has ever been made by CSRC. 




(b) Spread of false information and misrepresentation  
Compared to scalping, spread of false information and misrepresentation is a more 
common seen type of manipulation considering that, in this case, perpetrators could be 
anybody in the capital market, not limited to market professionals. Besides, the abusive 
information in this case concludes all untrue, inaccurate, incomplete or uncertain 
information that may have great influence on investors to make decisions. For instance, 
rumours about the international relationship, political affairs in special regions or health 
condition of the CEO of the issuer, are all possible to change investors’ original 
investment plan. 
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Spread of false information and misrepresentation, as an old manipulative technology, 
could be traced back to 300 years ago. At that time, it was quite easy for brokers to run up 
the stock prices of companies that carried out overseas trades simply through giving hint 
about the rich cargoes carried on ships soon to enter port in the Amsterdam market.
44
 The 
situation does not change too much today. Broker-dealers may spread or misrepresent 
false information about promising future of a company, in order to promote the sale of 
securities in which they make a market or which have been underwritten by their firm. 
Moreover, manipulation by spreading false or misleading information is much easier to 
perpetrate than ever with the advent of information technology in the modern financial 
market. This is because, on the one hand, market participants are able to have access to 
information that used to be hard or expensive to find, and on the other hand, the totally new 
information can be procured by the public once it appears. For a market manipulator, this 
means a new and more influencing way for “transmit and spread rumours, manipulate 
beliefs, and post incorrect information at little cost, while maintaining the cloak of 
anonymity”45. Examples of this type of manipulation are uncountable, ranging from the 
old well-known case of R v De Berenger
46
 in 1814, to the famous teenager, Jonathan G. 
Lebed, internet manipulation case in 2000
47
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(c) Manipulation by undisclosed information  
Full disclosure of information is critical for the transparency of the financial, which also 
ensures an equal opportunity for market participant
49
, so it is an obligation provided by the 
securities law in the main countries. However, there are inevitable situations that a person, 
such as corporate executives, financial journalists, and officers in the supervisory 
organisations, who has access to acquire accurate and complete information earlier than 
the public, abuses his right to get illegal profits.  
Nevertheless, information abused in this form of manipulation is different from inside 
information used in insider dealing, as it does not need to be very precise or relate to 
issuers or financial instruments. For instance, undisclosed information regarding political 
affairs, macro-economic policies or governmental budgets could be the devices for 
manipulators to take advantages to rig specific security’s prices angling for illegal profits.  
1.2.2 Manipulation based on artificial transactions 
Transactions convey information concerning the state of demand and supply of a 
particular investment instrument in the capital market. Therefore, fictitious trades could 
also be used for creating a misleading impression, which is not peculiar to the 
information-based manipulation.
50
 Artificial transactions create the appearances of great 
demand or supply for certain securities while there is no such demand or supply for them 
in reality, through which a fraud is made for unsuspicious investors. Artificial 
transactions-based manipulation is also an old story, and related cases could be found in 
the form of “trading pools” in the 19th century in the US and the UK.51 “Wash trades” and 
“improper matched orders” are two classic forms of fictitious trade-based manipulation 
while “fictitious orders” is a new coming type in particular with the usage of high 
technologies.   
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(a) Wash sales 
Wash sales (also known as wash trades)
52
 occur when an operator sells and buys the same 
security at the same time, aiming to change the stock price through artificially influence on 
trading volume. Wash sale trades are considered as fictitious because there is not real 
change in the beneficial ownership
53
 of securities, just like moving the securities from the 
left hand of the owner to the right one.  
Taking the case of Robert Crane for example, Robert Crane was charged by the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for manipulating the market for two penny 
stocks. As in June 2010, Crane, by placing his orders through the Internet for trades in his 
three accounts at two brokerage firms, created a false appearance of an active and liquid 
market for those two securities, without actually changes of beneficial ownership in the 
stocks he already owned. 
54
 Therefore, wash sale has initially been regulated as securities 
fraud in the main countries.  
(b) Improper matched orders 
Another important category of artificial transaction is improper matched orders. Although 
technique closely to wash sales, improper matched orders involve changes of beneficial 
ownerships of securities concerned. Improper matched orders occurs when “transactions 
where both buy and sell orders are entered at or nearly at the same time, with the same 
price and quantity by different but colluding parties”, unless the transactions could be 
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justified by related rules.
55
 The offenders in this type of manipulation must be at least two 
persons who have a prior knowledge of the plan and reach an agreement about it.  
(c) Painting the tape 
Painting the tape originated in the past era when “ticker tape” were used to transmit stock 
prices. It is one of the perennial favourite manipulation methods used to trick unwary 
investors, which could go back as far as three hundred years ago in the Amsterdam stock 
market.
56
 Painting the tape is the practice of making transactions among manipulators for 
the explicit purpose of influencing the price of a security, so as to give the impression of 
high trading volume or certain price movement in that security, which can attract 
unsuspecting investors to buy. 
A typical example of painting the tape is that brokers, using their customers’ accounts, 
make numerous buy and sell orders for a security to push its price up. Once investors’ 
purchases push up the security’s price as brokers’ desire, they will offset their holdings, 
succeeding to make a profit. Painting the tape is quite similar to improper matched orders, 
so some scholar claims that it is unnecessary to distinct from these two forms of market 
manipulation.
57
 Nevertheless, differences between them could not be ignored. In case of 
painting the tape, there is no prior agreement between brokers and investors, and brokers 
get the benefits while investors face losses.  
(d) Fictitious orders (Placing orders with no intention of executing them
58
) 
Fictitious orders manipulation is operated in a way that operators frequently makes orders 
with prices higher or lower than the previous bids and then withdraws them from the 
market before execution. The orders are fictitious because manipulators do not intent to 
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execute them but to create a misleading appearance of the high trading volume or price 
movement of the financial instrument concerned. “A variant on this type of market 
manipulation is to place a small order to move the bid/offer price of the financial 
instrument and being prepared for the order to be executed if it cannot be withdrawn in 
time.”59  
Fictitious orders manipulation is commonly used since the rise of electronic 
communication networks, which allow traders to place orders anonymously and to cancel 
them immediately with no consequence. Cases with regard to fictitious orders have 
increased substantially and such practices become regularly in the capital market in recent 
years. As a result, this form of manipulation has drawn more attention from the regulators 
since the beginning of the twentieth century.
60
 
1.2.3 Trade-based Manipulation 
Trade-based manipulation is hard to eradicate because its occurrence is made by 
manipulators’ actual buying and selling, without taking any publicly observable actions to 
alter the value of the firm or releasing false information to change the price.
61
 It could be 
simply understood as actual trades in the financial market with “bad intent”.  
Regulation of trade-based manipulation is not treated as a matter of course compared with 
the former two categories of market manipulation. Some experts argued that trade-base 
manipulation is self-deterring taking account of large number of capital or stock 
requirements for a successful manipulation. Besides, manipulation by actual transitions 
does not have a clear border with legitimate trades, the prohibition of which will raise 
significant social costs while acquiring few benefits.
62
 However, this theory is proved to 
be untrue by both theory and practices. On the one side, the big number of illegal profit 
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will always urge some person to take the risk; on the other hand, the capital needed to 
manipulate of a low liquid security is not achievable, in particular when manipulators are 
more than one or professional organizations.
63
  
Given its difficulty of detection and various derivative forms, trade-based manipulation is 
the main content provided by market manipulation regulation, like US SEA 1934 (section 
9), Market Abuse Directive (Article 1 (2) (a)). Forms of manipulation based on actual 
transactions are never exhausted, and the following cases are just the main types that are 
usually perceived in practice.  
(a) Marking the close 
“Marking the close”, also known as “trading at the end of the day”, means that buying or 
selling a financial instrument just before the close of trading day in an effort to alter 
closing price of that instrument. Closing price is one of the most important figures since 
that it usually is the standard for judging the market situation of an instrument on that day 
and also is the basis for the opening price on the next day. In many cases, market 
participants use closing price as the main basis to predict instruments’ price tendency and 
make investment decisions. For manipulators, “marking the close” is a favourite method, 
because no more trades can be made after that, which means less risky and lower cost to 
secure the instrument’s price as they desired. Therefore, intent is the key elements to 
differentiate a manipulative conduct from the legal transitions made at the end of the 
trading day.  
(b) Advancing the bids  
“Advancing the bids” occurs when manipulators successively increase the bid for a 
financial instrument to increase its price. As soon as he succeeds to make the price at a 
planned level, a manipulator will offset his possessions of that instrument to retail 
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investors (in normal case) to get a profit. Usually, “advancing the bids” is quite risky and 
expensive to exercise considering the large number of money needed and the possibility of 
failing to attract investors. However, this kind of manipulative practice still has chance to 
succeed when combined with spreading false information, particularly for large market 
traders or market intermediaries, who have a big money or influence advantage.   
(c) Abusive short selling 
Short selling (or short sales, short) has a long and arguable history, the regulation of which 
is still going through seriously debate in recent years. A short seller is the one who sells a 
security or other financial instrument, which he does not own or he owns but has not 
delivered. He delivers to the buyer shares that are borrowed from a shareholder, often 
broker-dealers or institutional investors. Short selling per se is neutral, just the reaction of 
traders who believe that the price of a security will fall
64
. If used appropriately, short 
selling could help the capital market to promote efficiency by eliminating overpricing.
65
  
However, short selling is also believed to depresses the price of a security through 
successive sales or one big enough selling activity, which creates a misleading impression 
that the security is overvalued. If such sales are made deliberately, they should be 
considered as manipulative. In contrast to “advancing the bids”, manipulators here benefit 
from selling borrowed securities at higher price and then buying them back at lower price 
to deliver. Generally speaking, short selling is a very popular situation that companied by 
manipulative conducts, in particular in the case of naked short selling. 
Naked short selling means that, a seller sells security short without borrowing the 
necessary security or making a good faith arrangement to borrow the security, or without 
reasonable belief that the seller can borrow the security by the settlement day”, thus 
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potentially results in a fail to deliver security to the buyer.
66
 Consequently, naked short 
selling may lead to a big damage to the capital market, since the failure of deliver 
securities, not only distorts the securities clear system, but also generates artificial trading 
prices. Accordingly, naked short selling is prohibited even in the US which has very 
lenient law towards short selling.  
However, except naked short shelling, the tolerant attitude towards short selling of 
regulators in the EU is forced to change in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis and 
debt crisis. Short selling is going to face more strict regulation with regard to its close 
relationship with market manipulation.  
(d) Cornering the market  
Cornering the market is a classic type of market manipulation abusing market power (or 
market position), observed more frequently in futures markets. Cornerers create a 
dominant position in controlling either the supply or demand-side of both the derivative 
and underlying asset of selected investment instrument. This dominant position forces 
buyer or sellers, usually those who “have to deliver, take delivery or defer delivery of the 
instrument/product in order to satisfy their obligations”67, to accept the distorted price 
provided by manipulators. Cornering the market has a long history, and it is never short of 
typical cases. For example, the 1869 Black Friday was caused by cornering the gold 
market on the New York Gold Exchange; the 1970s Silver Thursday was made by the 
Hunt brothers cornering the world silver markets; and between 2007 and 2010, cornering 




(e) Abusive squeeze  
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Abusive squeeze is the other typical form of market manipulation exploiting market 
position. According to rules made by IOSCO, abusive squeeze is defined as “taking 
advantage of a shortage in an asset by controlling the demand-side and exploiting market 
congestion during such shortages in such a way as to create artificial prices”. Sometimes 
people use “abusive squeeze” and “cornering the market” interchangeably, maybe because 
large traders often use former method accompanied by the latter. But these two 
manipulative behaviours have different aspects. An obvious distinction is that 
manipulators do not usually possess the underlying commodity or financial instruments 
concerned in abusive market squeeze.  
1.3 Rationales for the regulation of market manipulation  
1.3.1 General introduction 
By and large, the prohibition of market manipulation has received much fewer objections 
than insider dealing, despite the hard questions posed by defining market manipulation. 
The opinion that market manipulation does not need specific regulation is only showed in 
the article, “Should the Law Prohibit ‘Manipulation’ in Financial Markets?” published by 
Daniel R. Fischel and David J. Ross in 1991. Fischel and Ross claimed that legal 
prohibition of market manipulation is not necessary, since that information-based 
manipulations and artificial transactions-based manipulations are securities frauds in 
nature, which have already been regulated by legislations; while trade-based manipulation 
is self-deterrence because of its difficulty to profit, and also because their prohibition 
results in significant social costs and undermines traders’ freedom.69  
However, more opposite opinions are expressed by both legal scholars and economists 
after this article’s publish. They argued that profitable market manipulation is possible, so 
it cannot be self-deterrence as a matter of fact. A series of theoretical and empirical studies 
also prove that market manipulators can move investment instruments’ prices by trading 
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and can make illegal profits from doing so.
70
 Therefore, regulation of market 
manipulation is necessary way to ensure the well function of the financial market and to 
enhance the confidence of investors.  
The widely accepted theories, that explain the reason why market manipulation should be 
regulated, include Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH), social costs and moral 
considerations.  
1.3.2 Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis and market manipulation 
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH) is one of the fundamental theories for 
modern capital market, which could be simply stated as “security prices fully reflect all 
available information”, under a precondition that information and trading costs and the 
costs of getting prices to reflect information are always zero; or more sensible that prices 
reflect information to the point where the profits made by acting on information are less 
than the marginal costs.
71
 Started with studying the processes determining security prices 
in 1950s, ECMH has gradually been widely accepted through a line of theoretical inquiry 
and empirical research,
72
 even though it faces more criticism from the behaviour 
economists after the 1990s stock bubbles
73
. Accordingly, a capital market is efficient when 
investment instruments’ prices fully reflect all the relevant information available to 
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investors. That is to say the present prices of investment instruments represent all current 
relevant market information, and any future changes in price are unpredictable. In a 
similar way, prices cannot correctly reflect these fundamentals if false information is 
added.  
Market manipulations, however, destroy the capital market efficiency by adversely 
influencing its price formation mechanism. Manipulators feed the market with false or 
misleading information which distorts the whole market information quality, either 
through spreading rumours or by creating an artificial impression of the supply and 
demand state of an investment instrument. Under this situation, inefficient price of that 
instrument is formed, transmitting inaccurate assumptions regarding future profitability to 
investors, and then channelling resources to not so efficient usage. Given the fact that the 
primary role of capital market is allocation of fund, such misallocation has a detrimental 
effect on the whole market, which could be proved by those tragic consequences caused by 
the 1869 Black Friday, the Guinness share-trading fraud in the 1980s,  the eruption of the 
Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat and other corporate frauds in the 20
th 
century. 
1.3.3 Costs and benefits of market manipulation regulation 
“Regulation improves outcome when enforcing contracts is very costly (Posner, 1998) or 
when limited liability restricts the ability to punish deviants (Shavell, 1984).” 74 
Regulation also play an important role when contracts are incomplete or has difficulty in 
renegotiation, which is a quite common situation in the capital market, as most of the time 
one parties of the contracts are retail investors who are dispersed and lack of professional 
knowledge and money. These rationales are totally applicable in the case of market 
manipulation regulation. Hence, the prohibition of market manipulation can enhance the 
whole market welfare and secure its well function.  
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However, the regulation of market manipulation is not accepted by all the people. A 
typical opposite opinion is brought up by Professors Fischel and Ross. They argued that 
the costs of legal prohibition of market manipulation are more than its benefits. They 
claimed that, on the one hand, the enforcement costs are higher for manipulation than for 
other intentional rules, as manipulative acts are indistinguishable from normal trading on 
appearance and it is too difficult to judge only through manipulators’ mental state;  
On the other hand, sanctions are very severe for market manipulation, even including 
criminal liability, so the error costs will be too high considering the fact that 
non-manipulative trading might quite easily to be confused with manipulative ones. 
Further, the punishment of manipulation will also discourage those social desirable 
activities, like stabilization, which is a kind of manipulation in nature.
75
   
Nevertheless, it should be reminded that Fischel and Ross try to prove that costs of these 
rules outweigh benefits made, rather than argue that markets should not have rules against 
market manipulation. It’s true that the regulation of market manipulation is not going to be 
costless, but the potential costs are limited compared with substantial benefits.  
Firstly, regulation is a better choice when private responses of market manipulation are not 
enough to deter it. It is difficult for private parties to discover manipulation and even they 
could, few would like to bring suits since there is an important fixed cost for doing so.
76
 
Market intermediates have more abilities than retail investors to deter manipulation, 
unfortunately this is not the case because they might just be manipulators or profit by 
taking advantage of market manipulation.  
Secondly, if the prohibition rules only target behaviors with “bad intent”, they can realize 




                                                 
75
 Daniel R. Fischel and David J. Ross, pp. 522-523.  
76
 Zingales and Luigi, p. 22.  
77
 Steve Thel, pp. 287-288.  
        
35 
And finally, benefits of market manipulation regulation increase as the quick integration 
of international capital markets. Manipulation perpetrated through internet or cross-border 
is more easily and less risky, however, such manipulative activities are not self-deterrence 
and are impossible to be prohibited efficiently by single state regulators. Consequently, 
international supervisory and enforcement networks should be established in order to 
support information exchange and joint investigation between countries.
78
   
1.3.4 Moral consideration  
Morality consideration is another reason why market manipulation should be regulated. 
Manipulative schemes always involve deceptive conducts, such as spreading rumors, 
disseminating misleading messages or creating artificial transactions. These acts in nature 
are a kind of fraud, which is against the common value of human beings. This character 
makes the prohibition of market manipulation less controversial at least than insider 
trading. So in common law market manipulation was regulated as securities fraud at the 
very beginning. And this is still the same way of dealing with manipulation in some 
occasions, especially for market information-based manipulation and artificial 
transactions-based manipulation. For example, Section 9 of the SEA prohibitions 
(Prohibition against Manipulation of Security Prices)
 79
 are supplemented by section 10 
(Manipulative and deceptive devices)
80
 and section 15(c).
81
  
Conclusion of Chapter 1 
Market manipulation is an illegal practice which enable perpetrators profit from raising or 
lowering the prices of an investment instrument in capital market, which are created by 
spreading false information, by making fictitious trading or by actual trading but with bad 
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intent. It makes damages to the financial market through affecting the price formation 
mechanism and destroys investors’ confidences.  
Market manipulation is a complex offence. It has numerous forms and new forms are 
created with new financial products and technologies. Manipulations are classified into 
three categories in this thesis. Information-based manipulation and artificial 
transaction-based manipulation are two traditional categories, which are better regulated 
in the main jurisdictions. Yet they have new developments with the advent of new 
communication technologies and the integration of international capital market. And the 
last one, trading-based manipulation, is more complicated than the former two. Given its 
vague border with legal transitions, trade-based manipulation is difficult detect and 
determine, therefore becomes the major issue for legislators and regulators in recent years.  
Compared with insider dealing, the prohibition of market manipulation raises fewer 
arguments. The reason of its regulation could be explained by the ECMH theory, cost and 
benefit analysis and moral consideration. Market manipulation regulation has the 
advantages of reducing adverse influence on price formation mechanism, getting higher 
benefits received than social costs, and fighting against frauds (immorality).  
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Chapter 2 Market manipulation regime under the Market Abuse Directive 
Market manipulation, together with insider dealing, is the main content of market abuse 
regime. Its regulation has become predominantly European-based in EU Member States, 
with directives being the predominant source of the law. 
82
 Market Abuse Directive and 
its implementing acts established the basic legal framework for the regulation of market 
manipulation, contributing to the prohibition of misconducts in the financial markets.  
2.1 History of EU market manipulation regulation 
The first EU-level legislation concerning market abuse regime is Directive 89/592/EEC
83
 
(popular known as the Insider Dealing Directive), adopted in 1989. Unfortunately, only 
insider dealing was provided in in this Directive, while nothing with regard to market 
manipulation was mentioned. However, a sea change happened in financial market soon 
after. With the development of new technologies and financial products, cross-border 
transitions are becoming more and more common. Regulatory fragments became a serious 
issue in the EU financial market, which provides more opportunities for market 
manipulators.
84
 The increasing number of market manipulation cases during the 1990s 
stock market bubble revealed that the old market abuse regulation could not keep pace 
with new issues turning up.
85
 As a result, a new directive, Directive 2003/6/EC (also 
known as Market Abuse Directive)
86
, was adopted and market manipulation was firstly 
regulated in the EU.  
EU legal framework for market manipulation is established by the 2003 Market Abuse 
Directive, which is also the first directive created following the Lamfalussy four-level 
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regulatory approach (hereinafter referred to as Lamfalussy process).
87
 Shortly after the 
issuing of Market Abuse Directive, four level 2 implementing legislative acts
88
, which 
provided detailed technical rules about manipulation, were adopted subsequently. And 
three sets of level 3 guidance on the common operation of the Market Abuse Directive 
were issued by the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR, now the 
European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA)). The CESR guidance does not have 
binding effects, and it is only limited to the competent authorities. However, this guidance 
contributes to ensure uniformed implementation in Member States by providing clear 
explanations or recommendations during enforcement. These measures at large offer a 
general framework of market manipulation, which has played an important role in 
protecting the smooth functioning of the financial market and in enhancing the public 
confidences in the EU.  
Although the market manipulation regime established by the Market Abuse Directive is 
considered as a success in general, some regulatory deficiencies, such as lack of clarity and 
legal certainty, disproportionate administrative burdens on issuers, have become serious 
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issues because of the increasing competition among new markets, trading platforms and 
over-the-counter (OTC) and the use of technologies.
89
 In particular after the breaking out 
of the global financial crisis, a series of broad-influence cases
90
 remind us that more 
improvements should be made to the regulation of market manipulation.  
In 2010, the Commission launched a public consultation on the review of the Market 
Abuse Directive. Its objective was to consult financial market participants, governments, 
competent authorities and other stakeholders on the modifications to the Market Abuse 
Directive that the Commission is considering for its forthcoming legislative proposal. 
Later in June 2011, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Regulation on insider dealing 
and market manipulation (market abuse), and another for a Directive on criminal sanctions 
for insider dealing and market manipulation.
91
 And these two proposals were finally 
adopted by the European Parliament and the Council on 12 June 2014.  
The new rules, Regulation No 596/2014 on market abuse and Directive 2014/57/EU on 
criminal sanctions for market abuse, update and strengthen the existing framework to 
ensure market integrity and investor protection provided by the existing Market Abuse 
Directive ( 2003/6/EC) which will be repealed in 2016.
92
  
2.2 Scope and exceptions of the prohibition on market manipulation 
Market Abuse Directive is considered as the first legislation that prohibits market 
manipulation by name. Its prohibition is straightforward: “Member States shall prohibit 
                                                 
89
 Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper: executive summary of the impact assessment, SEC 
(2011) 1218 final.  
90
 The Libor and Euribor manipulation scandal, details available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libor_scandal; Morgan Stanley manipulation concerning false reporting of 
futures trades, details available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/aa6ea7ae-f886-11e2-92f0-00144feabdc0.html; 
CFTC manipulation about crude oil futures price, details available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303796404579097200823946312.html, and etc.   
91
 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on insider dealing and market 
manipulation (market abuse), reference 2011/0295 (COD); Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and the Council for criminal sanctions on insider dealing and market manipulation, reference 
2011/0297 (COD).     
92
 European Commission, Daily News on 12 June 2014, EXME 14/ 12.06.  
        
40 
any person from engaging in market manipulation.”93 Since market manipulation and 
insider dealing are under the same framework, this arrangement can ensure a better 
regulation for the wrongdoings that mix using these two abusive methods.  
2.2.1 A broad scope of market manipulation prohibition 
Market manipulation rules provided in the Market Abuse Directive has a very broad scope. 
It applies to any financial instrument admitted to trading on a regulated market in at least 
one Member State, or for which a request for admission to trading on such a market has 
been made, irrespective of whether or not the transaction itself actually takes place on that 
market.
94
 This means that the determination of manipulative behaviour hinges on two key 
definitions: financial instrument and regulated markets.  
Financial instrument is defined in Article 1(3) of Market Abuse Directive, covering equity, 
debt, commodities, derivatives thereof and other kinds of securities. It is not exaggerated 
to conclude that all the financial instruments allowed to trade on a regulated market are 
within the meaning of Market Abuse Directive.
95
  
The other core definition is “regulated markets”, the transitions on which fall into the 
prohibition of market manipulation. Regulated market is provided in Article 4(1)(14) of 
MiFID
96
, which repealed Article 1(13) of Directive 93/22/EEC. According to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU), two conditions are required for classifying a 
market in financial instruments as a “regulated market”. Firstly, it must be authorised as a 
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regulated market by a Member State. And secondly, its operation should be in accordance 
with the requirements set out in Title III of MiFID, which is an essential condition for 
obtaining and maintaining that authorisation. The situation where an operator of a 
regulated market also operates another trading system is not the reason for that trading 
system to become a “regulated market”. Moreover, the inclusion of a market on the list of 
regulated markets mentioned in Article 47 of MiFID is also not a constitute element for the 
classification of that market as a “regulated market”.97  
2.2.2 Exceptions for the prohibition of market manipulation 
Given the wide scope of market manipulation prohibition, a blanket exception for market 
manipulation prohibition is provided by the directive in order to avoid legal activities to be 
punished. In general, exceptions include two categories. The first one is concerning 
special transitions, which are “carried out in pursuit of monetary, exchange-rate or public 
debt-management policy by a Member State, by the European System of Central Banks, by 
a national central bank or by any other officially designated body, or by any person acting 
on their behalf. Member States may extend his exception to their federated States or 
similar local authorities in respect of the management of their public debt”. The second 
category includes safe harbours (buy-back programmes and stabilization
98
) and Accepted 
Market Practices, which will be analysed in detail.
99
 
2.3 Definition and identification of market manipulation 
Only the prohibition itself is not really useful because it depends on how market 
manipulation is defined. As mentioned in Chapter 1, market manipulation has too many 
forms and shows different appearances in different manipulative practices, so “formal, 
detailed definitions (of market manipulation) are unlikely to capture the full range of 
manipulative activity and are likely to become outdated rapidly.”100 Inflexible definition 
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might also encourage potential abusers to develop practices which fall outside the scope of 
prohibition.  
Therefore, EU defines market manipulation in a complicated way: first, a general clause 
concerning three categories of market manipulation is provided in level 1 Market Abuse 
Directive; secondly, further indicators are set out in level 2 Commission Directive 
2003/124/EC (article 4 and 5) and Commission Directive 2004/72/EC (article 2); and 
lastly typical examples of various of practices which might constitute market manipulation 
are given in level 3 CESR guidance.  
Besides, Market Abuse Directive chooses the effect-based approach to define market 
manipulation, according to which intention is not a necessary condition. This greatly 
reduces the difficulty of determining a manipulative activity by the judges and regulators 
and, as a result, increases the enforcement efficiency.  
2.3.1 Market manipulation by transactions or orders to trade 
Market manipulation by transactions or orders to trade (no matter real or fictitious) is the 
first part of EU’s market manipulation definition. It means transactions or orders which: (a) 
give, or are likely to give, false or misleading signals with regard to the supply of, demand 
for or price of financial instruments, or secure the price of one or several financial 
instruments at an abnormal or artificial level,
101
 or (b) employ fictitious devices or any 
other form of deception or contrivance
102
.  
Two features are worth mentioning in this core definition. One is that since the 
“effect-based approach” is adopted, mental element of manipulator is not a necessary 
element, which makes this form of manipulation much easier to prove. But problems exist 
in further clearing the concept of “abnormal or artificial price level” just like in other 
foreign jurisdictions.  
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The other feature is that this definition covers a very broad scope of manipulative activities, 
which can be classified into three sub-parts: false or misleading transactions (the first 
indent of Article 1(2)(a) of Market Abuse Directive), price positioning (the second indent 
of Article 1(2)(a)) and transactions involving fictitious devices or deceptions (Article 
1(2)(b))
103
. In particular, the flexible Article 1(2)(b) is designed to be a catch-all clause, 
ensuing that new devices of manipulation in the financial market could all be covered. In 
order to protect social desirable behaviors, transitions with legitimate reasons could be 




2.3.2 Market manipulation by dissemination of false or misleading information 
Market manipulation by dissemination of false or misleading information is stipulated in 
Article 1(2)(c) of the Market Abuse Directive. The person who knew, or ought to have 
known, that the information was false or misleading, is prohibited from disseminating the 
information through the media and any other means, especially internet. And the 
information concerned, including the dissemination of rumors and false or misleading 
news, shall give, or be likely to give false or misleading signals regarding financial 
instruments.
105
 It is designed to include manipulative practices involving dissemination of 




Information-based manipulation also explores the “intent-based approach”. The court or a 
regulator does not need to prove that a perpetrator intent to induce market participants to 
trade in the instruments affected by the misleading or false information spread. Only the 
                                                 
103
 These three terms are used in the first set of CESR guidance.  
104
 Accepted market practices are only limited to the first two kinds of practices provided in Article 1(2)(a) 
of Market Abuse Directive.  
105
 Market Abuse Directive, Article 1(2)(c). 
106
 The first set of CESR guidance.  
        
44 
action of spreading such information is enough. However, manipulator shall know, or 
ought to have known, the information he disseminated is false or misleading.
107
  
None the less, problems exist in this issue. Disseminating false or misleading information 
is not always explicitly distinct from exercising the right of free speech, in particular under 
the situation where right and wrong is not always clear. As a result, harsh punishment for 
misinformation might impede the exercise of such.
108
 As a result, special reference is 
made to journalists considering their professional features. Compared to other persons, 
journalists who act in their professional capacity are considered as manipulators only 
when they derive, directly or indirectly, an advantage or profits from disseminating rumors 
and false or misleading news, otherwise these misbehaviors are judged by rules governing 
their professions.  
Moreover, the risk of abuse of market manipulation prohibition is balanced by the 
fundamental rights and principles relating to freedom of the press and freedom of 
expression in the media recognized in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
109
 
2.2.3 Indicators of market manipulation 
Market manipulation is extremely difficult to determine in practice, mainly because of its 
non-ending emergence of new devices and a diverse mixture of manipulative techniques. 
The definition provided in the Article 1(2) of the Market Abuse Directive aims to include 
all new forms of manipulative practices, but it is hard for application considering its 
generality. Therefore, except for three instances given in second section of Article 1(2), 
both Directive 2003/124/EC and the first set of CESR guidance
110
 provide non-exhaustive 
lists of possible signals or examples, which should not necessarily be deemed in 
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themselves to constitute market manipulation, shall be taken into account when detecting 
transactions or orders in question. These indications would facilitate market participants 
and competent authorities with the identification of market manipulation.   
2.3.1.1 Dissemination of false or misleading information 
Manipulation by dissemination of false or misleading information is the least complicated 
one among the four variants that are provided in Article 1(2) of Market Abuse Directive, 
as it covers straight-forward situations like securities fraud.
111
 So only the first set of 
CESR guidance mentions a few examples in its paragraph 4.14.
112
  
A false or misleading signal as to financial instrument could be created positive actions or 
by negative inactions, through the venue of media or other means.  For example, an issuer 
fails to disclose inside information, which is not except from disclosure, or a manipulator 
deliberately makes the movement of physical commodity stocks to create a misleading 
impression concerning the supply or demand for a commodity or the deliverable into a 
commodity futures contract.
113
 It would not be wrong to conclude that, besides exclusion 
of “scalping”, the type of manipulation provided in Article 1(2)(c) is information-based 
manipulation, that is discussed in Chapter 1.  
2.3.1.2 False or misleading transactions 
The second variant provided in the first indent of Article 1(2)(a) is manipulation by false 
or misleading transactions, which could also be named as artificial transaction-based 
manipulation. Non-exhausted situations are listed by the directives and guidance where 
fictitious transactions or orders would happen. For instance, buying or selling a large 
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volume of a financial instrument with an explicit aim to mislead unsuspicious investors;
114
 
transactions undertaken lead to no change in beneficial ownership;
115
 and entering 
significant orders in the central order book of the trading system right before the price 
determination phase of the auction and then cancelling them just before the order book is 
frozen.
116
 Typical examples given by CESR include wash trades, painting the tape, 




2.3.1.3 Price positioning 
Price positioning manipulation
118
 is conducted through real transactions by a person or 
persons acting collaboration with the effect of securing the price of financial instrument. It 
belongs to trade-based manipulation that is discussed in Chapter 1. Market manipulation 
exploring this device is the most complex variant, because creating an artificial price level 
requires advantages in capital or stock possession, or the use of futures, options or 
derivatives. Therefore, more indicators are provided.  
In the first section Article 1(2) of Market Abuse Directive, second indent, price 
positioning could be conducted “by a person, or persons acting in collaboration, to secure 
a dominant position over the supply of or demand for a financial instrument which has the 
effect of fixing, directly or indirectly, purchase or sale prices or creating other unfair 
trading conditions”. Article 4 of Commission Directive and paragraph 5.10 of the first set 
of CESR guidance indicate more signals that might constitute market manipulation, such 
as considerable transactions undertaken within a short times pan leading to a price change 
which is subsequently reversed; the change of price caused by orders to trade given or 
transactions undertaken presenting a significant proportion of the daily volume or 
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transactions in the relevant financial instrument, or by persons with a significant buying or 
selling position. Typical examples of price positioning manipulation include marking the 
close, colluding in the aftermarket of an IPO, abusive squeeze, creation of a floor in the 
price pattern, excessive bid-ask spreads, and trading on one market to improperly position 
the price of a financial instrument on a related market.
119
  
2.3.1.4 Transactions involving fictitious devices or deception.  
The fourth variant of manipulation, provided in Article 1(2)(b) of Market Abuse Directive, 
is perpetrated by transactions involving fictitious devices or deceptions, using a 
combination of the transaction and information methods. However, this variant of market 
manipulation is usually confused with the second variant, manipulation by false or 
misleading transactions, sometimes even with the misinformation variant.
120
 A possible 
explanation might be that Article 1(2)(b) of Market Abuse Directive is designed to be a 
catch-all clause, so it is supposed to cover all manipulative behaviors which falls outside 
of the other three provisions.  
The most classic technique used in this case is orders or transactions are made preceded or 
followed by dissemination of false or misleading information or investment 
recommendations by the same person.
121
 “Scalping”, pump and dump, and trash and cash 
(opposite of pump and dump) are typical instances given by the CESR guidance. In 
practices, the number of “scalping” perpetrated by investment advisors is quite 
impressive.  
Article 5(b) of Directive 2003/124/EC provides that the person or person linked to him 
who makes orders or transactions before or after the dissemination of investment 
recommendation is possible involved in manipulation if the recommendations are 
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erroneous or biased or demonstrably influenced by material interest. None the less, what is 
a proper recommendation? Two elements are necessary: 1) information concerning the 
financial instruments to which that recommendation relates is fairly presented and, 2) 
interests or indicated conflicts of interest related are disclosed in a proper and efficient 
way.
122
 These criteria aim to ensure that, on the one hand, market participants’ risk of 
manipulation is minimized, and on the other hand, a high level of recommendation will 
protect investor interest.  
Another fictitious device popularly used in manipulation scheme is rumor. No matter true 
or false, the spreading of rumors causes damages to the market efficiency and investor 
confidence. Rumors reflecting true information may be caught by the insider dealing rules, 
while false rumors spread by opportunistic traders that gain from market prices being set at 
an artificial level fall into Article 1(2)(c).
123
  
2.4 Derogations to market manipulation prohibition  
The definition of market manipulation in EU legislation covers a quite broad scope. In 
case of prohibition abuse, Article 8 of Market Abuse Directive, accompanied by 
Commission Regulation 2273/2003, designs two safe harbours: stabilisation and buy-back 
programmes. Different from other acts concerning market abuse, these two defences are 
provided in the Regulation, the direct effect of which ensures greater legal certainty in 
implementation and application throughout the EU. Except for these two derogations 
shared with insider dealing, Accepted Market Practices (AMPs) as another defence is 
stipulated in Article 1(2)(a) for some forms of manipulative activities.  
Derogations to the market manipulation prohibition could greatly enhance market 
participants’ confidence considering that behaviours carried out in accordance with the 
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provisions do not bear the legal risk of being considered as abusive.
124
 Meanwhile, 
behaviours which do not satisfy conditions set out in the rules are not deemed to constitute 
market manipulations; however, they should be examined in pursuit to the related rules.  
2.4.1 Buy-back programmes 
Buy-back programmes means repurchase of own shares by a firm.
125
 It is an important but 
debatable issue in both company law and securities law, towards which the attitudes vary 
from one Member State to another. For those who oppose companies trading in own shares, 
they claimed that share buyback is a reduction of capital in essence, and therefore is 
against the principle of maintaining the capital provided in Directive 2010/30/EU.
126
 
Moreover, since the company has an absolute advantage of information about himself, it 
may perpetrate manipulative activities by trading its own shares.
127
  
However, those who support buy-back programmes believe that repurchase shares is an 
easy way to invest the surplus cash, to provide an exit-opportunity for shareholders 
(especially in merger process), to create additional demand for the firm’s shares so as to 
maintain its price at level reflecting its real value, and to use as pension or compensation 
plans for employees.
128
 The positive effects of trading in own shares are increasingly 
being recognized, and as a result, it becomes a permissive trend to accept or deregulate 
such transitions. Consisting with this trend, Market Abuse Directive adopts buy-back 
programmes as a justification for market abuse.  
2.4.1.1 Purposes of buy-back programmes 
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The scope of buy-back programmes provided in Regulation 2273/2003 is narrower than 
that in the company law, and its application should also comply with rules stipulated in 
Directive 2012/30/EU
129
. In order to benefit from this exception, behaviours carried out 
should solely serve three objectives and be subject to certain trading restrictions and 
disclosure requirements. Firstly, the purpose of buy-back programmes only include three 
situations: reducing the capital of an issuer, meeting obligations arising from debt 
financial instruments exchangeable into equity instruments, or allocating shares to 
employees concerning employee share option programmes.
130
  
2.4.1.2 Disclosure requirements of buy-back programmes 
Before the starting of trading, the company need a buy-back programme, in according to 
Article 21(1) of Directive 2012/30/EU, which comprises the objective, the maximum 
consideration, the maximum number of shares to be acquired and the authorised duration. 
Then the company must adequately disclose full details of the programme and subsequent 
changes, if there are, to the public in Member States in which it has requested admission of 
its shares to trading on a regulated market. Furthermore, during the execution of the 
programme, issuer must guarantee fulfilling its trade reporting obligation to the competent 
authority of regulated market on which the shares have been admitted to trade by certain 
mechanisms. And finally, such repurchases must be publicly disclosed no later than seven 
daily market sessions after the execution date.
131
  
2.4.1.3 Restrictions of buy-back programmes 
To start with, price restriction is stipulated in Article 5(1) of Regulation 2273/2003. The 
price that issuer repurchase its own shares or derivatives thereof must not be higher than 
the price of the last independent trade and the highest current independent bid on the 
                                                 
129
 Directive 2012/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on 
coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by 
Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 54 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, in respect of the formation of public limited liability companies and the 
maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent. 
130
 Regulation 2273/2003, Article 3.  
131
 Ibid, Article 4. 
        
51 




In the second place, the buy-back programmes should, generally, set a trading volume 
restriction, which must be less than a quarter of “the average daily volume of the shares in 
any one day on the regulated market on which the purchase is carried out”.133 But in 
particular situation, when the relevant market is extremely low of liquidity, the issuer 
could buy its shares more than 25% limit but less than 50% if adequate disclosure is made 
to the public and competent authority.
134
  
And finally, trading time restriction is used to forbid issuer to sell during the process of 
share buyback, or trade during the national trading market’s closed period issuer’s delayed 
inside information disclosure time. The trading time restrictions can be justified either in a 
time-scheduled buy-back programme or when investment firms or credit institutions has 
established effective information barriers (Chinese Wall) during certain time to ensure 
transactions made independent of the discretion of issuer.
135
  
In general, the conditions and restrictions set out for the application of buy-back 
programmes, on the one hand, aim to avoid abusive activities, as the repurchases of 
company will change the actual perceived value of asses of the firm;
136
 however, on the 
other hand, the narrow scope of allowable purpose of repurchases, at the same time, 
significantly restrict the defence’s application in practice. 
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2.4.2 Stabilisation 
Stabilisation means activities of purchasing or selling of a security for maintaining the 
price at an equilibrium level.
137
 Stabilisation per se is a market manipulative activity, 
which intends to induce potential investors to buy the offered security. Nevertheless, it is 
allowed in most countries considering the fact that such transitions could foster the 
distribution of the security, especially during Initial Public Offer (IPO), and promote the 
interest of issuers, underwriters, and shareholders.
138
 Given the obvious risk that the 
underwriter might use its information and statue advantages to benefit herself, strict 
limitations in provided in the Market Abuse Directive concerning the application of 
stabilisation.  
Stabilisation is provided in Article 8 of Market Abuse Directive. It is defined as temporary 
price support activities through purchase or offer to purchase transferable securities or 
associated instruments equivalent thereto by an underwriter due to a selling pressure in 
such securities.
139
 According to this definition, stabilisation as an exception to market 
manipulation does not include sell side trading, as it exclusively aims to prevent or retard 
the decline of the security price, which could only be achieved by purchases, rather than 
sells, of securities. However, this does not come to the conclusion that sell side trading is 




Given stabilization is a manipulative behaviour in nature, strict restrictions are imposed in 
order to avoid abusive application. Firstly, in terms of time limit, stabilisation should be 
carried out in a limited time after an initial or secondary offer of transferable securities. 
For shares and other securities equivalent to shares, it lasts no more than 30 calendar days 
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starting from the date of trading in IPO
141
 or the date of adequate public disclosure of the 
securities’ final price in the secondary offer. For bonds and other forms of securitised debt, 
the stabilizing time begins when adequate public disclosure of the terms of the offer of the 
relevant securities,
142
 and ends either no more than 30 calendar days after the date on 




Secondly, stabilisation is also subject to specific price conditions. Underwriters should not 
buy shares or equivalent instruments at a price more than the offering price or, when 
concerning convertible or exchangeable debts, the boundary is the market price at the 
disclosure time of new offer’s final terms.144  
And finally, two adequately public disclosures are required. One is made before the 
opening of the offer period of the relevant securities, with regard to stabilizing information 
such as the existence, objective, beginning and end time, identity of the stabilisation 
manger and the maximum size of any overallotment facility or greenshoe option if there is. 
The other disclosure is made one week at the end of the stabilisation period, mainly about 
the execution time and price. For better regulation of stabilisation, every detail of the 
stabilisation transactions should be reported to the competent authority issuers, offerors, 
entities undertaking the stabilisation, or persons on behalf of them.
145
 
Furthermore, ancillary stabilisation, which involves overallotment facility or “greenshoe 
option”, in addition to disclosure requirements provided in Article 9 of Regulation 
2273/2003, should be executed only during the subscription period and at the offer price, 
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and be restricted to 15% of the original offer size for greenshoe option and 5% of the 
original offer for naked short position.
146
 
2.4.3 Accepted Market Practices 
AMP is not a safe harbour like buy-back programmes or stabilisation. It is the “behaviour 
when dealing in financial markets that can reasonably be expected in one national market, 
for example, due to local, long-established customs while potentially constituting market 
abuse in others.”147 It serves to avoid punishing activities that could foster innovation and 
continued dynamic development in capital market caused by the broad scope of Article 
1(2)(a) of Market Abuse Directive.  
Even though AMP has the appearance of manipulation, it could be justified if certain 
circumstance and conditions are satisfied.
148
 For benefiting from this derogation, a person 
involving in speculative practices should establish that 1) he has a legitimate reason to 
make such transactions or bids and, 2) his transactions or bids conform to accepted market 
practices on the regulated market concerned.
149
 Since the adoption of Market Abuse 
Directive in 2003, 10 AMPs have been issued by 8 Member States. 6 of the total 10 AMPs 
are concerning “liquidity contracts”, allowing listed companies or closed-end collective 




However, AMPs generate several issues in practice. First of all, AMP defence is neither 
available in the absence of legitimate purpose, nor applicable when legitimate and illegal 
reasons are at the same time behind the manipulator’s conducts. Further question rises 
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concerning the interpretations of “legitimate reason”. Could the compliance with accepted 
market practices per se be presumed as having legitimate reason? No answer can be 
founded in relevant legislations or guidance.
151
  
In the second place, AMP is a national discretion, the constitute elements of which are 
decided by national legislations. Therefore, these elements vary among Member States 
considering different market size or supervisory rules. This raises a common concern. 
Significant legal uncertainty is generated for multi-listed issuers or intermediaries 
operating in multiple markets, because costs increase for the person who cannot do exactly 
the same practices in different markets that allow different AMPs. 
2.5 Liability regime of market manipulation 
Imposing suitable liability would, to a large degree, deter market participants from 
perpetrating manipulative activities. Generally speaking, civil, criminal and administrative 
liabilities are used to punish participants’ misconducts, in order to enhance market 
integrity and to increase investor confidence in different countries’ financial markets. 
Nevertheless, only administrative liability is harmonised at a minimum level in Market 
Abuse Directive, the other two are totally up to the decision of Member State.  
Before entering into force of Market Abuse Directive, not all regulators in the Member 
States had the right to impose administrative sanctions on manipulators. Administrative 
sanctions are considered as an effective way for preventing market manipulation by the 
EU legislations, and therefore, a harmonisation has been made.  
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2.5.1 An general requirement of administrative sanctions  
Article 14 of Market Abuse Directive provides a general harmonisation of administrative 
sanctioning regime in the EU. Firstly, appropriate administrative measures or sanctions 
should be imposed against the manipulators covered by the Directive and the persons who 
fail to cooperate in such investigation. Secondly, those measures or sanctions should be 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive. And lastly, the competent authority should 
disclose such administrative measures or sanctions unless this would seriously jeopardize 
the financial markets or cause disproportionate damage to the related parties.
152
  
Administrative sanctions could be imposed on be both natural and legal person by 
competent authority, while the former is relatively higher punished than the number of the 
latter from 2008 to 2010.
153
 And those measures imposed include pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary sanctions, such as reprimand or warning, temporary disqualification, and 
withdrawal of licenses.
154
 Moreover, most competent authorities managed to use serious, 




2.5.2 The constructive elements of administrative liability 
In order to imposing administrative measures on suspects of manipulative activities, the 
competent authorities need to prove:  
(a) There is one or more manipulative acts, which could be false or misleading trading, 
price positioning, transactions involving fictitious devices, or dissemination of false or 
misleading information provided in Article 1(2) of Market Abuse Directive;  
(b) Intent, “the person who made the dissemination knew, or ought to have known, that 
the information was false or misleading”,156 is a necessary element only for determination 
of manipulation by dissemination of false or misleading information. Since market 
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manipulation is defined by the effect-based approach, there is no need to prove whether 
the intention of the manipulative is to induce other investors to trade.
157
  
(c)  The price of, supply of or demand for financial instruments is effected by 
perpetrator’s activities; and  
(d) There is causation between the manipulative act and the price or supply and demand 
changes. Whether the person, except journalists, deriving, directly or indirectly, an 
advantages or profits his act is irrelevant with the imposition of sanctions.  
However, there are some issues concerning the administrative sanctioning regime. To 
begin with, difficulties exist in establishing links between market acts and outcomes, 
especially in the situation which requires an element of intention to be established.
158
 Also, 
the concept of “artificial or abnormal price” is obscure, so further interpretation is needed 
for a uniform application in the EU.  
And the last issue that deserves more words is about the derogations to manipulation by 
fictitious devices or deception. As mentioned before, this form of manipulation is designed 
as a catch-all type, so it is quite flexible and broadly applicable, or even may “overlap with 
the previous two categories in several respects” 159 . Although fictitious devices 
manipulation is also defined by the effect-based approach as fictitious or misleading 
trading or price positioning manipulation, it is not given the same derogation, AMPs. For 
this reason, it is quite risky that conducts, in particular the new developed and aggressive 
ones, may fall within the prohibition even if legitimate.  
2.6 Preventive measures of market manipulation  
Like the old adage says, preventing is better than curing. Efficient preventive measures 
will significant reduce the number of potential manipulation by cutting down the social 
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costs with regard to the detection or investigation of suspicious cases. And they could also 
enhance regulator’s enforcement efficiency considering useful information provided by 
insiders of a manipulator. Hence, a couple of preventive measures are provided in the 
market manipulation regime in EU.  
2.6.1 Continuous disclosure obligation 
Continuous disclosure obligation (or on-going disclosure obligation) is imposed on issuers 
in Article 6 of Market Abuse Directive, serving an ex-ante prophylactic function and 
working in tandem with ex-post enforcement and investigation framework.
160
 Combined 
with the disclosure regime provided in Directive 2004/109/EC (also known as 
Transparency Directive)
161
, it aims to ensure related information is provided to investors 
efficiently, accurately and timely. This will reduce the chance of spreading false or 
misleading information, and as a result, provide less opportunity for perpetrating 
manipulation. 
2.6.2 Obligations of market operators and professional organizations 
Except from issuers, market operators and professional organizations also have the 
obligation to prevent market manipulation. According to Article 6(6) of the Market Abuse 
Directive, market operators are required to adopt structural provisions, such as 
requirements concerning transparency of transactions concluded, total disclosure of 
price-regularisation agreements, and clear rules concerning transaction suspension, in 
order to prevent and detect market manipulation practices.
162
 
Furthermore, several prophylactic measures are recommended to professional economic 
actors, including “Chinese wall”, internal codes of conduct and other means aiming at 
combating market manipulations. In particular, the transaction reporting requirement 
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 contributes to deter manipulative practices. However, these 
measures are not compulsory, so it depends on the national law and choice of the 
professionals.  
2.6.3 Suspicious transaction reports 
The most important preventive measure introduced by Market Abuse Directive is 
suspicious transaction reports, which is also popular known as whistle-blower regime. 
Taking consideration of the large size and complexity of current financial markets, it is 
impossible for competent authorities to detect all possible manipulative practices. 
Therefore, useful information and evidences concerning suspicious transitions provided 
by reporters will play an effective role in helping regulators to detect more breaches that 
may have gone unnoticed, which has been proved in market manipulation investigation.
164
  
Suspicious transaction reports means that entities responsible for reporting suspicious 
transactions are the persons professionally arranging transactions. This regime is provided 
by Article 6(9) of Market Abuse Directive, Articles 7 to 11 of the Directive 2004/72/EC, 
part 5 of the first set of CESR guidance and part 2 of the third set of CESR guidance. 
According to related rules, some conditions are set out to ensure the efficiency of such 
reports. Firstly, the responsibility of a person to report doubtful trading is a case-by-case 
decision, but it’s certain that investment firms or credit institutions should do so.165  
Secondly, a reasonable suspect should be established when a person make notification to 
the competent authority.
166
 In terms of the criteria for determining the notifiable 
transactions, as recommended by CESR, an unexecuted trading order, on equity or 
non-equity regulated markets, raising suspicion of market manipulation shall be reported 
                                                 
163
 MiFID, Article 25(3): ”Member States shall require investment firms which execute transactions in any 
financial instruments admitted to trading on a regulated market to report details of such transactions to the 
competent authority as quickly as possible, and no later than the close of the following working day. This 
obligation shall apply whether or not such transaction were carried out on a regulated market...” 
164
 The third set of CESR guidance and information on the common operation of the Directive to the market, 
Reference CESR/09-219, p.8.  
165
 Market Abuse Directive, Article 6(9), and Directive 2004/72/EC, Article 1(3).  
166
 Generally speaking, the notification should be made to the competent authority in home Member State. 
But for branches, it is the competent authority in host Member States. Directive 2004/72/EC, Article 7.  
        
60 
to the competent authority when it is not already legally required on a national basis.
167
 
With regard to the contents of such notification, “any information which may have 
significance in reviewing the suspicious transactions” 168  should be reported and a 
non-exhausted and purely indicative list of examples is provided by ESMA
169
.  
Last but not least, in order to protect the person notifying suspicious transaction, the 
reports in good faith to the competent authority do not fall within professional secrecy and 
the competent authority should not disclose this person to anyone in case he would be 
harmed.
170
 The protection of reporter’s identity and privacy will keep them from 
retaliation, and encourage such actions.  
2.7 Supervision regime of market manipulation  
While EU now is the main rule maker of financial markets, supervision has long been the 
competence of Member States since outset.
171
 Supervision of market manipulation in the 
EU financial markets is generally based on two principles: the home State control 
principle, which determines the authority competent to ensure supervision, and mutual 
recognition principle, which guarantees the decisions of home State competent authority 
being recognized by the host country.
172
  
Market Abuse Directive makes endeavours to ensure a minimum degree of supervisory 
coordination and to allocate supervisory jurisdiction. However, with the arrival of 
European Securities and Market Authority (hereinafter referred as ESMA) in January 
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2011, the supervision system in securities markets has been changed dramatically. This 
new EU level supervisor plays a much more active role in supervisory area.   
2.6.1 Supervisory authority and its powers 
Considering the fact that regulatory authorities in Member States are of different 
responsibilities or powers will create confusion among economic actors,
173
 Market Abuse 
Directive requires that each Member State shall have a competent authority that is 
responsible for international collaboration and supervisory cooperation. According to the 
Directive, competent authority should be administrative nature, and has appropriate 
financing guaranteed by Member States. Consequently, they are more independent 
compared with economic actors considering the chance to avoid conflicts of interest.
174
   
In order to ensure supervisory effectiveness, a common minimum set of effective tools and 
powers for the national competent authorities is provided in Market Abuse Directive.
175
 
Competent authorities shall, at least, have: (a) investigatory powers, including having 
access to any document and receiving copies, demanding information from any person, 
requiring existing telephone number and existing data traffic records; and making on-site 
inspections;
176
 (b) supervisory measures, covering the cessation of any practices failing to 
comply with provisions in the Directive, suspending related financial instruments’ trading, 




However, Market Abuse Directive only makes a minimum harmonisation concerning 
powers of competent authorities, so different competent authorities still have substantial 
differences on the powers granted to them, “both in respect of what they can do by ways of 
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supervision and in respect of the enforcement actions (including sanctions) open to them 
when a firm is in breach of its duties”178.    
Furthermore, certain obligations concerning supervision are also provided for Member 
States and their competent authorities in Market Abuse Directive. The first one is that all 
persons, who have access to information during the exercise of professional duties related 
to the powers mentioned before, are subject to the obligation of professional secrecy. Such 
information covered by professional secrecy should not be disclosed unless in conformity 
with legal provisions.
179
 The other one is that judicial remedy for administrative decisions 
should be provided.
180
 These rules aim to prevent regulators and their officers from 
abusing powers, and offer a legal basis for seeking compensation in case it happens.  
2.6.2 Supervisory cooperation mechanism 
With the integration of financial markets in EU, the number of cross-border activities 
increases dramatically, which provide more opportunities for cross-border manipulation. 
Such kind of manipulative activities is hard to detect or punish by single supervisors. 
Therefore, cooperation among different parties becomes an essential requirement for 
establishing an efficient supervisory system for combating market manipulation. Market 
Abuse Directive has created a supervisory cooperation mechanism, which requires 
competent authorities in Member States to exchange information and to cooperate during 
investigation of market manipulation.  
The cooperation between national competent authorities is the foundation of EU market 
manipulation supervision. According to Article 16 of Market Abuse Directive, national 
competent authorities have the obligation to cooperate with each other whenever 
necessary in order to deliver their duties. Two most important ways to assist each other are 
information exchange and cooperation in investigation activities.  
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On the one hand, competent authority in one Member State should immediately gather and 
provide the information required by the other competent authority. If it fails to do so, 
justified reasons need to be provided. And intervention at EU level will also be made in the 




On the other hand, investigation of market manipulation is based on the principle of home 
Member State control. A competent authority shall notify the home State’s competent 
authority the fact that such misconducts is being carried out in the latter’s territory if he 
requires investigatory cooperation. The requiring competent authority may ask the home 
supervisor to have its personnel to follow the investigation. But the home Member State’s 
competent authority has the right to refuse such accompany if statutory reasons are 
provided; vice versa, it will be intervened by related EU authority.         
Furthermore, the EU supervisory authority plays as an arbitrator between competent 
authorities. It has the right to organize a discussion of national supervisors to settle 
disagreements between them when there is a refusal of information exchange or 
investigatory cooperation. Such discussion is taken place in order to reach a rapid and 
effective solution.
182
 However, the result of the discussion is not binding, which reduce 
the efficiency of this process.  
In wake of the global financial crisis, the cooperation system established by the Market 
Abuse Directive is proved to be inefficient. A financial supervisory reform is made and 
new EU supervisory authorities have been instituted. In terms of regulation of the 
securities market, ESMA takes the place of CESR, and the new powers of ESMA greatly 
enhance the effectiveness of the supervisory cooperation mechanism. Further details 
concerning changes made will be discussed in Chapter 4.  
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182
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Conclusion of Chapter 2 
Market manipulation regulation in EU is a success in general. The Market Abuse Directive 
and its implementing acts have realized their main objectives of enhancing financial 
market integrity and public confidence in the financial markets. A clear definition of 
market manipulation is provided by the EU legislation, which is further elaborated by 
possible signals and typical examples. This definition not only could covers manipulative 
practices that may come out in the future, but also help market participants and supervisors 
to understand what this hard concept means. In order to avoid overly prohibition, EU 
regulation stipulates two safe harbours, buy-back programmes and stabilisation, for all 
abusive actions and Accepted Market Practices (AMPs) for two specially forms of market 
manipulation.  
For a better supervision and enforcement, administrative liability of market manipulation 
is harmonised, and different constituent elements for different forms are also provided in 
the relevant regulations. Furthermore, a couple of preventive measures in the market 
manipulation regime, especially suspicious transaction reports, contribute to the 
deterrence of illegal behaviours in the financial market. And finally, a convergence 
supervision regime is stipulated. Competent authorities in Member States are designed and 
certain powers are granted to them to ensure a better supervision on manipulations.  
However, further improvements concerning the market manipulation regulation should be 
made. Definition of market manipulation is not totally clear, as the distinction between 
different forms is ambiguous at some degree. And some types of manipulation have 
overlaps, but they do not enjoy the same derogations. Further, AMPs vary form Member 
State to Member State, which would cause confusion for market participants and then 
decrease their willingness to do cross-border activities. Moreover, the deficiencies of 
liability and supervision regime may affect the efficiency of manipulation rules. All these 
show the necessity of a reform to the current market manipulation regulation, and details 
of the reform will be discussed in the Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.           
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Chapter 3 Reform of the EU Market Manipulation Regime: Part (1) reasons of the 
reform and legal framework changes 
Market Abuse Directive has played an important role in combatting market manipulation 
and insider dealing since it came into force in 2004. The harmonised regulation is 
generally considered as a success for protecting the reasonable function of financial 
market and for enhancing investors’ confidence.183 Although significant improvements 
have been made by this Directive, the current market manipulation regulation is not 
sufficiently effective, in particular given the role that manipulative behaviours played in 
the global financial crisis.
184
 
Therefore, a review of market manipulation regulation (also the whole market abuse 
regulation) was initially undertaken by the European Commission in 2007, after CESR 
published the ‘Report on Administrative Measures and Sanctions as well as the Criminal 
Sanctions available in Member States under the Market Abuse Directive’ at the request of 
the Commission. Then two public consultations were launched on 20 April 2009 and 28 
June 2010 respectively. Taking into account of the contributions collected from interested 
parties and report proposed by ESME, proposals for a Regulation on insider dealing and 
market manipulation (market abuse) (Market Abuse Regulation), and for a Directive on 
criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation were adopted by the 
Commission on 20 October 2011.  
Then, in the wake of the Libor scandal, the prohibition of benchmarks manipulation is 
proved to be necessary, so amendments concerning such prohibition are made in the draft 
Regulation and Directive on 25 July 2012. And finally, Regulation No 596/2014 on 
market abuse (Market Abuse Regulation) and Directive 2014/57/EU on criminal sanctions 
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for market abuse (Market Abuse Directive) were published in the EU Official Journal on 
22 June 2014. The Market Abuse Regulation shall enter into application in July 2016, 
while the Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse will be transposed into national 
law by Member States in two years.  
The new package of market abuse regulations shares the same aims as Market Abuse 
Directive, namely to ensure the integrity and transparency of the EU financial markets and 
to enhance investor confidence. However, it keeps pace with market developments, 




3.1 Why market manipulation regime needs to be reviewed in EU? 
3.1.1 Regulatory gaps as the developments of new trading platforms and technologies 
3.1.1.1 Market fragmentation leads to regulatory gaps 
Current market manipulation regulation only covers an instrument, which is admitted to 
trading on a regulated market, no matter on which platform its real transactions are carried 
out.
186
 It means that a trading will not be caught by the prohibition, if the instrument is not 
admitted to trade on a regulated market but is only traded on a Multilateral Trading 
Facilities (MTF), Organized Trading Facilities (OTF, such as swap execution facilities or 
broker crossing systems) or Over-The-Counter (OTC).
187
 At the time when Market Abuse 
Directive was adopted, regulated market is in the dominant position for trades of financial 
instruments. Unfortunately, this situation has changed in the past few years, particularly 
after the adoption of MiFID. New emerging trading platforms attract more and more 
investors and capital raisers than before, thus, the dominant status of traditional trading 
venues were threated.  
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 Commission staff working paper, “Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment”, SEC(2011) 1218 
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For example, traditional exchanges or regulated markets accounted for around 60% of the 
total distribution of trading in the European market in 2008, whereas at the end of 2011, 
this number dropped to about 45%. In the meantime, MTF has acquired near 15% percent 
of the business in three years with the advent of MiFID. Besides, OTC-trading represented 
a high and stable market share around 40%.
188
 Not to mention the international derivatives, 
the total amount of trading volume on OTC market is 6 times more than that on exchanges 
from January 2008 to November 2011. What’s more, a notable number of shares and 
bonds, which fall outside the regulation of market manipulation as they are not listed on 
the exchanges, only trades on MTFs.   
As a result, financial instruments only traded on non-regulated markets are particularly 
susceptible to market manipulation. For example, according to the annual report published 
by German competent authority, German Federal Financial Services Authority (BaFin), at 
the beginning of June 2011, this category of cases represented over 90% of market 
manipulation cases investigated, compared with 69% in the previous year.
189
 Therefore, 
with the increasing importance of MTF, OTF and OTC, the current regulatory scope of 
trading platforms is not sufficient to ensure an even playing level and protection of 
investor’s confidence. 
3.1.1.2 Increasing cross-market trades increase regulatory pressure 
In order to satisfy various needs of capital raisers and investors, rules of different types of 
trading platforms concerning prospectus, information disclosure and surveillances vary 
from each other. Yet the connections between different platforms are becoming much 
closer with the development of derivative products. And this increases the possibility of 
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market manipulation, as a potential manipulator may take advantage of less stricter rules in 
one trading platform to affect another.  
For example, a manipulator could succeed to use a derivative instrument traded on OTC, 
such as credit default swap (CDS), which is not covered by Market Abuse Directive, to 
manipulate a related financial instrument covered by the Directive on an exchange.
190
 
Unfortunately, such situation does not fall into prohibition of market manipulation 
according to Market Abuse Directive.  
3.1.1.3 New technologies make market manipulation harder to detect 
The technological innovations not just help the financial market to become more economic 
and efficient, but also make it more complex and harder to supervise. The universal 
adoption of automate trading methods in European financial markets, in particular 
algorithmic trading or high frequency trading (HFT), requires the Union and national 
competent authorities to have specific arrangements or regulation to ensure the prevention 
of market abuse.
191
 For instance, Germany adopted the High-Frequency Trading Act on 




HFT is a quite fiercely discussed topic, raises a lot of concern on the automated trading 
forms. It is a type of algorithmic trading, typically not a strategy per se but a usage of very 
sophisticated technology to implement traditional trading strategies, such as arbitrage and 
market making strategies. HFT is relatively new and does not have a uniform definition
193
, 
which, if carried out, is likely to constitute market abuse. According to the guideline issued 
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by ESMA, market manipulation is very likely to happen in four cases: ping orders, quote 
staffing, momentum ignition, layering and spoofing.
194
  
Although HFT contributes to increase market liquidity, to reduce volatility in most 
circumstances and to enhance price discovery, it is also responsible for May 2010 flash 
crash, knight Capital case in the US, and the Norwegian Robot case. Currently, about 30% 
of all activity is operated by HFT in European equity markets
195
, so it is wise to elaborate 
market manipulation regime to make sure manipulations through HFT could be correctly 
treated.  
3.1.2. Gaps in the regulation of commodity markets and commodity derivatives markets 
Manipulation may take place on commodity markets and related commodity derivatives 
markets.
 196
 An introduction of market manipulation prohibition for physical is 
recommendable, considering the damages made by manipulators in the market.
197
 
However, it is not wise to apply the same rules for commodities manipulation and 
securities manipulation. On the one hand, the functions of financial market and physical 
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market and related derivatives market are quite different from each other.
198
 And on the 
other hand, rules of the commodity markets need to be made according to different 
characters of commodities, in particular for the energy market. 
Nevertheless, interconnections between commodity markets and related financial markets 
are highly strong. Illegal benefits could be made by using important information of a spot 
market to speculate the price of an instrument traded on a financial market. This means 
that investors in commodity derivatives may be less protected than investors in derivatives 
traded on financial markets, as the Market Abuse Directive does not apply to transactions 
of commodities and related derivatives, except those derivatives which are admitted to 
trade on a regulated market.
199
 The ignorance of significant influence from physical 
markets on financial markets is, therefore, considered as a big loophole in market 
manipulation regulation. This becomes one of the most important parts of the Market 
Abuse Directive review concerning whether and how to introduce a suitable market 
manipulation framework for physical markets.  
3.1.3 Unclarity and impropriety in market manipulation regime 
Market Abuse Directive gives a large scope of options and discretions for Member States 
to implement it, which has led to uniform and ambiguous applications. This situation is 
worsened by the fact that Market Abuse Directive’s adoption did not benefit from useful 
public consultations that may help EU acts to reduce inconsistences in enforcement. In 
order to create an integrated market manipulation regime in EU, those unclear and 
ambiguous rules should be identified and amended.  
3.1.3.1 The definition of market manipulation is partially unclear 
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It is at large a success for EU legislation to give a formal definition of market manipulation. 
Despite the fact that this concept is defined in a wise way, combining a general definition 
with detailed sub-definitions, confusions still exist. The first problem is concerning 
overlaps among sub-definitions. Manipulation only based on transitions or orders 
provided in Article 1(2)(a) of the Market Abuse Directive and manipulation based on 
fictitious devices or other forms of deception provided in Article 1(2)(b) are both defined 
by the effect-based approach. In practice, these two categories of manipulations cover a 
large-scale of misconducts. For avoiding the punishment of desirable activities in the 
financial markets, except from buy-back programmes and stabilization, AMP as a special 
derogation is provided for the former category, while the latter one could not benefit from 
it. Accordingly, a behaviour, which has caused influence of a financial instrument through 
execution of transactions or placing orders without intention to manipulation, might also 
be caught by current regulation.  
Also, scalping perpetrated by investment advisors through recommendation is commonly 
considered as a typical example of information-based manipulation in other countries and 
illegal intention of manipulating financial instrument is an essential element of such 
manipulation. Since investment advisors are not insiders, their recommendation or analyst 
is made basing on public resources and their own abilities, which is impossible to avoid 
mistakes. So it is necessary to consider the intention of a perpetrator when making a 
judgment. As a result, it is better for balancing prohibition of manipulation and protection 
of investment advisors if this form of manipulation is provided in Article 1(2)(c) rather 
than Article 1(2)(b), in pursuit of which intent of inducing trading is not a necessary 
condition.  
The second problematic issue is with regard to unclear key concepts. Article 1(2)(a) 
stipulates that transactions or orders to trade which “secure” the price of one or several 
financial instruments at an “abnormal or artificial level” should be prohibited. The 
interpretation of “secure” is disputable in practice. Given that the price of a financial 
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instrument could be influenced by various elements, it is very hard to verify that the price 
is “secured” at an abnormal or artificial level by manipulative behaviours. With the 
advanced technologies, trades of investment instruments could be transited within seconds, 
so the artificial or abnormal prices may just be set in a very short time. A few seconds is 
enough for manipulators to get illegal profits, while it is difficult for the regulators to 
collect evidence. Therefore, in order to fall within Article 1(2)(a), whether it requires the 
price of one or more financial instruments which considered to have been fixed at an 
abnormal or artificial level, must maintain an abnormal or artificial level for more than a 
certain duration. 
This question is answered by the Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU) in the case of 
IMC Securities
200
. CJEU ruled that securing the price of the financial instrument or 
instruments does not need to maintain it at an abnormal or artificial level for more than a 
certain duration, and it is sufficient if the speculative conduct “has led to the setting of the 
price of one or more financial instruments at an abnormal or artificial level in order for it 
to come within the meaning of market manipulation.”201 
Another key concept is concerning “abnormal or artificial level or price”. This concept is 
in the central for defining market manipulation based on trading or orders, however, 
neither the EU legislation nor case law of CJEU has ever tried to give a clear answer. And 
the last critical concept is “false or misleading information”. What are the criteria of 
“misleading”? Is the factually correct information included? Whether rumour falls within 
such kind of information? All these issues could not find satisfied solution in current 
market manipulation regulation.  
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As these key concepts concerning market manipulation are not clearly provided by the EU 
legislations, Member States have many differences during their implementations, and 
therefore the uniformity of the EU market manipulation regime is affected.  
3.1.3.2 Derogations for market manipulation are quite arguable 
In terms of buy-back programs, the major argument focuses on its narrow legal intention. 
In order to benefit from this safe harbour, only three purposes of shares repurchases are 
permissible, which are reducing the issuer’s capital, meeting obligations arising from debt 
financial instruments exchangeable into equity instruments, or allocating shares to 
employees concerning employee share option programs. This scope is narrower than that 
provided in company law. As a result, many private parties strive for adding more legal 
reasons to buy-back programs, such as delivering the payment of dividends through shares 
to shareholders, or purchasing own shares to hold them for future merger or acquisition, 
which is an AMP in Greece and France.
202
  
With regard to the other safe harbour, stabilization, its various applications among 
Member States is the central issue. Even though stabilization is provided in regulation 
with direct binding effect rather than directive, its implementing rules diverge across the 
Member States, including issues concerning whether the stabilization of debt securities is 
available, when and what kind of information stabilization should disclose. Furthermore, 
information disclosure relating to stabilization involving more than one Member States is 
costly, as related information has to be published separately in line with different local 
rules
203
. A concern about these differences is raised by market participators during the 
Commission’s public consultation, and further resolutions should be provided to secure 
the integrity of financial market rules.  
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The last issue concerns Accepted Market Practices (AMP). The recognition of AMP 
totally depends on competent authorities in each Member States, which leads to 
divergences in the practice. Although many parties argued that AMP should remain a 
national decision, custom-made according to market size, supervisory rules or other 
standards, it still harms the integrity of market manipulation regulation in the EU level. It’s 
true that AMPs should be made in accordance with each market’s special situations, 
however, it will be better to harmonize it at EU level in case of further divergence, 
especially when the situations in many trading markets are similar. For example, “liquidity 
contracts” is quasi a common circumstance that AMP is made, so a harmonisation of 
technical rules at EU lever is a better choice.  
3.1.4 Non-efficient enforcement by national regulators 
Even the most delicate regulation will not be effective if lacks of sufficient enforcement. 
Although Market Abuse Directive has harmonized the powers of competent authorities at 
a certain level, substantial differences still exit among them, “both in respect of what they 
can do by ways of supervision and in respect of the enforcement action, including 
sanctions”.204 Just as the response of Borsa de Luxembourg to the Commission’s public 
consultation regarding Market Abuse Directive reform, “significant improvement is 
needed in the fights against market abuse in EU. However, regulatory or legislative action 
at European level will not change the current state of play in our view. Solutions have to 
be found at the supervisory and operational level. Enforcement action is the key in this 
respect.”205 And two main points could be concluded to explain inefficient enforcement 
of market manipulation regulation in the Union. 
3.1.3.1 Different powers of competent authorities in the pre-investigation-phase 
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Pre-investigative-phase “covers actions to identify any abnormal moves on the market 
based on surveillance and complaints”.206 It is the beginning of an action against market 
manipulation. A national competent authority may not efficiently make a detection of 
suspicious market abuse if he is lack of some useful powers. Although Market Abuse 
Directive has made a harmonisation concerning the powers of competent authorities, not 
all of them enjoy the necessary resources to discover market manipulation.  
Particularly, some competent authorities do not enjoy the power to have access to 
information of new trading platforms. The fragmentation of financial markets provides a 
chance for manipulators to speculate an instrument traded on regulated market through 
manipulating another related derivative on MTF, OTF or OTC. Taking account of the 
growing percentage of trading taken on them, it is reasonable for the competent authority 
to have access to information on these markets. However, the practical application is quite 
different among Member States, only some of them have full or part power concerning this 
information. This could be seen from Table 1, which shows the practical differences of 
competent authorities’ power under Market Abuse Directive for dealing with market 
manipulation in MTF market.  
Table 1: Competent Authority’s Power under Market Abuse Directive in MTF207 
Power under MAD in MTFs  
Full power on all MTFs 3 MSs (SP, HU, NL) + Iceland 
Partial power on all MTFs 8 MSs (AT, LT, LU, NO, PO, PT, 
SE, SK) 
Full power on some MTFs 2 MSs (EL, MT) 
Partial power on some MTFs 6 MSs (BE, DE, FI, FR, IT, UK)  
                                                 
206
 ESMA Report, “Actual Use of Sanctioning Power under MAD”, 26 April 2012, ESMA/2012/270, 
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No power 8 MSs (BG,CY, CZ, EE, IE, LV, 
RO, SI) + Demark 
3.1.3.2 Some competent authorities are lack of powers in the investigative phase 
Investigatory powers of competent authorities vary from Member State to Member State 
in practice despite improvement has been by the Market Abuse Directive, especially 
concerning the actual enjoyment of the power to require existing telephone and existing 
data traffic records. Existing telephone and existing data traffic records are among the 
most useful methods for national supervisors to make a successfully investigation 
concerning market manipulation. Given the high possibility of infringement of the privacy 
right when exercising this right, competent authorities, however, are required to use it with 
limitations, or even have right to use it.  
For example, according to Dutch law, the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets 
(AFM) could not actually exercise all the powers provided in Article 12(2) of the Market 
Abuse Directive, including demand information from any person concerned, access to 
telephone and existing data traffic records, and etc.
208
 This view is also shared, more or 
less, by regulators in other Member States. Therefore, removing the uncertainties with 
regard to this power is appreciated by almost all the public authorities, according to the 
contributions that they provided in the 2009 consultation on the review of Market Abuse 
Directive.      
3.1.3.3 Sanctioning powers for market manipulation diverge in the EU and are lack of 
deterrent effect in some Member States  
Sanctioning is the last guarantee of an effective enforcement, a coherent application of 
which in EU-wide is critical to fight against market manipulation and then to maintain the 
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integrity and order functioning of the financial markets.
209
 The rules provided in the 
Market Abuse Directive are far from enough to realize these objectives. And defections 
relating to the sanctioning powers could be discussed from three aspects.  
The first aspect is concerning the incoherency actual use of administrative sanctioning 
powers in the EU. According to ESMA’s report on the actual use of sanctioning powers 
under MAD in 2012, two competent authorities of Member States, Demark and Sweden, 
could not give rise to administrative sanctions neither on nature person nor on legal person 
when dealing with market manipulation. Even for competent authorities who are able to 
impose administrative sanctions, the way and conditions to use this power vary from each 
other. Further, the divergences among national regulators could also be revealed by the 
number of actual sanctions made, types of administrative measures, level of sanctions, and 
factors that need to be considered when sanctioning, which are generally showed in the 
following Table 2. 
Table 2: Differences of the actual use of administrative sanctioning power for dealing 
with market manipulation in Member States (except Croatia)
210
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 Niamh Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 
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YES NO  






More than 1 case 0 case N/A 
22 MS 3 MS (Ireland, 
Luxembourg, 
Slovakia) 
2 MS (Demark, Sweden) 
types of Pecuniary sanctions Non-Pecuniary  
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 From this table, it is not difficult to see the differences in exercising administrative power 
for punishing market manipulation among competent authorities in Member States. And 
this badly infringes the effectiveness of the EU-level market manipulation regulation, as 
manipulators might take advantage of the lenient sanctioning regime in a Member States.     
The second aspect relates to incoherent criminal sanctions to market manipulation. 
Criminal sanctions usually have greater deterrent effect than administrative and civil 
punishment. The fear of criminal prosecution, possible imprisonment and related moral 
condemnation may keep potential perpetrators from carrying out market manipulation.
211
 
Therefore, a harmonized criminal sanction regime at EU level is considered as a good way 
to enhance effectiveness of market manipulation regulation by the European Commission.  
However, rules concerning criminal sanctions to market manipulation in Member States 
are quite different from each other. Currently, manipulative activities could be imposed 
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criminal sanctions in 23 Member States, while market manipulation is a criminal offence 
in Austria only if the same facts constitute fraud, and the remained 3 Member States, 
Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Slovenia, do not approve giving rise to criminal sanction.
212
 
Consequently, manipulators may benefit from such regulatory difference to avoid 
punishment.  
The last aspect is about private-law claims or civil liability. Civil compensation could be 
an efficient supplement to administrative and criminal sanctions based on three reasons: a) 
civil enforcement is brought by private parties, so there is no need for the competent 
authorities or other public parties to establish evidences, which will save a large number of 
social resources; b) the level of proof in civil case is lower than that in criminal case, 
therefore, manipulators would be punished at a higher chance; and c) the large 
compensation that needs to be paid once the private parties won the case, particularly in 




Despite civil liability is accepted by more and more countries as an effective way to deter 
market manipulation, it is still not a common choice of all Member States in the EU. For 
example, a claim for damages based on a breach of the prohibition of market manipulation 
is denied in Germany according to the principles developed by the German Federal 
Supreme Court, which takes the view that market manipulation prohibition in the German 
Securities Act is primarily aimed at ensuring the proper functioning of the markets for 
securities rather than a protective law for the purposes of German Civil Code.
214
 
Therefore, it will be very hard to harmonise the civil sanctioning regime in the Union.  
3.1.3.4 Inefficient whistleblowing regime 
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 reduces the clear-up rate for market manipulation. 
Whistleblowers, usually the company insiders, may come across evidence of market 
manipulation during their daily works, so they probably can find some evidences which 
are hard to detect from outside and save more resources when collecting information.
216
 
Whistleblower tips are becoming almost the most efficient way to combat market 
manipulation or financial fraud in these days. It contributes to 54.1% of the detection of 
uncovered fraud schemes in the listed corporations in the USA and this number is about 6 
times to that detected by external auditors and the SEC exam team together.
217
 Although it 
is also considered to be very useful and helpful by competent authorities in Member States 
in the EU
218
, the whistleblowing case number is very low in EU.  
Despite the market structure and culture differences, this is partially caused by insufficient 
protections and incentives for the potential whistle-blowers. The regime on the basis of 
Market Abuse Directive and its implementing Directive 2004/72/EC focuses on the 
notification obligation of a whistle-blower and the main contents of the notification, while 
protection of the whistleblower from retaliation is only a generally provision. Such 
arrangement will significantly undermine related a person’s motivation to report 
suspicious transactions, as they may face discrimination or loss of jobs if their notification 
is discovered.  
Besides, current whistleblowing regime in the Union is not applicable to OTC derivatives. 
Given the big influence and complexity of derivatives, whistleblowing could play a more 
important role in the prevention of market manipulation in the related markets. 
Consequently, improving the whistle-blower regime is going to be an efficient and 
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economical way to help national supervisors to detect manipulation cases in the financial 
market.  
3.2. Structure Reform: from Directive to Regulation 
The current market manipulation regulation is mainly based on EU directives, which need 
Member States’ transposition to be applicable. Because of the discretion, the actual market 
manipulation regime in Member States is quite different from each other. Therefore, a 
structure reform is made by the EU legislators.  
After the reform, the Market Abuse Regulation will totally take place of Market Abuse 
Directive and its implementing directives, which means that the main legislative act for 
regulating market manipulation will be a regulation rather than a directive. As an EU 
regulation, Market Abuse Regulation has e direct effect in all Member States,
219
 the 
implementation of which does not further enactment of domestic legislation. Member 
states, however, will need to amend or repeal the provisions in their national law with 




As a level 1 legal framework of the Lamfalussy four-level procedure, most of the key areas 
of the Market Abuse Regulation are to be supplemented by detailed technical standards to 
be prepared by ESMA for approval by the Commission. These second level acts will 
provide detailed requirements that market participants and advisors need to comply with. 
“The full impact of the new regime, and the compliance procedures that will need to be put 
in place, will therefore not be clear until these technical standards have been finalised.”221  
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The structure change, from a directive to a regulation, seeks to create a single and directly 
applicable rulebook of EU market manipulation, reduce the divergences that arise from the 
transposition of a Union Directive to national legislations, and provide more legal 




Furthermore, a new Directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market 
manipulation is also adopt by the EU. It is a complement to Market Abuse Regulation by 
introducing minimum rules on criminal offences and criminal sanctions for market 
manipulation. Member States have the option to retain or adopt more stringent criminal 
law provisions. Except from Demark and the UK, other Member States will need to 
transpose this Directive into their national legislations.  
3.3. Substantial reform: expansion of the scope of market manipulation regime in 
terms of trading venues and products  
In the last decade, investment instruments have increasingly traded on non-regulated 
markets, and new types of financial products have attracted more and more investors. 
However, the lenient rules concerning these new trading platforms and investment 
instruments provide a good opportunity for manipulators. Therefore, Market Abuse 
Regulation greatly expands the scope of market manipulation regime to deal with this 
situation compared with that provided in Market Abuse Directive.  
3.3.1. Expansion of trading venues subject to the market manipulation regime 
According to Market Abuse Regulation, the new market manipulation regime will apply to 
trading on all European Economic Area (EEA for short) trading facilities, including 
regulated markets, multilateral trading facilities (MTFs), organized trading facilities 
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 whereas the current regime applies only to trading on a regulated market 
within EU
225
. This change means an end to the divergences in the application of market 
manipulation rules concerning MTF or OTF in Member States, as well as the situation that 
competent authorities is lack of supervisory power on MTF or OTF as those showed in 
Table 1.  
Besides, an OTC may also be covered by the market manipulation regime if the price or 
value of a financial instrument traded on a regulated market, on a MTF or on an OTF, 
depends on or has an effect on the price or value of an instrument traded on the OTC.
226
 
Furthermore, a commodity market may also fall into the market manipulation prohibition 
according to Market Abuse Regulation. Market manipulation regulation does not intend to 
govern directly the commodity market, which is identical with the majority opinion 
contributed during the call for evidence for the review of Market Abuse Directive.
227
 
However, the regime applies if transactions, orders to trade or other behaviour relating to 
spot commodity contracts has or is likely or intended to have an effect on a financial 
instrument covered by the Regulation.
228
  
This new amendment is an appropriate way to make up the regulatory loophole in 
commodities and related derivatives markets. But certain concerns are raised after this 
change, such as, the allocation of allocation of supervisory responsibilities between 
ESMA and the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER)
229
, or the 
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possibility that market participants may be subject to multiple and differing obligations as 




3.3.2 Expansion of products subject to the market manipulation regime 
Compared with Market Abuse Directive, the new Regulation will make significant 
improvement concerning the scope of market manipulation regime in terms of products. 
On the one hand, Market Abuse Regulation unifies the meaning of “financial instrument” 
in Market Abuse Regulation and in MiFIR
231
, which mitigates the confusion for financial 
market participants. On the other hand, the prohibition of market manipulation is extended 
to transitions, orders to trade or other behaviour relating to new types of financial 
instrument, spot commodity contracts and benchmarks.
232
  
3.3.2.1 Special types of financial instruments 
Some types of financial instruments, in particular derivative contracts or derivative 
instruments for the transfer of credit risk (hereinafter referred as credit derivatives), the 
transaction, order or behaviour of which has or is likely or intended to have an effect on 
spot commodity contracts or on a financial instrument traded on regulated market, on MTF, 
or OTF.
233
 Market Abuse Regulation catches the manipulation perpetrated by speculating 
derivatives on OTC or by manipulating contracts on spot commodity market, in order to 
fill the loophole in Market Abuse Directive because of the development of multi-level 
financial markets.  
3.3.2.2 Spot commodity contracts 
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Spot commodity contracts, which are not wholesale energy products, may also be covered 
by the new market manipulation regime, if the transaction, order or behaviour of such 
contracts has or is likely or intended have an effect on a financial instrument that traded on 
a regulated market, on MTF, or on OTF.
234
 Considering the high interconnection between 
commodity markets and related derivative markets, cross-market manipulation may take 
place by transactions in the spot market which is used to manipulate derivatives markets, 
or vice versa.
235
 The regulatory gap concerning this situation is filled by Market Abuse 
Regulation.  
3.3.2.3 Benchmarks 
Benchmark is “any commercial index or published figure calculated by the application of 
a formula to the value of one or more underlying assets or to prices by reference to which 
the amount payable under a financial instrument is determined”236. Benchmark indexes 
are used widely as a reference rate for the pricing of many financial instruments, such as 
interest rate swaps. Therefore, manipulation of benchmark would cause a serious impact 




Since the Libor (the London inter-bank offered rate) and Euribor (The Euro Interbank 
Offered Rate) scandals
238
 break out in 2011, benchmark manipulation raised a worldwide 
concern. However, this type of manipulation is neither covered in Market Abuse Directive 
or in the proposal adopted in October 2011, so an immediate amendment was made in 
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order to add benchmark manipulation into market manipulation prohibition.
239
 It is now 
provided in the Market Abuse Regulation that, any manipulative behaviour in relation to 
benchmark will be prohibited.
240
 Further, manipulation of benchmark will be subject to 
criminal sanction if it is serious and perpetrated with intent.  
3.3.2.4 Emission allowances 
According to the reclassification of “financial instrument” made in MiFIR, emission 
allowances is a type of financial instrument, which will be covered by the new market 
manipulation regime. it is forbidden to buy or sell on secondary market of emission 
allowances or related derivatives prior to the legal auction with the effect of fixing the 
auction clearing price for the auctioned products at an abnormal or artificial level or 
misleading bidders bidding in the auctions.
241
  
3.4. Substantial Reform: Refined definition, new prohibition and detailed 
derogations  
3.4.1 A refined definition of market manipulation 
Market Abuse Regulation, like the Market Abuse Directive, adopts the effects-based 
approach, defining market manipulation in terms of trading practices (Article 12(1)(a) 
and (b)) and dissemination of false or misleading information (Article 12(1)(c)).
242
 
However, improvements have been made concerning its supportive rules.  
In order to build market understanding of market manipulation, Market Abuse 
Regulation brings most of the indicators, signals and examples of possible market 
manipulation, which are provided in the amplified directives of Market Abuse Directive 
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and CESR guidance, into the Regulation and its Annex. This change could ensure the 
definition of market manipulation highly detailed and directly applicable.  
Market manipulation defined in the Market Abuse Regulation, except from the three 
sub-definitions, is supported by Article 12(2), which sets out the types of behaviour that 
will be considered as market manipulation, including abusive squeezes
243
, marking the 
opening or close
244
, manipulation concerning algorithmic and high frequency trading
245
, 
information-based abuse (taking advantage of occasional or regular access to the 
traditional or electronic media)
246
, and specific behaviours in the emission allowance 
market
247
. Further, this definition is also supported by the non-exhausted list of 
indicators provided in Annex 1 of Market Abuse Regulation. Indicators concerned 
generally map the rules in CESR guidance, which should not be considered as market 
manipulation unless there are no legitimate reasons.  
In general, Market Abuse Regulation refines the definition of market manipulation by 
bring much of the administrative rulebook into the Regulation, which reduce regulatory 
divergence and ensure a clear and directly binding legal regime.
248
  
3.4.2 An additional prohibition of market manipulation 
It is commonly accepted that manipulative behaviours are always difficult to prove. 
Although the adoption of effect-based approach for defining market manipulation has 
reduced the regulator’s burden of proof regarding the mental element, there still are 
situations where the actual effect on the market has not been achieved perpetrators, which 
is uneasy to be determined as manipulation. For this reason, an expressly prohibition of 
attempted market manipulation would be a helpful way to enhance the enforcement of 
market manipulation prohibition. In particular, attempted market manipulation will be 
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useful for supervisors of commodity markets, where enforcement action is not easy to 
bring because of multi reasons for price movements.  
Attempted market manipulation is a strong deterrent of market offence. However, in order 
to avoid punishing behaviours that have no concrete or potential aptitude to rig financial 
instruments’ price, attempted market manipulation should be delicately defined, as 




According to Article 12 and 15 as well as recital 46 and 47 of Market Abuse Regulation, 
an attempt to engage in market manipulation may comprise (a) attempting to enter into a 
transaction, trying to place an order to trade or trying to engage in any other trade-based 
manipulative behaviour, and (b) attempting to disseminate information as defined in 
information-based manipulation.  
Unfortunately, this definition is not well defined. Firstly, the general prohibition of 
“attempting to enter into a transaction” and “trying to place an order” probably include any 
trader in the capital market, which would be useless in practice. Second, mens rea element 
should be clearly provided. As the obscure border between legal commercial activities and 
manipulative practices, it is necessary to give a relatively high threshold of intention to 
guarantee a secured regulatory environment for market participants.  
Furthermore, there seems is a contradiction in the current regime. As the trade-based 
market manipulation provided in Article 8(1)(a) is effect-based not intent-based, while the 
judgment of an attempted based-trade manipulation will unavoidable to evaluate the 
intention, so it is just like what Association française des marchés financiers (AMAFI) 
claimed that “There is no such thing as an attempt at market manipulation but only actual 
                                                 
249
 See contributions provided by Association française des marchés financiers (AMAFI), Associazione 
Italiana Intermediari Mobiliari (ASSOSIM) for the 2010 public consultation on the review of the market 
abuse directive hold by the European Commission, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2010/mad_en.htm, last visited on 5 March 2015.  
        
89 
manipulations. The challenge is to move away from the criterion of impact on the price to 
other criteria that regulators could use to qualify the abuse.”250  
Attempted market manipulation actually is a supplement to market manipulation, aiming 
to catch manipulative behaviours that could not be proved by the regulators with the 
latter’s strict criteria. Yet, what could be a suitable definition for attempted market 
manipulation? It would be appropriate for regulators to take actions when they could not 
prove or hard to prove that a person has caused an artificial or abnormal price of a financial 
instrument, while it can be proven that a person (a) has had an intention to manipulate, (b) 
has executed transactions, place orders, or disseminating false or misleading information 
and, (c) has had an impact on the price.
251
   
3.4.3 Increasing legal certainty of derogations to market manipulation 
Derogations afford defences to behaviours that would otherwise amount to market 
manipulation. In terms of safe harbours, buy-back programmes and stabilization, Market 
Abuse Regulation repeals Commission Regulation 2273/2003 and maps its major rules. 
A harmonisation concerning this regime will be made through regulatory technical 
standards developed by ESMA, which will specify the conditions that buy-back 
programmes and stabilization measures must meet, including conditions for trading, 




The significant change made in this section is with regard to Accepted Market Practices 
(AMPs). Divergent AMPs are considered as a main reason for creating legal uncertainly 
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of market manipulation regime. Although the Commission failed to remove the AMP 
regime out of the new regulation, this regime has been significantly recast, primarily by 
means of the incorporation of the original Market Abuse Directive AMP administrative 
regime within Market Abuse Regulation and the conferral of a range of oversight powers 
on ESMA.
253
 Compared with the current market manipulation regime, Member States 
will be subject to stricter scrutiny when establishing an AMP in their markets and further 
will have to follow technical standards drafted by ESMA.
254
 
National Competent authorities will have to, not less than three months before the AMP 
is intended to take effect, notify ESMA and other regulators of their intention to establish 
an AMP, and provide details of their assessment of the criteria which must be 
examined.
255
 Then ESMA will provide and publish an opinion concerning the 
compatibility of the notifying AMP with criteria provided and related regulatory 
technical standards. Meanwhile, whether the proposed AMP would threaten the market 
confidence in the EU financial market should be assessed in the opinion.
256
 Further, 
ESMA shall publish a list of AMPs, monitor their application and submit an annual 
report concerned to the Commission.
257
 And finally, a competent authority can 
challenge AMP in another with the help of ESMA and, in any event, he should review 
his AMPs at least every two years.
258
  
Conclusion of Chapter 3 
Although Market Abuse Directive greatly refines the market manipulation regime at the 
EU level, a number of defections and regulatory gaps have been revealed in practice. 
Benefiting from post-FSAP commitment to Better Regulation, European Commission 
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committed to review the implementation and functioning of the Directive at the end of 
2007.  
The review of Market Abuse Directive soon became incorporated within the wider 
crisis-era reform programme.
259
 According to contributions collected from public 
consultations and expert reports, the major weaknesses of current market manipulation 
regime have been identified, which include regulatory gaps in the terms of trading 
venues and of financial instruments, notably market manipulation in commodity 
derivatives and related spot markets; legal uncertainty caused by AMPs; inefficient 
enforcement linked to limited national competent authority powers and cooperation 




With the adoption of Market Abuse Regulation and Directive on criminal sanctions for 
market abuse, the regulatory package will repeal Market Abuse Directive and its related 
supporting administrative rules. Market manipulation regime will be further harmonised 
at the EU level. On the one hand, a structure reform is made. Regulation will replace 
directive to be the cornerstone of market manipulation regulation, which would ensure a 
higher definite and directly binding legislative system, and significantly reduce 
divergences during enforcement of Member States.  
On the other hand, substantial reform has also been made to efficiently prevent market 
manipulation in the EU financial markets. The first part of substantial reform is 
concerning scope, definition and exceptions of market manipulation regime, while the 
second part focuses on supervision and enforcement, which is analysed in detail in 
Chapter 4.  
Market manipulation regime after the reform, will expand beyond an original prohibition 
on a range of manipulative behaviours, extending the regime to include manipulation 
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relate to commodity derivatives, HFT, emission allowance, and benchmarks. The wider 
scope of market manipulation regulation aims to provide effective prevention of market 
manipulation that take place cross boarder or cross markets.  
Besides, market manipulation will be better defined by that Market Abuse Regulation 
bring indicators, signals and typical examples of market manipulation, which are 
currently provide in supporting administrative rules of Market Abuse Directive, into the 
Regulation and its Annex. Meanwhile, attempted market manipulation is added as a new 
prohibition, in order to catch behaviours that do not successfully achieve the effect of 
speculating the price, the supply or demand of an instrument. Further, the AMP regime 
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Chapter 4 Reform of the EU Market Manipulation Regime: Part (2) supervision and 
enforcement 
Destructive imbalance in the regulatory and supervisory architecture was considered as 
the core issue in the EU crisis, given “the specific and additional difficulties arising from 
the mis-match between the pan-EU operations of some major banking groups and 
nationally-based supervision and resolution regimes”.261 Market Abuse Regulation is 
trying to enhance the effectiveness of supervision and enforcement through increasing the 
investigatory and supervisory powers of competent authorities, refining the coordination, 
cooperation and information-sharing system among competent authorities, and 
harmonising sanctioning regimes of market manipulation in the EU.  
4.1 Increasing the investigatory and supervisory powers of competent authorities  
Investigatory and supervisory powers are important tools for competent authorities to 
guarantees supervisory effectiveness. Given that the actual powers exercised by national 
competent authorities vary greatly, a set of changes has been made to ensure them in 
possession of adequate tools and powers.  
4.1.1. Strengthening the existing powers enjoyed by competent authorities 
The power significantly improved is the right to require existing telephone and existing 
data traffic data records. The importance of telephone and data traffic records for detecting 
market manipulation is without debate, the rule provided in Market Abuse Directive, 
however, is too general and ambiguous, which lead to  a lack of legal certainty. As a 
consequence, not all regulators in Member States could actually enjoy this power in the 
practice. For example, the Dutch law on telecommunication restricts the power of the 
AFM to require existing telephone and existing data traffic records.
 262
 So it is generally 
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supported by the European Commission and all the competent authorities that, the new 
market manipulation regulation will contain a clear statement that the power to acquire 
telephone and data traffic records should be granted to national competent authorities and 
should not be constrained by confidentiality restraints or other limitations.
263
 
Therefore, Market Abuse Regulation not only confirms the record requiring power of 
competent authorities, but also sets out clear conditions for its exercises. Firstly, Member 
States shall ensure that competent authorities, on the one hand, have the right to acquire 
existing recordings of telephone conversations, electronic communications or data traffic 
records held by investment firms, credit institutions or financial institutions; and on the 
other hand, have the power to require existing data traffic records held by a 
telecommunications operator in conformity with national law. Secondly, a reasonable 
suspicion of an infringement of market manipulation must exist to use this power. And 
thirdly, records required must be relevant to the investigation of the manipulative 
infringement.
264
 Besides, all the records required shall be telephone and data traffic that 
already exists. Information provider does not have the obligation to prepare new records, 
and the information provided shall not concern the content of communication.  
Compared with the prior rule provided in Article 12(d) of Market Abuse Directive, the 
new regulation makes a great process to eliminate the uncertainties on the rights of the 
competent authorities to have access to records. It clearly states that what kind of records 
could be required, from who the records could be got, and what conditions should be 
satisfied. Nevertheless, new confusion is at the same time created by the “reasonable 
suspicion” which is a key element when requiring data traffic records from 
telecommunication operators. Since there is no uniform definition of “reasonable 
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suspicion” in the Regulation or relating legislation, it will result in discretionary 
enforcement in Member States.  
Another improvement is made concerning the on-site inspections. According to Article 
23(2)(d) of the Market Abuse Regulation, national competent authority has the right to 
carry out on-site inspections. But an exception is added: on-site inspections and 
investigations should be carried out at sites other than at the private residences of natural 
persons, and it should lessen the possibility of infringing the right to private privacy.  
4.1.2 New supervisory and investigatory powers conferred to the national competent 
authorities 
4.1.2.1 The power to have access to information of spot commodity markets 
Market manipulation can take place across spot and derivatives markets. “Trading in 
financial instruments, including commodity derivatives, can be used to manipulate related 
spot commodity contracts and spot commodity contracts can be used to manipulate 
related financial instruments”.265 However, information in the spot markets is not as 
transparent as that in the securities market, because spot markets are not subject to the 
transparent rules followed in the financial market. Hence, it is necessary for competent 
authorities to have information regarding related spot market in order to have a better 
detection of such kind of market manipulation.   
After the reform made by the Market Abuse Regulation, competent authority, in relation to 
derivatives on commodities, can request information from market participants on related 
spot markets according to standardized formats, obtain reports on transactions, and have 
direct access to traders’ system.266 Gaining information from market participants provides 
more opportunities for competent authorities to detect and investigate suspicious market 
manipulative activities; and having direct access to traders’ system enable supervisors 
monitor real-time data flows in physical markets in the circumstance that information may 
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4.1.2.2 Power to enter private premises to seize documents and data 
In some special cases competent authorities might face the risk to be deprived from 
important and necessary evidence, and accordingly, lose the chance to detect or even 
sanction cases of market manipulation. These situations include the circumstance where a 
person fails wholly or in part to comply with the authority’s demand for information, or 
where “there are reasonable ground for believing that if a demand were to be made, it 
would not complied with, or that documents or information to which the information 
requirement relates, would be removed, tampered with or delayed”.268 In order to avoid 
such circumstances, the new regulation allows supervisors to enter private premises to 
seize evidences as soon as possible. 
For exercising the power to enter private premises to seize documents and data, competent 
authorities must satisfy the following conditions. Firstly, there should be a reasonable 
suspicion that documents or data in any form relating to the subject matter of the 
inspection or investigation may be relevant to prove a case of market manipulation.
269
 
Secondly, national law regarding entering private premises must be followed, and a prior 
authorization should be obtained from the judicial authority if required. However, the 
same issue about the definition of “reasonable suspicion” exists, which is similar with that 
in the power to have access to telephone conversation and data traffic records. 
4.1.2.3 Power to refer matters for criminal investigation 
Competent authorities will be empowered to refer manipulative offences for criminal 
investigation. Criminal sanctions of market manipulation currently are not available in all 
the Member States. Some competent authorities, such as Financial Supervision 
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Commission (Bulgaria) and Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (Hungary), only 
can make or refer for administrative investigation.
270
 With the harmonization of criminal 
sanction made in the new market abuse regulation package, criminal sanctions should be 
available to manipulative offences in the EU. Therefore, it is necessary for competent to 
have the right refer market manipulation cases for criminal investigation.  
In general, increasing the supervisory and investigatory powers of competent authorities is 
a good way to increase the possibility to detect and sanction of cross-border or 
cross-market manipulative behaviours. Market Abuse Regulation will greatly enhance the 
efficiency of supervision and enforcement of market manipulation taking consideration of 
improvement made in this aspect. Even though these changes are commonly welcomed by 
the public, they are not totally out of debate.  
Some market participants argued that the powers of supervisory authorities provided in the 
Market Abuse Directive to investigate market manipulation are adequate. The way to 
solve enforcement problem does not lie in in increasing powers but in ensuring that the 
existing powers are consistently implemented by all Member States.
271
 And further 
concern is brought by most market participants with regard to certain aggressive powers of 
the competent authorities, such as entering the private premises to seize documents, 
requiring existing recordings of telephone conversations, electronic communications or 
data traffic record, because these powers dramatically increase the obligation for the 
private parties to provide information and the possibilities of interference of fundamental 
rights. Issues relating to market manipulation and fundamental rights will be further 
analysed in following part.  
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4.2 A refined supervisory cooperation mechanism 
Coordination and organization of supervision across the internal financial market is at the 
centre of the EU financial supervision. Although Market Abuse Directive has established a 
framework to strengthen cooperation between national regulators, the global financial 
crisis and the following European debt crisis have revealed numerous weaknesses with 
regard to the supervision of cross-border activities in the financial market. And the EU 
coordination system of regulators is also proved to be inefficient.
272
 Further, the 3L3 
committees of local supervisors
273
 are ill-equipped to deal with crisis management and 
coordination.
274
 For example, CESR failed to coordinate on the issue concerning the 
prohibition of short selling in Member States.
275
 As a result, reform of market 
manipulation regime focuses on strengthening supervisory cooperation.  
A refined supervisory cooperation mechanism is developed in the Market Abuse 
Regulation, in particular with the establishment of ESMA, a successor of CESR. The new 
cooperation mechanism is constituted by two main elements: information sharing system 
and cooperation of investigation, supervision and enforcement.  
4.2.1 A more efficient information-sharing system 
Competent authorities in Member States are required to exchange information with each 
other, and with ESMA as well as third national supervisor. Such information-sharing 
obligation is a key part of the EU cooperation mechanism of supervisors. Compared with 
rules provided in Market Abuse Directive, system of information exchange after the 
reform will work more efficiently.  
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Firstly, the new information-sharing system will include more types of information. 
Information that could be required by competent authorities will not be limited to 
information concerning investment instruments’ trading or orders to trade in the financial 
market. It will also cover information relating to commodities which are agricultural 
products listed in Annex I to the TFEU, information concerning energy market, trading 
information of wholesale energy products and emission allowances, and information in the 
related spot markets.
276
 Having access to these types of information will facilitate 
competent authorities’ detection of cross-border and cross-markets manipulative 
activities.  
Secondly, more institutions and bodies are involved in the cooperation system of 
information exchange. Not only national competent authorities to cooperate with each 
other and to cooperate with ESMA, other institutions and bodies are also required to 
provide information to ESMA, which include EU supervisory authorities (e.g. the Agency 
for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER)), the national minister responsible for 
finance, national central banks, statistical office of the Member State concerned if the 
national competent authorities fail, or even directly to financial market participants if the 
former two ways do not work out.
277
 This amendment ensures that competent authorities 
and ESMA can timely obtain necessary information to investigate or supervise market 
manipulation in the financial market. 
And thirdly, new reason concerning the refusal of information exchange and investigation 
cooperation has been added. Following the new rule, a competent authority could refuse to 
provide information in a new circumstance, where “complying with the request is likely 
adversely to affect its own investigation, enforcement activities or, where applicable, a 
criminal investigation”.278 However, this change is quite arguable. According to the 
                                                 
276
 Market Abuse Regulation, Article 25. 
277
 Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending 
Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC (hereinafter Regulation 
1095/2010), Article 35.   
278
 Market Abuse Regulation, Article 25(2)(b).  
        
100 
opinion of the European Commission and the Germany regulator, competent authorities 
should have a narrow scope of reasons to refuse information-sharing in order to guarantee 
an efficient cooperation with other competent authorities.
279
 While regulators in other 
Member States claimed that reasons for refusal of requiring information provided in 
Market Abuse Directive are adequate and there is no need to change.
280
 Despite these 
arguments, Market Abuse Regulation, on the contrary to reducing reasons, adds a new 
reason for refusal. It is reasonable to state that this addition is made because the new 
cooperation system will cover a much wider scope than before, so some refusals of 
information requirement should be allowed in case of abuse of information by competent 
authorities.  
Nonetheless, although the benefits of these changes made concerning information-sharing 
system are obvious, there still is a point that deserves further consideration. According to 
Article 25(4) of Market Abuse Regulation, the quested party should provide the 
information immediately, when a request for providing information is made by a 
competent authority. This rule is, however, not suitable, considering the fact that 
supplying information on an “immediate” basis is not always practical or logistically 
possible.
281
 So a “timely” basis seems more proper.282  
4.2.2 Cooperation for cross-border investigation 
With regard to the cross-border investigatory cooperation between competent authorities, 
Market Abuse Regulation enlarges the scope of activities that could be done by national 
regulators. And the biggest change is regarding with the permissible actions of the 
requesting competent authority in the territory of the requested Member State.  
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Under Market Abuse Directive, cross-border investigation was subject to the overall 
control of the host Member States, and the requesting authority could only ask that its 
personnel could be allowed to accompany the requested regulator’s personnel during 
investigation.
283
 However, according to the new regulation, the requesting authorities are 
not limited to accompany situation, they could, if the requested authority agrees, 
participate in the on-site inspection or investigation or carry out the on-site inspection or 
investigation by itself. Nevertheless, some authority argued that the investigation of 
market manipulation should remain to be taken by the requested national supervisor, as it 




In addition to rights of requesting competent authority, the requested one will have an 
additional choice of appointing auditors or experts to carry out the on-site inspection or 
investigation, of sharing specific tasks related to supervisory activities with the other 
competent authorities, or of cooperating with competent authorities of other Member 
States with respect to facilitating the recovery of pecuniary sanctions.
285
  
4.2.3 ESMA’s critical role in the new cooperation system 
It is one of the most important areas in the reform of market manipulation regime that 
ESMA will play an active role in facilitating and ensuring a strong coordination. In 
response to the global financial crisis, the European Union made a financial supervisory 
system reform according to the advice in De Larosière report
286
. ESMA, as one of the three 
supervisory authorities established in the European System of Financial Supervision 
(ESFS), is responsible for the supervision in the securities market.
287
 This new authority 
not just takes the place of its forerunner CESR, but has been granted powers “more powers 
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than has typically been the case for the other independent European agencies that have 
been set up at the EU level in the past several years, due to concerns of competence under 
the Treaty”.288 Therefore, ESMA now is in a better situation to take actions for combating 
market manipulation. 
4.2.3.1 ESMA’s center role in collecting and sharing information 
In terms of collecting information, ESMA could require competent authorities to provide, 
without delay, all information necessary to carry out its duties. If the information is not 
available to the national authorities, it could make request to other EU and national 
institutions, or even directly to market participants as mentioned previously. Furthermore, 
when the information is with regard to administrative sanctions and measures imposed 
on market manipulative cases by the competent authority, it should be provided to ESMA 
annually. And such annual report obligation is also applied to anonymized and 
aggregated data regarding all administrative investigations undertaken.
289
 Similarly, 
criminal sanctions for the manipulative infringements made by their competent 
authorities shall be provided to ESMA annually, as well as anonymized and aggregated 




In terms of sharing information, at the request of a competent authority, ESMA may 
provide necessary information to facilitate the competent authority to carry out its duties, 
as long as it does not infringe the professional secrecy.
291
 And the annual report 
concerning administrative or criminal sanctions and measures imposed by competent 
authorities shall also be published.
292
  
4.2.3.2 ESMA’s new power to settle disagreements 
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Although competent authorities are obliged to cooperate with each other, it is inevitable 
that in some cases they do not act within a reasonable time or reject to act without sound 
reason. Prior to the establishment ESMA, CESR, with the agreement of interested parties, 
would host a discussion to settle the disagreement. However, as the result of the discussion 
is not binding, such discussion did not work effectively to resolve complicate problems 
between national supervisors.  
With the arrival of ESMA, this situation is extremely different. ESMA is granted of more 
powers to resolve disputes between competent authorities.
293
 At the first stage, when a 
competent authority fails to provide information requested, to open an inquiry, or for its 
officials to take part in on-site inspection by a competent authority that handles a 
cross-border manipulation case,
294
 ESMA may coordinate the national authorities in 
solving the disputation either at the request of one or more competent authorities or on its 
own initiative in some specified cases.
295
 During this period, it works as a mediator, trying 
to resolve the problem without further damages.  
However, if the competent authorities fail to settle their disagreement at the first stage, 
ESMA has a unilateral power to resolve the dispute at the second stage. At the beginning, 
ESMA may take a decision requiring national regulators to take specific action or to 
refrain from action in order to resolve the dispute. And this decision is with binding effects 
for the competent authorities concerned.
296
 Then if this decision is not complied, ESMA 
may adopt an individual decision addressed to a financial market participant that fails to 
comply with Market Abuse Regulation as a result of the behaviour of the competent 
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 Moreover, the individual decision adopted prevails over any previous 
decision adopted by the competent authorities on the same matter and their actions shall be 
compatible with such decision.
298
  
“Mediation between supervisors will often relate to operational questions where there is 
genuine uncertainty as to the interpretation of a rule or standard, or uncertainty as to 
supervisory jurisdiction.”299 Compared with CESR’s soft mediation powers, ESMA now 
is in a much better situation to ensure a more efficient and practical solution in cases of 
disagreement between competent authorities. The power to make binding decisions on 
national regulators will let ESMA settle sectoral disputes more easily, in particular when 
there is an emergency. And ESMA’s power to address direct decision to financial market 
participants, in the circumstance where competent authorities fail to comply with the 
decision mentioned former, could ensure the smooth functioning and integrity of the 
financial system. These new powers granted to ESMA certainly will guarantee a better 
cooperation between national supervisors and enhance the efficient and uniform 
implementation of EU market manipulation rules.  
However, new problems are also created. On the one hand, addressing binding decision 
directly to individual firms is a big challenge for dividing the line between ESMA’s 
competences and those of national competent authorities. On the other hand, it is still an 
ambiguity in relation to the enforcement of the binding decision made by ESMA, in 
particular when enforcement remains the competence of Member States. So the effect of 
such decision would weaken if it cannot be enforced.
300
 Moreover, further guidance on 
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4.3 A more efficient sanctioning regime: administrative sanctions 
A harmonized sanctioning regime of market manipulation at EU level will reduce the risk 
of regulatory arbitrage and support a strong enforcement. Even though Market Abuse 
Directive has made a tentative foray into the sensitive area of sanctioning powers and 
liability in Member State, a variation between member states exists in the level of 
sanctions that can be imposed in market manipulation cases, according to experiences 
from conducting commons investigations,.
302
 For example, market manipulation is 
sanctioned less severely in some Member States than the others, and criminal sanctions are 
not applicable in all Member States. As a result the deterrent effect of sanction is limited 
and perpetrators may make use of the most lenient sanction systems.
303
  
In particular after the breakout of the global financial crisis, the deep and problematic 
divergences existing in national sanctioning regimes is considered as a big threaten to the 
effectiveness of pan-EU enforcement.
304
 Therefore, it is generally supported by public 
authorities and private market participants that Market Abuse Regulation provides a 
higher level of harmonization of sanctions at the EU level as a means to increase their 
deterrent effect to market manipulation.
305
 
Pursuit to the current market manipulation regime, not all competent authorities enjoy a 
full set of powers at their disposal, through which they can respond to all situations with 
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the appropriate sanction corresponding to the severity of manipulative behaviours.
306
 
Market Abuse Regulation makes a credible change in this part. In order to ensure a 
uniform application at the EU level, it provides some common standards with regard to 
administrative sanctions of market manipulation that Member States should respect.  
4.3.1 A minimum set of administrative sanctions and measures
307
  
Unlike Market Abuse Directive, which allows Member States to determine appropriate 
sanctions for market manipulation, Market Abuse Regulation provides a set of 
administrative sanctions and measures that should be empowered to competent authorities. 
And these administrative sanctions or measures could be classified into two categories: 
monetary sanctions and non-pecuniary sanctions.  
4.3.1.1 Monetary sanctions of market manipulation  
Administrative fine is an efficient deterrence of market manipulation. Given the large 
gains that could be obtained from manipulating investment instruments in the financial 
market, sufficient high fines should be allowed for national supervisors to impose 
effective, proportionate, and dissuasive fines. However, according to the report issued by 
ESMA on the actual use of sanctioning powers under Market Abuse Directive, 
administrative fines apparently vary among Member States. For instance, the lowest 
sanction that is imposed on nature person for market manipulation ranged from €100 
(France) to €134,060 (the UK) while the highest sanction imposed ranged from €405 
(Lithuania) to €1,500,000 (France). And the lowest sanction imposed on legal persons 
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ranged from €575 (Estonia) to €4,556,328 (the UK) while the highest amount imposed 
ranged from €575 (Estonia) to €5,000,000 (Portugal).308  
The large divergences of national administrative fines may tempt financial market 
participants to engage in regulatory arbitrage, by which they could benefit from the most 
lenient sanctioning regimes, whereas this will lead to distortions of competition in the 
internal financial market.
309
 Therefore, a maximum level of administrative pecuniary 
sanctions is provided in Market Abuse Regulation taking into account the amount of the 
profits gained or losses avoided because of the infringement. Details of the amount of fines 
are showed in Table 3.  
Table 3 Maximum level of administrative fines for market manipulation
310
 
 Nature Person Legal Person
311
 





EUR 5 000 000 EUR 15 000 000 or 
15 % of the total annual 
turnover 
Person concerning 





EUR 1 000 000 EUR 2 500 000 or 2 % 
of its total annual 
turnover 
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Managers and investment 
advisors
314
 (at least) 
EUR 500 000 EUR 1 000 000 
Overarching minimum 
fine applicable to market 
manipulation 
At least three times the amount of the profits gained or 
losses avoided 
From this table, it could be concluded that the new sanctioning regime establishes a harsh 
level of administrative fines,
315
 which, on the one hand, has a better effect for deterrence 
of market manipulation; on the other hand, lessening the divergences among Member 
States.             
4.3.1.2 Non-pecuniary sanctions of market manipulation  
Compared with monetary fines, the non-pecuniary sanctions play a more important role in 
preventing a repeated offender and in reducing further damages. A minimum set of 
non-pecuniary sanctions is provided by Market Abuse Regulation, including orders for 
ceasing and desisting manipulative conduct, orders for disgorgement of profits or losses, 
public warnings, withdrawal or suspension of regulatory authorizations of an investment 
firm, and temporary or permanent bans on the exercising of management functions by the 
managers implicated in the breach.
316
  
Further, measures stipulated in Article 23 of the Regulation should also be available to 
competent authorities, which cover a request to freeze or sequestrate of assets, a 
suspension of trading of the financial instrument concerned, a temporary cessation of any 
practice that the competent authority considers contrary to this Regulation and temporary 
prohibition on the exercise of professional activity.
317
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In general, the clear list of administrative sanctions will avoid the situation that effective 
measures are not provided in all national legislations. Take public warning for example, it 
is not available in some Member States. However, this measure is an effective prevention 
of market manipulation, as it indicates the person responsible for a manipulative case and 
the nature of the infringement. It can make a significant contribution to general prevention, 
which not only helps the public to understand typical behaviours subject to sanctions, but 
also makes a public humiliation of perpetrators.
318
  
Since Market Abuse Regulation only makes a minimum harmonization of administrative 
sanctions and measures, Member States has the right to grant competent authorities more 
powers and to provide for higher levels of sanctions than that established in the new 
rules.
319
 Such as the maximum administrative pecuniary sanctions rule is in fact the 
minimum requirement of maximum fines. It means that the upper limit for fines shall not 
be lower than the amount stated above, while Member States are allowed to provide a 
higher level. This minimum harmonization approach is agreed by ESMA, “taking into 
consideration that the appropriate sanction in a particular enforcement case depends on 
the unique circumstances of each case, it is considered that minimum harmonization 
would be more appropriate than maximum harmonization”.320  
4.3.2 Appropriate factors to be taken into account in determining administrative 
sanctions 
Sanctions of market manipulation are the competence of national regulators, so 
divergences would be created if competent authorities take consideration of different 
criteria when determining the type and level of administrative sanctions. However, such 
criteria vary across Member States, because Market Abuse Directive did not make any 
rules concerning this section. According to the actual enforcement, only four common 
factors (seriousness of the violation; duration; impact on market; and level of 
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responsibility or seniority) were actually used by seven national authorities that had 
imposed administrative sanctions from 2008 to 2010.
321
  
As a result, Market Abuse Regulation makes a minimum list of common key factors that 
are required to take into account by competent authorities when making administrative 
penalties. Factors included are the gravity and duration of the violation; the degree of 
responsibility and financial strength of the manipulator; the importance of the profits 
gained or losses avoided; cooperative behaviours with the competent authority; previous 
infringements by perpetrator; and measures taken to prevent the repetition of 
infringement.
322




The provisions concerning common factors could make a maximum harmonization of 
various criteria for imposing administrative sanctions in Member States. Furthermore, in 
terms of cross-border manipulative cases, competent authorities shall coordinate their 
actions in order to avoid duplication and overlaps when imposing administrative sanctions, 
and ensure the sanction imposed to be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.   
4.3.3 Publication of sanctioning decisions 
Publication of administrative sanctioning decisions is the so called “naming-and-shaming” 
strategy. It is an effective way to deter market manipulation given reputational risk,
324
 and 
is also a useful tool to inform the public of what is manipulative behaviour as well as to 
promote good behaviour among market participant.
325
 Even though the use of 
“naming-and-shaming” strategy is identified as an important achievement of Market 
Abuse Directive,
326
 this method is not applicable in all the Member States.
327
 Takin into 
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account the importance of the publicity of decisions, the new regulation makes a further 
harmonization in this section.  
Firstly, competent authorities are obligated to disclose any decision that imposes an 
administrative sanction or other administrative measure relating market manipulation. 
Such decisions should be published on the regulators’ website immediately after the 
perpetrator has been informed.
328
 ESMA should be notified simultaneously when 
competent authorities make the disclosure.
329
 The decisions disclosed are of a sanctioning 
nature, not including those of an investigatory nature. The content of the publication shall 
include at least information in relation to the type and nature of the infringement and the 
identity of the person subject to the decision.
330
 Moreover, the decision is subject to 
publish even if it is appealed, and information as well as any subsequent information 
regarding the outcome of such an appeal also needs to be disclosed. And the same rules 
apply to annulment of such decision.
331
  
Secondly, there are several exceptions for the general rule of publicity in case of 
disproportionate damage to the persons involved or jeopardizing the stability of financial 
markets or an ongoing investigation the competent authority.
332
 Competent authorities 
could delay the publication or publish the decision on an anonymous basis to ensure the 
effective protection of the personal data concerned.
333
 And the competent authorities can 
only deny publishing the administrative sanctions and measures when the anonymous or 
delayed publication could not realize the purpose pursued or such publication is not 
complied with the principle of proportionality.
334
 So delay publication and the anonymous 
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publication are two measures that the new regulation uses to reduce the situation of 
non-publication.   
And lastly, record-keeping is an important measure for establishing an efficient and 
transparent sanctioning mechanism.
335
 Competent authorities are obliged to keep record 
of the publication of decisions on their website for a period of at least five years after their 
publications. Relating personal data shall also be kept on the website in accordance with 
the applicable data protection rules.
336
 Keeping the record of such publication could 
strengthen the shaming effect for perpetrators and lead to better deterrence of misconduct 
in financial market.  
The new rules concerning publicity of decisions ensures a dissuasive effect of the 
decisions that impose administrative sanctions and measures on the public at large. It 
generally changes the divergent regulation in Member States and keeps the affected parties 
from disproportionate damages.
337
 However Market Abuse Regulation only makes a 
minimum harmonization, leaving more space for Member States. For example, national 
legislators could decide the format and content of the publication, the disclosure of 
investigating measures, or the criteria used to determine whether publishing a decision that 
is not required to disclose in principle.  
4.4 A more efficient sanctioning regime: criminal sanctions 
An equal, strong and deterrent sanctioning regime against financial misconducts is the 
basis of sound and integrated financial markets.
338
 The current market manipulation 
regime seeks to improve the enforcement of the market manipulation prohibition primarily 
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through administrative procedures and sanctions.
339
 In terms of whether or how to impose 
criminal sanctions, it is totally up to Member States. However, the global financial crisis 
reveals that the present Member States sanctioning regimes are in general weak and 
heterogeneous, therefore lack of sufficient deterrent effect.
340
 Given the fact that 
“criminal sanctions demonstrate social disapproval of a qualitatively different nature 
compared to administrative sanctions or compensation mechanisms under civil law”341, 




This idea of harmonising criminal sanctioning regime in Member States is strengthen by 
the occurrence of the Libor scandal. A serious case of benchmark manipulation has 
exposed relevant problems and loopholes, which impact gravely on market confidence and 
might result in significant losses to investors as well as distortions of the real economy.
343 
Furthermore, divergences existing in national criminal sanctions leave a certain space for 
perpetrators to take advantage of the most lenient criminal system across the Union. As a 
result, an approximation of criminal sanctions for market manipulation is essential to 
ensure the effective implementation of Union policy on fights market abuse.
344
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4.4.1 Article 83(2) TFEU and criminal sanction on market manipulation 
As provided in Article 83(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), criminal law can be used as a regulatory tool to ensure the effective 
implementation of European Union policies. The financial sector, market manipulation or 
insider dealing for instance, is a subject covered by the scope of EU policies.
345
 
Accordingly, EU has the right to adopt directives to set minimum rules on both the 
definition of offences and on their sanctions. However, the harmonization of criminal law 
is subject to two constraints: one is that criminal measures adopted should be essential to 
ensuring the effective implementation of an EU policy; and the other one is concerning the 
area that must already have “been subject to harmonization measures”.346  
The EU rules on market abuse are a case in point where criminal law could be a useful 
additional tool to ensure effective enforcement.
347
 As analysed, the administrative 
sanctioning regime for market manipulation provided in the Market Abuse Directive is 
weak and heterogeneous, and divergent criminal definitions of offences and imposition of 
penalties in Member States enable perpetrators to choose jurisdiction with less strict 
sanctioning regime, which could further undermine the integrity of internal financial 
market. In the absence of a common EU framework, national initiatives cannot ensure 
consistency in the reinforcement of sanctioning regimes.
348
 Therefore, greater 
convergence between national criminal sanctioning regimes concerning market 
manipulation can mitigate divergences among Member States, increase the deterrent 
effects and ensure a better implementation of the Union policy to combat market abuse.
349
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The Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse is adopted by the European 
Parliament and the Council on 16 April 2014. This is the first time that the EU has used the 
criminal law competences conferred by Article 83(2) TFEU.
350
 The Directive sets out 
minimum criminal rules with regard to the definitions of market manipulative offences 
and criminal sanctions, such as a term of imprisonment for four years, in order to make 
sure the punishment effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Besides, such common 
minimum rules are also considered to facilitate the cooperation of law enforcement and 
judicial authorities in the Union, particularly in cases of cross-border offences. 
However, it is not out of controversy to use Article 83(2) TFEU as the legal basis of the 
Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse. It is argued that the Directive does not 
satisfy the “essential requirement” of Article 83(2), as no concrete evidence is provided by 
the European Commission to prove that the sufficient implementation of market abuse 
rules cannot be guaranteed by sanction regimes of administrative or civil nature,
351
 and 
accordingly criminal sanction is a measure of last resort.
352
 Further, there is also no actual 
evidence to prove the occurrence of such displacement of criminal activities and the 
consequences which this would have. Even though the report on the actual use of sanction 
powers issued by ESMA and the European Commission’s impact assessment paper 
concerning market abuse regulation make certain supplements, the problem that the 
evidences for harmonizing criminal sanctions for market manipulation are still too general 
and conceptual.  
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4.4.2 A general introduction of the Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse 
Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse is separately adopted, as a limb of Market 
Abuse Regulation, considering that the harmonization of criminal law could only be done 
by means of directives.
353
 It aims to increase the deterrent effects of the market abuse 
regime by raising the level and aggression of enforcement activity across the EU.
354
 This 
Directive is in line with the scope of Market Abuse Regulation and reprises much of its 
wording, including the financial instruments concerned, the definition of the core market 
abuse offences, and exclusions and exemptions. To keep pace with the faster development 
of current financial market, the new criminal sanctioning regime of market manipulation 
targets not only financial instruments traded on regulated markets, on MTF and on OTF, 




Also aligned with the scope of Market Abuse Regulation, a group of transactions for 
certain purposes are not deemed to criminal penalties, which include buy-back 
programmes and stabilization of securities; transactions, orders or behaviours in the 
pursuit of monetary, exchange-rate or public debt management policy in compliance of 
certain conditions and procedures; and activities in the pursuit of the Union's Climate 
Policy, the Union's Common Agricultural and the Union's Common Fisheries Policies.
356
  
In addition, the scope of the Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse is designed 
to complement and ensure the effective implementation of Market Abuse Regulation.
357
 
Member States are free to choose the type of liability to impose for infringement of market 
manipulation. Administrative and criminal penalties could be imposed for the same 
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offence in accordance with national law, while the principle of ne bis in idem should be 
ensured not to be breached. However, maintenance of criminal sanctions rather than 
administrative sanctions for infringement regarding market manipulation could be 
allowed and such decision should be notified to the European Commission and to 
ESMA.
358
 The choice of only imposing criminal sanctions should not reduce or otherwise 
affect the ability of competent authorities to cooperate and access and exchange 
information timely with competent authorities in other Member States.
359
 
Furthermore, Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse provides a wide scope of 
jurisdiction. Criminal sanctions are at least applicable to market abuse committed in whole 
or in part within a Member State, or the offence is perpetrated by a Member State national 
in a territory where the act is a breach of law.
360
 Besides, the Directive extends its 
jurisdiction to offences committed outside the territory of a Member State if the offender is 
a habitual resident in its territory; or the offence is committed for the benefit of a legal 
person established in its territory.
361
 Although this broad scope of jurisdiction guarantees 
a Member States to have the right to investigate and punish the market manipulation that 
infringes the interest of a Member State or its nationals, it, at the same time, may cause 
serious issue of overlap of jurisdictions. To resolve this problem, a closer cooperation 
between competent authorities in Member States and third countries is critical.  
4.4.3 Offences of market manipulation subject to criminal sanctions 
According to the Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse, insider dealing, 
unlawful disclosure of inside information and market manipulation are three types of 
offences that are subject to criminal sanction. It is not appropriate to impose crimination 
for all the manipulative behaviours, taking consideration of the long and high resource 
consuming proceedings, poor expertise of prosecutors, and low harmonization of 
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 Hence, only manipulative offences that are of seriousness and 
committed with intent are subject to criminal sanctions according to the Directive.  
The first key element for deciding criminal manipulation offence is “seriousness”. 
“Seriousness” should be determined taking into account several factors, which include 
impact on market integrity, gain derived or loss avoided, level of damage caused to the 
market, level of alteration of the value of the financial instrument or spot commodity 
contracts, or amount of funds originally used, and position of the perpetrator.
363
 For 
example, if manipulative activities are committed by a market professional or an officer in 
a supervisory authority, they should be judged as serious, since the perpetrator is a person 
who is supposed to be trusted by the market participants and has the duty to maintain the 
sound function of financial market. 
The other key element is “intent”. Act constituting a criminal offence should be committed 
with intent. Although the market abuse regime in general in the EU appears to be an 
“effect-based” regulation,364 the mental state is still a necessary requirement for imposing 
criminal sanction, which is not the same as administrative sanction. Given the severity of 
criminal sanction, not requiring the intent element may raise uncertainty and potential 
injustice. Moreover, since Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse only makes a 
minimum harmonisation, it does not preclude Member States to provide that market 




Excepting those two general requirements, criminal offences of market manipulation 
could be committed by four general methods: manipulation by disseminating false or 
misleading information; manipulation based on transactions or orders to trade, either by 
giving misleading signals or by securing an artificial price in the absence of an accepted 
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market practice; manipulation by employing a fictitious device, deception or contrivances; 
and manipulation of benchmark.
366
 Although these four categories of activities are 
generally in line with that provided in the Market Abuse Regulation, there still are several 
different points that are worthy to mention.  
(a) Unlike rules in Market Abuse Regulation, Directive on criminal sanctions of market 
abuse only applies to behaviours that do create a manipulative effect, precluding those 
activities which are merely “likely” to cause such an effect.367 This strengthens the fact 
that criminal sanctions only target the serious case of market manipulation, not all of them.  
(b) Attempted market manipulation should also be punished as a criminal offence if its 
realization may create serious adverse effects on the integrity of the financial markets and 
on investor confidence in those markets.
368
 Furthermore, the Directive also criminalizes 
the offences in relation to inciting, aiding and abetting market manipulation.  
And (c) manipulation of benchmark, as a newly added type of market manipulation, is 
now subject to criminalization. Manipulation of benchmark, such as the Libor scandal, is 
the worst kind of market manipulation. However, the perpetrators in the scandal in Europe 
have been sent to the US to face the full force of the law, because criminal liability was not 
required by the EU rules. With the Directive entering into force, such embarrassing 
situation will be changed.
369
 Benchmarks manipulators now are also subject to 
punishment of imprison in the Union.  
4.4.4. Manipulators subject to criminal sanctions 
The prohibition of market manipulation applies to any person, which means that both 
nature and legal persons are in face of criminal liability for committing offences related. 
While there barely are arguments for imposing criminal sanctions on nature person, the 
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introduction of criminal sanction for legal person could be describe as a great shock. With 
the growing presence and importance, legal persons play an even more important role than 
nature persons in the financial market. In some circumstance, it is the financial institution 
as a whole that should be responsible for the manipulative infringement, so imposing 
criminal sanction only on its employees involved might not have the expected deterrent 
effects.
370
 In addition, because of the potential stigmatizing effect of criminal sanctions
371
, 
a legal person may have more motives to take the organizational measures and provide 
staff trainings that are effective methods to prevent infringements.
372
 
In order to impose criminal sanction on a legal person, certain conditions must be satisfied. 
On the one hand, the criminal offences must be committed for the benefit of the legal 
person, not for its employees. On the other hand, such offence is perpetrated, no matter 
acting individually or as part of an organ of the legal person, by either: 
a) A person who has a leading position within the legal person, no matter acting 
individually or as part of an organ of the legal person. The leading position here could be 
based on: a power of representation of the legal person; an authority to take decisions on 
behalf of the legal person; or an authority to exercise control within the legal person.
373
 
This type of person is in fact a representative organ of the corporation or a member of 
such an organ, for instance corporate directors or even the de facto directors, or 
b) A person subject to the authority of persons indicated previously, in other words, the 
lower level officers, employees or agents,
374
 and whose misconduct is a result of the 
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lack of supervision or control of the high hierarchy person. “This lack of surveillance 
can be based on flaws in the company’s organization.”375 
Despite that the imposition of criminal sanctions on legal person for the serious market 
manipulation offences is considered as an appropriate measure to ensure effective 
implementation of the EU rules concerning the prohibition of market manipulation,
376
 it 
at the same time opens up the question of corporate liability across Europe more 
generally.  
Although the criminal liability of legal person becomes common in Europe, there still are 
Member States that criminal liability of legal person is not foreseen in national law.
377
 
And Germany’s view on the criminal liability of legal is probably the most sceptical and 
restrictive of the principal European nations.
378
 Criminal law in Germany does not 
“tolerate the fiction that a corporation had done anything, let alone possessed the mens 
rea necessary to be convicted a crime”.379 Nevertheless, the current sanctioning regime 
in Germany is as effective as any criminal sanction,
380
 with extension of criminal law to 
individual corporate directors and agents and a combination of administrative and civil 
law remedies to regulate and punish the corporation itself.
381
 So is it really necessary to 
introduce criminal sanction for legal person across EU for preventing market 
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manipulation? No concrete evidence or explanation is provided by the European 
Commission,
382
 and it can only be proved by the practice in the future.  
4.4.5. Types and levels of criminal sanctions for market manipulation 
4.4.5.1 A general requirement of criminal sanctions 
In general, the criminal sanctions on nature persons and legal persons, who commit serious 
manipulative offence with intent, are required to be effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
by the Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse. However, both the old and new 
market manipulation regulations do not establish any criteria for assessing “effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive”. It is up to national legislation to define those criteria.  
None the less, certain hints are provided in the preamble of the Directive states that “the 
imposition of sanctions should be proportionate, taking into account the profits made or 
losses avoided by the person liable as well as the damage resulting from the offence to 
other persons and, where applicable, to the functioning of markets or the wider 
economy”383. Of all these factors, the profits made or losses avoided is confirmed by the 
case law.
384
 Besides, hypothetical criminal sanction which may subsequently be imposed 
does not influence the assessment of how effective, proportionate and dissuasive the 
administrative sanctions are.
385
   
4.4.5.2 A minimum list of available types of criminal sanctions  
Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse makes a minimum harmonization of the 
level and types of criminal sanctions for manipulation. In terms of nature person, a 
maximum term of imprisonment term of at least four years should be applicable to the 
person who commits manipulation in order to ensure the sanction effective. In terms of 
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legal person, the sanctions imposed shall include unquantified criminal or non-criminal 
fines and may include other sanctions, such as exclusion from entitlement to public 
benefits or aid; temporary or permanent disqualification from the practice of commercial 
activities; placing under judicial supervision; judicial winding-up; temporary or 
permanent closure of establishments implicated in the wrongful conducts.
386
  
4.4.5.3 Key elements harmonised by the Directive 
In order to increase the deterrent effects of market manipulation regime and to ensure 
uniform enforcement in Member States, Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse 
clarifies some key elements to reduce the possibility of ambiguity during the application:  
Firstly, Directive on the criminal sanctioning for market abuse provides for minimum 
rules, therefore Member States are free to provide the maximum sentence of more than 
four years or maintain the period of imprison of four years in their national law. Secondly, 
liability of legal person shall be distinguished from that of nature person who are involved 
as perpetrators, inciters or accessories in the offences. Nature persons and legal persons 
could be sanctioned at the same time. Thirdly, the sanctioning scheme of legal person does 
not preclude imposition of pecuniary penalty along with other non-pecuniary measures, 
such as placement of an entity under judicial surveillance, which prevents the entity from 
committing crimes in the future.
387
 And finally, the publication of a final decision on a 
sanction could be adopted by the Member States as a dissuasive measure to prohibit 
market manipulation. The publication could include the identity of the liable legal person, 
taking into account fundamental rights, the principle of proportionality and the risks to the 
stability of financial market and ongoing investigations.
388
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4.4.6 Issues concerning the sanctioning regime of market manipulation  
The introduction of criminal sanction for market manipulation is not considered as a total 
success. Firstly, the criminal sanctions are treated as complement of administrative 
sanctions provided in Market Abuse Regulation, not as a last resort, to resolve the issue 
that previous sanctioning regime does not ensure sufficient deterrent effects for market 
manipulation. Therefore, it is argued by many commentators that the harmonization of 
criminal law concerning market abuse does not satisfy the conditions to use Article 83(2) 
as a legal basis.  
Secondly, according to the Directive, only “serious” offences are punishable by criminal 
sanctions. Even though several factors are suggested to take into account when 
determining seriousness, “the exact perimeter of the criminal sanctioning regime will 
remain uncertain and harm the Commission’s goal of harmonization”389. Thirdly, the new 
jurisdiction provision aims to prevent from omitting market manipulation, in particular 
cross-border cases, however it worsen the issue of jurisdiction overlap, challenging the 
principle of home Member States.  
And finally, disagreements still exist in relation to the necessary of imposing criminal 
sanctions on legal person. As in some Member States, particular Germany, it does not 
conform to their traditional criminal legal theory that legal person is held liable of criminal 
liability. And most of the functions of criminal liability of legal person could be replaced 
by civil liability, administrative liability and criminal liability of nature person, either 
individually or in combination. As a result, the criminal liability of legal person would 
only be socially desirable in a few rarest circumstances, given that “the higher sanctioning 
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costs of stigma penalties and the increased costs of deterring corporate misbehavior 
created by the procedural protections of criminal law”.390 
Conclusion of Chapter 4  
Enforcement is a critical element for the success of EU’s market manipulation regime. 
However, the prohibition of market manipulation is notoriously difficult to enforce, 
taking consideration of the fact that the detection and control of manipulative behaviours 
are heavily dependent on action by actors.
 391
 Market Abuse Regulation tries to enhance 
the efficiency of supervision and enforcement relating to this prohibition through four 
main aspects.  
Firstly, powers of competent authorities have been enhanced to support effective 
intra-Member State and cross-border supervision. The new market manipulation regime 
aims to ensure equivalence in supervisory powers by providing a minimum list of 
powers that should be conferred on national regulators. New and strengthened powers 
are provided, in particular the right to require telephone and data traffic from 
telecommunications operations (as well as from investment firms), the right to request 
information from related spot market participants directly according to standardized 
formats, the right to obtain transaction reports and to have direct access to traders’ 
systems.  
Secondly, supervisory cooperation has been extended on the basis of that set out in 
Market Abuse Directive. The scope of information and subjects subject to the 
information-sharing system will be wider, and requesting competent authorities will have 
more options during the investigatory cooperation. More significantly, ESMA, taking the 
place of CESR, will play a more active role in the supervisory cooperation mechanism. It 
is not limited to the role of mediator, but also could impose directly binding decisions on 
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national competent authorities, or even market participants, when settling disagreements 
between national regulators.  
Thirdly, preventive measures of market manipulation have been refined by Market 
Abuse Regulation, especially the whistle-blowing regime, reflecting international trends 
as well as similar measures in other crisis-era securities and markets measures.
392
 
Protections of blowers and procedure for receipt of reports and follow-up are specified in 
the new regime. Financial incentives may be also granted, which depends on the choice 
of national law.  
And finally, the sanctions regime has been further harmonized in new market 
manipulation regime. On the one hand, rules concerning administrative sanction of 
market manipulation have been specified in Market Abuse Regulation. A minimum list 
of the types of measure and sanction available in Member States is provided, and 
pecuniary sanctions, which must be available, will be set the minimum quantum, in order 
to mitigate divergences in Member States. Further, publication of administrative 
sanctioning decisions, a “name and shame” mechanism, is designed to harness market 
discipline dynamics. And finally, the new market manipulation regime imposes reporting 
obligations on national competent authorities and ESMA to enhance monitoring and 
support convergences.
393
   
On the other hand, criminal sanctions regime is introduced into the new market 
manipulation regulation. This is the first time that Article 83(2) TFEU is used as the legal 
basis for harmonizing criminal law, and it is also a pioneer to employ criminal law to 
ensure the effective implementation of EU polices. Directive on criminal sanctions for 
market abuse has made a minimum harmonisation to criminal sanctions of market 
manipulation, and Member States could choose retain or impose stricter rules.  
                                                 
392
 Niamh Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation, Oxford University Press 2014, pp. 
761. 
393
 Ibid, pp. 764-765.  
        
127 
Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse adopts the same application scope and 
exception with Market Abuse Regulation. Both nationals and legal persons are punishable 
by criminal sanctions for commitment of manipulative offences, which are serious and are 
committed with intent. So does inciting, aiding, or abetting offences aforementioned, and 
attempts to engage in market manipulation. In order to guarantee the dissuasive and 
deterrent effect of manipulation rules, a minimum maximum-term of imprisonment is 
provided for nature person liable for a breach. Legal persons must be subject to effective, 
proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions, which must include criminal (or non-criminal) 
fines.  
Changes made in the Market Abuse Regulation will significant enhance the efficiency of 
supervision and enforcement of market manipulation prohibition in the EU. However, 
there still are some unsolved issues, such as, interpretation of “reasonable suspicion”, the 
criteria to decide “seriousness” and so on. Therefore, further improvements are needed to 
establish an EU uniform market manipulation regime.   
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Chapter 5 Market manipulation regulation and fundamental rights in the EU 
Fundamental rights
394
 are formally recognized as part of the EU law by the Maastricht 
Treaty (1992). Protection of these rights has entered into a new phase since the adoption of 
the Lisbon Treaty. Article 6 of TEU is the central provision of fundamental rights. It 
clearly provides that fundamental rights come from three resources: the European Union 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (the Charter)
395
, national constitutional 





And EU law gives these fundamental rights (rather than the instruments in 
which they are contained) the same legal status as the Treaties.
 397
 
Fundamental rights have played a more and more important role in the regulation of the 
internal market through legislative harmonization.
398
 On the one hand, fundamental rights 
are directly binding upon the EU legislators, and compliance of which should be checked 
during the drafting process. This development is proved by the fact that older legislation 
did not contain any reference to fundamental rights or the general principles of 
Community law, while the more recent pieces of legislation, since 2005, contain recitals 
concerning the compliance with the Charter.
399
 On the other hand, it is also apparent from 
the settled case-law that fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles 
of law whose observance the Court ensures, respect for human rights is a condition of the 
lawfulness of Union acts and measures implementing legislation should be compatible 
with those fundamental rights.
400
  
Accordingly, Market Abuse Regulation, a secondary Union act, should respect the 
fundamental rights. The legislative measures setting out rules for market manipulation, 
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including sanctions should be in compliance with relevant fundamental rights.
401
 And 
fundamental rights of particular relevance to the regulation of market manipulation 
include the freedom of expression; the right to private and family and the right to protect 
personal data; and the fundamental rights concerning justice.  
However, fundamental rights are hardly ever of an absolute character, the application of 
which can be limited.
402
 According to Article 52(1) of the Charter, limitation on the 
exercise of the rights and freedoms can be provided if, firstly, they are made by law and 
respect the essence of those rights and freedoms; and secondly, the limitations imposed are 
necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognized by the Union or the 
need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. Market Abuse Regulation aims to ensure 
and enhance the integrity of internal market and protect investors’ interests (particularly 
fundamental right to property), but there are possibilities that some measures set out to 
regulate market manipulation in the Regulation may infringe fundamental rights when 
carried out. Therefore it is necessary to make an assessment of fundamental rights 
concerned and reach a balance between the general interest objective of ensuring market 
integrity and protection of fundamental rights. 
5.1 The regulation of market manipulation and freedom of expression 
Freedom of expression is one of the most important fundamental rights that guaranteed in 
the Union and in the Member States and as recognized pursuant to the Charter and to other 
relevant provisions. It means that everyone should have the freedom to hold opinions and 
to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by the public authority 
and regardless of frontiers.
403
 However, freedom of expression has a close relationship 
with market manipulation, the exercises of which might constitute market manipulation, 
and therefore need to be limited.  
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5.1.1 information-based manipulation and freedom of expression 
Manipulation or attempted manipulation of financial instruments could be perpetrated by 
spreading false or misleading information through the media, including internet, 
newspaper and other means. The false or misleading information has a significant impact 
the prices of financial instruments, and could destroy the price discovery mechanism in the 
financial market. And such impact cannot be corrected in a relatively short period of time 




Information-based manipulation is particularly harmful, as it distorts the information 
which is the basis for the investors to rely on to make investment decisions, destroys the 
credit of issuers by misleading the public. Accordingly, free expression should be limited 
in financial market when a person know or ought to have known the information is false or 
misleading, in order to ensure the general interest objective of market integrity. 
Certainly, there is an obvious borderline between disseminating false or misleading 
information with the freedom of expression, and this fundamental right never entails a 
person the right to spread false or misleading information. However, the harsh punishment 
imposed on misinformation pursuit to market manipulation regulation may seriously 
affect the right,
405
 because it is not always easy to make distinguish of the right and wrong 
in the world, and the fear of being punished for manipulation based on false or misleading 
information may be detrimental to the exercise of free speech.
406 
 
5.1.2 Market manipulation and journalist 
Journalist, especially the one making financial comments, is a typical case concerning the 
relationship between market manipulation and freedom of expression. Articles concerning 
financial instruments, listed companies and related hidden resources published by 
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journalists, usually have a significant impact on the public when making investment 
decision.  
According to current market manipulation regime, journalists are not except from the 
liability for manipulating market, as a result, they may be in fear of expressing their 
opinion concerning financial market, if market manipulation regulation covers a too wide 
scope and the sanctions are extremely serious. The solution is naturally to seek a 
compromise that on the one hand respects the very broad limits of free speech for the 
media, while on the other hand emphasis that market manipulation will apply to journalists 
who are in a conflict of interest by investing in the securities they comment on.
407
  
Therefore, journalist is privileged to be regulated by national rules governing the freedom 
of press and freedom of expression in other media and the rules or codes governing the 
journalist profession, if these rules achieve similar effects as regulatory technical 
standards provided in the Market Abuse Regulation.
408
 At the same time, measures should 
be established to ensure that journalists objectively express their opinion, and to disclose 
their interests or indicate conflicts of interest concerning the financial instruments to 
which that information relates. Journalists might be considered as manipulators if (a) they, 
or persons closely associated with them, derive, directly or indirectly, an advantage or 
profits from his comments; or (b) the disclosure or the dissemination is made with the 
intention of misleading the market as to the supply of, demand for, or price of financial 
instruments. 
5.1.3 Market manipulation and investment recommendations  
Another typical case concerning the balance between right to freedom of expression and 
general interest of integrated market is investment recommendations or other information 
recommending or suggesting an investment strategy. Unlike journalists, investment 
                                                 
407
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recommendations or suggestions are usually published financial market professionals, 
such as independent analysts, investment firms, credit institutions, or natural persons 
working form them under a contract of employment or otherwise. They contain context in 
relation to one or several financial instruments, including the present or future value or 
price or the situation of their issuers. Such kind of information has significant influence on 
investors’ investment judgments, in particular when the information is disclosed by 
famous financial market professionals.  
Many market manipulation cases happen where orders to trade are given or transactions 
are undertaken by persons before the same persons or persons linked to them produce or 
disseminate investment recommendations which are erroneous, biased, or demonstrably 
influenced by material interest. As a result, in order to avoid the abuse of the right to 
freedom of expression, persons who produce or disseminate investment recommendations 
or other information that recommends or suggests an investment strategy in one or more 
financial instruments should be subject to strict transparent rules if they make trading of 
such instruments on their own accounts.  
And given professional duties, investment advisors and similar person should take 
reasonable care to ensure that information published is objectively presented. Further, they 
also should disclose their interests or indicate conflicts of interest concerning the financial 
instruments to which that information relates.
409
  
5.2 Regulation of market manipulation and the right to privacy and protection of 
personal data 
The rights to privacy and protection of personal data are recognized in Article 8 of 
ECHR
410
, Article 7 and 8 of Charter of Fundamental Rights of The European Union
411
, 
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and in the general principles of Union law. These rights are also directly protected in 
Directive 95/46/EC, Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Directive 2002/58/EC.
412
  
5.2.1 Circumstances that might infringe the right to privacy and protection of personal 
data 
The fundamental right to privacy and protection of personal data may be infringed in four 
circumstances according to the market manipulation regulation. The first case is regarding 
the exercise of investigatory and supervisory powers of competent authorities. A 
minimum set of powers is granted to competent authorities to facilitate the detection and 
sanctioning of market manipulation, in particular, the power to enter private premises to 
seize documents and data and the power to require telephone conversation, 
communication records or data traffic records, which are seen as the most important tools 




Nevertheless, the exercise of these powers is of high possibility to seriously interfere with 
the fundamental rights, notably the right to respect for private and family life and the right 
to the protection of personal data. It is confirmed by the case law of the Court that the 
access of the competent national authorities to the data constitutes a further interference 
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with the right to privacy and personal data protection recognized by Article 8 of the ECHR 
and Article 7 of the Charter.
414
 
The second situation is with regard to the whistleblowing regime. As analysed previously, 
whistleblowing is an efficient tool to detect market manipulation. However, the person 
who blows the whistle may face retaliation if his personal data is revealed to his employer 
or to the public. In addition, the right to privacy of the nature person who allegedly 
committed the infringement may also be infringed if his personal data is not well 
protected.  
The third circumstance where the right to privacy and the right to protection of personal 
data is face of infringement is concerning the information-sharing system. In order to 
combat cross-border market manipulation, related information is shared among competent 
authorities, ESMA, and even supervisors in a third country. Personal data is inevitably 
included in the information exchanged. As a result, there is a possibility that personal data 
may be illegally disclosed or abused during or after the transfer.  
And the last possible measure that may infringe the right to privacy and the right to 
protecting personal data is publication of decision. Disclosing the administrative or 
criminal sanctions for market manipulation is a “naming-and-shaming” strategy, which is 
also an effective way to deter market manipulation given reputational risk. However, 
according to Market Abuse Regulation, the context of publication concludes the identity 
of the person subject to the sanctioning decision, so there may be some situations that the 
disclosure of such data is disproportionate.  
5.2.2 Balancing the fundamental right to privacy and general objective of the integrated 
market 
Just like the right to freedom of expression, the right to privacy and protection of personal 
data are also not absolute. Such rights are subject to certain limitations when they are 
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necessary and genuinely meet general objective of integrated market in accordance with 
Article 52(1) of the Charter. It is also firmed by the case-law of the Court that the Union 
rules do not preclude Member States from laying down an obligation to disclose personal 
data for administrative proceedings, in this case for supervising or investigating market 
manipulation, provided that such an obligation is subject to the principle of proportionality 




In relation to determine the proportionality test and fair balance, no general rules are 
provided in the Market Abuse Regulation, so it is currently depending on the case law of 
Court.
416
 However, some measures are set out in the Market Abuse Regulation that may 
indicate whether the behaviour taken to limit the right of privacy and protection of data is 
proportionate or not.  
5.2.2.1 The proportionality test and powers of competent authorities 
In terms of the exercise of the powers to acquire data traffic records from 
telecommunications operator, it could be considered as proportionate if: a) a reasonable 
suspicion of market manipulation must exist; b) the data required is provided only to the 
competent authorities responsible for the manipulative investigation and serve the purpose 
thereto; c) the data required is limited to what is strictly necessary to carry out the 
investigation and is deleted when the investigation is closed without further action.
417
  
In terms of the power to enter the private premises to seize documents and data, safeguards 
that ensure the proportionality are similar to that of the power to acquire data traffic 
records, including: a) a reasonable suspicion of the infringement of market manipulation 
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and of the removal or destruction of critical evidences; b) prior judicial authorization 
should be acquired if needed according to national law; and c) deletion of the related 
information when the investigation is totally finished. In addition, these powers should be 
carried out in accordance with national law, and exercised to the extent necessary for the 
proper investigation of serious cases where there are no equivalent means for effectively 
achieving the same results.
418
 
5.2.2.2 The proportionality test and processing of personal data 
Limitation to the right to privacy and protection of personal data is proportionate if the 
personal data processed is accurate, adequate and the use of such data is solely for the 
purpose of investigating market manipulation by competent authorities. In addition, the 
personal data access should be limited to the time necessary to conduct market 
manipulation investigation, and it shall be retained for a maximum period of five years.
419
 
Further, the processing of personal data should be complied with the national laws, 
regulations or administrative provisions transposing Directive 95/46/EC and Regulation 
(EC) No 45/2001, and the proportionality test should be based on a case-by-case basis.  
5.2.2.3 The proportionality test and whistle-blowing 
Measure provided is proportionate if it can ensure protection of whistle blowers, including 
protecting private and personal data. Meanwhile, the personal and private data of suspects 
under investigation of market abuse as a result of whistle blowing should also be protected 
by the competent authorities. If the investigation fails to detect market abuse, the data 
provided by the whistle blower should be deleted by the competent authorities. To this end, 
competent authorities should assess if there are reasonable grounds to suspect market 
abuse. 
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5.3 Regulation of market manipulation and the fundamental rights to justice 
In order to reduce regulatory arbitrage and support effective enforcement in the EU 
financial markets, the sanctioning regime of market manipulation has been harmonised 
and both administrative and criminal sanctions can be imposed on the offences. These 
sanctions are critical to deter and punish market misconducts, to protect investor 
confidence for the financial markets and to preserve the integrity of the internal market.  
However, sanctions and measures would certainly interfere with, on the one hand, the 
substantive fundamental rights, such as the property right or the right to conduct business; 
and the procedural rights on the other hand. Therefore, it is unlawful for a public authority, 
including the supervisory authorities, courts or tribunals, to act in a way which is 
incompatible with fundamental rights unless they could not have acted differently as a 
result of existing legislation.
420
 And sanctions for market manipulation, which might limit 
the exercise of fundamental rights, are legal only if they serve the justified objective and 
comply with the proportionality test.  
This section focuses on the fundamental rights of particular concerning market 
manipulation regulation, which cover those provided under Chapter VI Justice of the 
Charter and Article 6 and 7 of ECHR: the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial; the 
presumption of innocence and right of defence; the principles of legality and 
proportionality of criminal offences and penalties; and the right not to be tried or punished 
twice in criminal proceedings for the same offence
421
.  
5.3.1 Administrative sanctions and the fundamental rights to justice 
Although serious misconduct subject to the Market Abuse Regulation is similar in nature 
to the criminal offences of market manipulation, the administrative sanctions imposed on 
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by competent authorities are not criminal.
422
 Compared with the criminal procedure, the 
market manipulation proceeding has a lower threshold of proof, and does not result in a 
criminal record, moral opprobrium that attaches to criminal convictions, or the 
imprisonment of the defendant.
 
Despite that market manipulation regime is not accepted 
as criminal in nature, and it is the national competent authority rather than the court or 
tribunal to make sanctioning decisions, protections provided in the Charter (Chapter vi 
Justice) and ECHR (Article 6 and 7) should still be respected in proceedings for the 
imposition of a penalty for market manipulation.
 423
  
The right to an effective remedy and fair trial, the right to presumption of innocence and 
right of defence are of particular concern when a person is under the proceeding for 
administrative sanction. Some measures stipulated in the Market Abuse Regulation 
contribute to the protection of these fundamental rights. 
In the first place, the Market Regulation introduces uniform rules for administrative 
sanctions and measures, which aims to ensure that the comparable offence of market 
manipulation would be subject to comparable type and level of administrative sanction 
across the EU.
424
 In addition, common minimum rules set out in the regulation to efficient 
remedy provided for people who suffer lost because of market manipulation. The rules 
would ensure that administrative sanctions are higher than the potential profits from 
market abuse and disgorgement of profits.
425
 Particularly in the case of monetary penalties, 
administrative fines imposed under the regulation are paid back to the financial services 
industry, thus compensating, albeit indirectly, those who suffer the increased costs 
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imposed on market participants by market manipulation.
426
 The amount of the fines is 
determined with consideration of the gravity and duration of the manipulative offence, the 
responsibility of the perpetrator, the importance of the profits gained or losses avoided, 
and other elements provided in the regulation. Furthermore, a minimum maximum the 
administrative pecuniary sanction, in respect of both natural and legal person, is set out in 
order to guarantee the fine is sufficient and deterrent and to avoid divergent treatments in 
different Member States. All these measures would contribute to the right to an efficient 
remedy and fair trial.  
In the second place, the right of presumption of innocence and the right of defence are also 
respected and protected in the administrative proceedings. Before making administrative 
sanction decisions, competent authorities should provide sufficient evidence to prove that 
a person has involved in a manipulative behaviour or an attempted manipulative behaviour, 
despite that the burden of proof does not follow the criminal level but civil one. The person 
allegedly to commit such misconduct shall also have the right to defend. Even though 
Market Abuse Regulation does not provide explicitly rules, Member States are required to 
have the law to ensure that these fundamental rights are respected and observed.  
A typical example is relating to whistleblowing regime. When suspicious orders and 
transactions that may constitute market manipulation or attempted market manipulation 
are reported by a company insider, the person alleged should be entitled the fundamental 
rights to justice. Firstly, competent authorities should make an assessment if there are 
reasonable grounds to suspect market manipulation before they carry out their 
investigation.
427
 At the same time, the nature personal who allegedly committed the 
infringement should be protected at all stages of the procedure without prejudice to 
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5.3.2 Criminal sanctions and the fundamental rights to justice 
Given the harsh punishment, criminal sanctions are considered to have a strong deterrent 
effect on potential market misconducts. However, criminal investigations and sanctions 
compromise intrusive rules, which have a significant on individual rights, which may 
result in deprivation of liberty and stigma effect. Therefore, it is very important that the 
imposition of criminal sanctions and measures is in accordance with the Charter and 
ECHR, which provide important limits for EU action this field.
429
  
In general, Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse respects the fundamental 
rights and observes the principles recognized in the Charter, especially the right to an 
effective remedies and the right to a fair trial, the resumption of innocence and right of 
defence, the principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties, 
and the right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same 
offence.
430
 To be specific, firstly, an approximation of national criminal law with regard 
to market manipulation is made in order to reinforce uniform enforcement of market 
manipulation rules and to increase the deterrent effect.  
Secondly, criminal sanctions and measures are only subject to serious offences of market 
manipulation or attempted market manipulation committed with intent. Such arrangement 
would, on the one hand, guarantee that the person who causes the most serious damage to 
the financial market and investors is punished with the harshest type and level of sanctions 
or measures; and on the other hand, avoid wasting time and legal resources to cases of 
slight influences.  
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And finally, a minimum requirement regarding the type and level of criminal sanction 
would help to make comparable sanction to offences by comparable punishment at EU 
level, in case that the perpetrator takes advantage of the lenient jurisdiction. As stated in 
the recital of Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse, imposition of criminal 
sanction should be appropriate, taking account the profits made or losses avoided as well 




In addition, Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse does not preclude Member 
States from imposing both administrative penalties and criminal sanctions for market 
manipulation at the same time. And the possibility and/or the level of a criminal sanction, 
which may subsequently be imposed, do not affect the assessment in relation to the effect, 
proportionality and deterrence of an administrative sanction.
432
 Since punishments 
imposed by the competent authorities are not criminal in nature, no breach is made 
concerning the right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same 
offence.  
Furthermore, except from the obligations under Union law on procedural right in criminal 
proceedings, Member States are also obliged to ensure the procedure rights of suspected or 
accused person in criminal proceeding in their national laws. Since the Directive only 
makes a minimum harmonization on certain aspects of criminal sanctions for market 
manipulation, it is mainly the obligation of Member States to provide higher level rules to 
protect these fundamental rights.  
It is fair to conclude that these measures adopted in the Directive on criminal sanctions for 
market abuse contribute to the protection of the fundamental rights to justice. Since 
criminal sanctions and measures are big threats to the fundamental rights considering their 
severity and stigma effects, the impositions should be stick to the proportionality principle. 
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If criminal law measures are used to support the enforcement of EU policies, such as 
ensuring and promoting market integrity in this case, they must always remain a measure 
of last resort. So an analyse whether measures other than criminal law measures could not 
sufficiently ensure the policy implementation and whether criminal law could address the 
problems more effectively needs to be made.
433
 In essence, whether limitations for 
fundamental rights to justice could be justified or not is a question about how to make a 
balance between effective enforcement of market manipulation rules and procedural 
fairness and fundamental rights. 
Conclusion of Chapter 5 
Fundamental rights are given the same legal status with the Treaties by EU law. They 
have played an increasing important role in the regulation of the internal market through 
legislative harmonization.
434
 Fundamental rights are not only directly binding upon the 
EU legislators, the compliance of which should be checked during the drafting process, 
but also form an integral part of the general principles of law whose observance the Court 
ensures. Therefore, Market Abuse Regulation and Directive on criminal sanctions for 
market manipulation, as secondary Union acts, should respect the fundamental rights.  
Meanwhile, the application of fundamental rights can be limited if limitations, which are 
made by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms, are necessary and 
genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognized by the Union or the need to 
protect the rights and freedoms of others. Regulation of market manipulation, aiming to 
ensure and enhance the integrity of internal market and to protect investors’ interests 
(particularly fundamental right to property), satisfies such conditions. Accordingly, an 
assessment relating to balancing the prohibition of market manipulation and protection of 
fundamental rights should be made in practice.  
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Three types of fundamental rights are of particular relevance to the market manipulation 
prohibition, including freedom of expression; the right to private and family and the right 
to protect personal data; and the fundamental rights concerning justice. Firstly, journalists 
and investment advisors will be affected by the prohibition of market manipulation 
because of their professions. In order to avoid abusive punishment, the market 
manipulation regime sets out special conditions of determining related manipulative 
behaviours.  
Secondly, some powers of competent authorities are very aggressive, such as the right to 
enter into private premises in order to seize documents and other data, to require 
telephone and data traffic from telecommunications operators and investment firms. The 
rights to privacy and protection of personal data are easily breached by these powers, so 
Market Abuse Regulation sets out conditions of their exercises to avoid abuses, while 
national law plays a more important role in their protection. 
And finally, fundamental rights concerning justice should be paid more attention with the 
further harmonisation of sanctioning regime of market manipulation in the EU. Some 
measures that ensure the procedural rights of suspected manipulators during 
administrative sanctions have been provided by Market Abuse Regulation. While 
Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse requires that Member States should 
guarantee procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings.  
In general, the new EU market manipulation regime has made big improvements 
concerning the balance between prohibition of market manipulation and protection of 
fundamental rights. And the success will highly depend on Member States, who are 
obliged to ensure proper measures are provided in the national law.  
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Market manipulation has been one of the most serious issues in the Chinese securities 
market since its establishment. However, the regulation of market manipulation in China 
is far from mature, which cannot efficiently prevent this type of illegal activities. On the 
contrary, EU market manipulation regime has been proved to be effective in combating 
market manipulation, in particular after the adoption of new regulatory package, many 
tough issues, such as detection, investigation and supervision of cross-border and 
cross-markets manipulation, will be further refined. As the Chinese securities market is 
getting more fragment and international, many issues that exist in the EU financial market 
have showed in the China while the relating regulation is still blank. Therefore, studying 
the EU regulatory experiences concerning market manipulation will be useful for refining 
the Chinese market manipulation regime.  
6.1 A brief review of the development of Chinese securities market  
A general picture of the developing history of securities market in China is the background 
knowledge, which helps us to get a better understand of the Chinese market manipulation 
issue. While the People’s Republic of China was founded in the 1949, its securities market 
began to establish after the Economic Reform in 1979.
436
 It was not until December 1990 
that China established its two stock exchanges, Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange. Although the starting point of Chinese securities market is very late 
compared with other ones in most of the developed countries, it has developed extremely 
fast in the past 30 years. At the end of September 2014, Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange’s worldwide ranking are 7th and 9th respectively according to 
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 Besides, China is devoting to develop multi-level capital market 




In order to guarantee the sound functioning of securities market and to protect investors, a 
set of legislations has been adopted and amended since the market’s establishment. 
Administrative regulations of the State Council constituted the major legal resources for 
regulating the securities market before the adoption of Law of the People's Republic of 
China on Securities in 1998 (hereinafter “the 1998 Securities Law”). 439  The 1998 
Securities Law is the “constitution law” for the securities market, which not only affirms 
the legal status of securities market in China, but also provides basic rules for the offering 
and trading of securities as well as the liability regime for wrong-doings in the securities 
market. With the further development of economy and financial system reform in China, 
the 1998 Securities Law were amended with significant changes in 2005 and a package of 
relative administrative regulations were published at the same, together of which a 
complete legal system for regulating securities market is generally created.
440
 
Further, a single centralized supervisory system for the securities market has been 
established with more than 20 years’ effort. Initially, two dedicated regulators, the 
Securities Committee of the State Council (SCSC) and the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC)
441
, were instituted to oversee the nationwide securities market in 
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1992, which was a remarkable milestone as from then on China’s securities market started 
to align for the first time under a single centralized regulatory framework.
442
 Meanwhile, 
People’s Bank of China (PBC), the central bank, shared part of the powers concerning the 
regulation of securities companies. It was at the end of 1998 CSRC replaced SCSC and 
took over PBC’s power with regard to securities companies’ regulation, becoming the 
single independent supervisor for the entire securities market in China.  
In the past 20 years, CSRC has played a crucial role in ensuring the market’s sound and 
order functioning and in protecting investors. In particular, an inspection department 
targeting illegal behaviours in the securities and futures market was instituted by the 
CSRC in 1995. Seven years later, another specific inspection department for investigating 
insider dealing and market manipulation was established inside CSRC. Then in 2004, 
CSRC instituted regional supervisory agencies in each province, and created cooperation 
mechanism with the local government, which greatly increased the efficiency of 
enforcement. Furthermore, CSRC has also engaged to develop international supervisory 
cooperation with other worldwide supervisors, enabling it to exchange information or 
provide helps for cross-broad investigations.
443
  
Despite significant achievement that has made, the Chinese securities market is still quite 
young and immature. There are many critical issues requiring further efforts to resolve in 
order to keep the market from collapse, including the significant influence of government 
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policy to the securities market, the problem of ownership structure
444
, inadequate 
protection of minor shareholders, and inefficient enforcement.
445
  
Given the incomplete regulation system and credit mechanism, market manipulation has 
been a big threat to the securities market since its establishment. It is commonly accepted 
that the development history of the securities market in China is also a developing history 
of combating market manipulation.
446
 Unfortunately, no effective system has been 
founded concerning the regulation and supervision for market manipulation until now. 
Furthermore, the globalisation of securities market provides more opportunities for 
cross-broad market manipulation, and will worsen the current situation of the Chinese 
securities market.  
6.2 Market manipulation and its main features in the Chinese securities market 
Market manipulation is closely associated with the Chinese securities market since its 
establishment in the late 1970s. It is one of the primary threats to the market integrity and 
investors’ interest. The history of the Chinese securities market is also the history of 
market manipulation.
447
 Market manipulation cases, not only have an impressive number, 
but also have a significant serious influence to the securities market. With the development 
of securities market and related legislation, market manipulation shows different features 
in different phases of the securities market’s development. 
6.2.1 Market manipulation in different developing phase of securities market 
6.2.1.1 Market manipulation before 1990 
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Before 1990, the securities market in China was a paradise for manipulators. On the one 
hand, the price of a stock was easily influenced. Because at that time there was no stock 
exchange, so few stocks were offered, the transitions of which were made either in the 
over-the-counter market or in private. As a result, the small trading volume led to higher 
possibility of manipulation. On the other hand, as no legislation prohibiting market 
manipulation was adopted, it did not raise any cost for a person to perpetrate such 
behaviours.  
Since the stock exchanges had not been established at that time, the typical form of market 
manipulation was speculating the issue prices of a stock, which is a rare case in other 
mature securities market.
448
 Many manipulators with capital advantages dumped the 
shares to make illegal profits shortly after pushing up the issue price of a stock at an 
abnormal level. Besides, the government could be said to be the biggest manipulator, 
because it had decisive power to approve the issue of a security and its issuing price. 
Furthermore, given that information disclosure system was not established and the 
majority investors were retail investors, who did not have much professional knowledge, 
information-based manipulation constituted another typical type of manipulation during 
that period. 
6.2.1.2 Market manipulation between 1990 and 2004 
In wake of the establishment of two stock exchanges at the end of 1990, securities trading 
were greatly increasingly. Unfortunately, so did the number of market manipulation cases. 
Although a uniform regulatory and supervisory framework has been gradually established 
at the end of 1998, it is not mature enough to make an effective deterrence or sanction of 
manipulative activities. A series of manipulative cases with significant influence has been 
investigated and reported to the public, which cover the main forms of market 
manipulation. For example, the cases of Yi’an Keji and Zhongke Chuangye are model 
                                                 
448
 Geng Jian-xin, and Zhou Fang, “Positive Analysis: Reform of Marketing Issuing Price”, Economic 
Theory and Business Management, 2002, Issue 11, pp. 34-39.  
        
149 
cases of wash sale and successive trading, Su Sanshan case represents manipulation 




In general, most of the manipulators from 1994 to 2004 are a group of people, popular 
known as zhuangjia (arch manipulators), who specialize in making illegal profits by driving 
up the prices of certain stocks before getting out and leaving small investors holding the 
bag.450 Therefore, this period is also called “dealer-manipulated share time”.451 
6.2.1.3 Market manipulation after 2004 
Given the serious damages made by market manipulation in the securities market, more effects 
are made by legislators and supervisors in order to prevent market manipulation and to 
enhance investors’ confidence in the securities market. The level of administrative and 
criminal sanctions for market manipulation was increased after the amendment of the 
Securities Law (2005) and Criminal Law (2006).452 And in terms of enforcement, more 
inspectors are established nationwide by CSRC in order to have a better detection of market 
manipulation. From 2008 to August 2014, 150 cases to be suspected of market 
manipulation were investigated by CSRC, of which 41 cases had been imposed 
administrative sanction and 7 cases were responsible for criminal punishment.
453
  
As the regulation and supervision systems become more efficient, methods employed by 
manipulators also evolve at the same time. With the wide use of computers and the internet 
in securities transactions, there was a burst of manipulation cases based on false or 
misleading information around 2008, such as case of Wang Jianzhong (scalping), Wuhan 
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Xin Delan Investment Consultants Ltd (scalping), Leading Brother (Daitou Dage) 777 
(false and misleading information).
 
Compared with manipulation before 2004, the 
majority cases have become more complex and harder to detect in recent years. They no 
longer just depend on capital advantages, but employ a combination of several methods 
(capital, information, dominating position, and so on).
 454
 As a result, the phase after 2004 
is popular known as “post dealer-manipulated shares time”.  
6.2.2 Main features of market manipulation in the China’s securities market 
From the evolvement of the securities market and manipulative cases in practice, certain 
features of market manipulation in the China’s securities market could be concluded.  
6.2.2.1 Manipulation of Chinese character: dealer-manipulated shares 
Dealer-manipulated shares have a long history in the Chinese securities market, and they 
are still active in recent years. Since the establishment of the securities market, market 
manipulation has never been out of sight. Prior to the launch of split-share structure 
reform
455
 in 2005, nearly every stock in the secondary market was under speculation, and 
the trading price and volume were significantly influenced by the arch manipulators who 
were in possession of large capital.
456
 While the regulatory and supervisory framework 
has been improved after 2005, the number of manipulation cases is still quite surprising. 
The Chinese securities market is considered as a giant platform for manipulation, as 
investors try to get profits from speculation rather than share dividend.
457
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6.2.2.2 Manipulation by more complex and sophisticated methods  
The forms of market manipulation become more complex and harder to detection in China. 
Comparatively, the main forms of market manipulation in 10 years ago were wash sale, 
improper matched orders and successive trading, which were usually made by one single 
or a few institution or nature person with a large amount of funds or shareholdings. For 
example, in the case of Yi’an Keji (2001), the shares were speculated by four investment 
advisory companies, who speculated the stock price increasing from 26 RMB to more than 




However, such easily detected kinds of manipulations are getting less and less with CSRC 
becomes more and more decisive and efficient. A number of more complex and new forms 
of market manipulation come into sight. On the one hand, with the wide use of internet and 
computers, fictitious orders, scalping and other manipulative methods are created and 
generate a number of derivative forms in a very short time. Besides, speculators now do 
not use a single method, but employing a combination to affect the trading prices or 
volumes of shares.  
On the other hand, market manipulation is usually accomplished by a relatively larger 
number of people than before, and the connection between manipulators is harder to 
prove.
459
 For example, the accounts used for manipulation used to belong to the 
manipulator himself or his relatives’, but now the accounts used have no connections and 
are spread widely. Furthermore, market manipulation cross the future markets or 
commodity markets is also being detected. Such emerging kind of market manipulation 
has a larger influence to the financial market and it is also very difficult to supervise.
460
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6.2.2.3 Dominant position of information-based manipulation 
Manipulation by disseminating false or misleading information becomes the dominate 
type of market manipulation in recent years. Information spreads much wider and faster in 
the securities market with the development of communication technologies. Blogs, 
bulletin board service (BBS for short), and other social networking platform are the 
modern and hot way for disseminating and receiving information, in particular for retail 
investors who are easier to be influenced. 
According to the information disseminators, two main categories of manipulators exist. 
One is led by manipulative investors, who have bought certain shares before they spread 
beneficial information through BBS, blogs and other social networking platform to induce 
a great quantity of retail investors to purchase these shares, and they will dump these 
shares when the price gets higher. The shares targeted in this form of manipulation are 




The other type of manipulator is predominated by the listed company and/or its major 
shareholders or managers. In order to benefit the leading shareholders to sell down their 
stakes, a list company may control the time and contents of the information disclosed, or 
the managers may conspire with outsiders to make up positive events of the listed 
company. 
In general, as the development of the securities market and its regulation, market 
manipulation also evolves. From the cases investigated by CSRC, it could conclude that 
both the strategies and methods used by manipulators are becoming more complicated. 
More manipulation cases are made in a short term employing several forms of 
manipulation at the same time, such as wash sale, fictitious orders and information-based 
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manipulation; the fund used to speculate the target stocks is extremely large, and the 
amount of transition can accumulate to millions or even billions of Euros; and the 
cross-border or cross-markets manipulation is emerging in the Chinese securities, which 
deserves more attention in both regulation and supervision aspect.
462
 
6.3 An analysis of market manipulation regime in China 
As a result of the Culture Revolution from 1966 to 1976, the whole legal framework of the 
securities market in China was destroyed. Therefore, the current securities legal 
framework is built from zero with more than 30 years’ efforts, which is based on the 
special Chinese special economic structure and draws many experiences from the US, 
Germany and Japan. However, the securities legal framework, in particular the part 
concerning market manipulation, is still immature and inefficient. 
6.3.1 Legislation history and legal resources of market manipulation regulation in 
China  
6.3.1.1 Market manipulation regulation before 1998 
Market manipulation was free of regulation in the first 10 years after the establishment of 
the securities market. It is firstly prohibited in a regional administrative regulation issued 
by Shanghai municipal government in November 1990, in which improper matched orders, 
successive trading, manipulation based on information, buy-back programmes, and 
manipulation employing other types of methods were clearly banned.
463
 Soon after that 
similar rules were provided in Shenzhen Interim Provisions on Management of the 
Trading of Stocks, another regional regulation. It was until 22 April 1993 that the State 
Council adopted the first nationwide regulation, Interim Provisions on the Administration 
of the Issuing and Trading of Stocks, which provides a nationwide prohibition of market 
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manipulation. This regulation worked as the “constitution law” of the securities market for 
more than 5 years before the entering into force of the Securities Law in 1 July 1999.  
The Interim Provisions on the Administration of the Issuing and Trading of Stocks 
stipulates several forms of manipulation subject to administrative punishment, including 
affecting the offering or trading of stocks by conspiracy, fund advantage or disseminating 
rumours and so on, improper matched orders, and short selling. With regard to the 
sanctioning regime, administrative liability is the major form of punishment. While civil 
and criminal liabilities are both mentioned in the regulation, they are not applicable 




Besides, given illegal securities behaviours were quite active at that time, a specific 
regulation prohibiting securities frauds was published by the State Council on 2 September 
1993, Interim Provision of the Prohibition of Securities Frauds of the State Council (1993), 
which provided more detailed rules with regard to the definition and types of market 
manipulation.
465
 Then in 1996, CSRC issued an announcement to make a particular ban of 
manipulative behaviours in the securities market, adding some new measures used by 
manipulators to induce investors to make investment decision.
466
 
6.3.2.2 Market manipulation regulation under the 1998 Securities Law 
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On the base of the former legislations and experiences in practice, the Securities Law was 
finally adopted at the end of 1998. Market manipulation is clearly prohibited by the law.
467
 
And in Article 71 of the Securities Law, three types of manipulation, including 
manipulation by actual purchases, wash sale, and matched orders, are expressly stated. 
Besides a catch-all rule concerning manipulation by other measures is also provided in the 
same article.  
Furthermore, administrative sanctions are formerly stipulated by law. Any person 
perpetrating manipulative behaviours should be confiscated and fined for an amount 
between one and five times of his illegitimate earnings. For those cases that are serious, 
criminal liability is available with the amendments of the Criminal Law in 1997.
468
 The 
Securities Law is a milestone for regulating the securities market, and its issue has 
encouraged further legislation and enforcement regarding market manipulation.  
6.3.1.3 Market manipulation regulation after 2005 
With the fast development of the financial market in China, legislations of financial 
market were outdated, so a big wave of regulatory reform was made in China around 2005. 
Market manipulation rules were also included, and important adjustments were made for 
increasing its deterrent effects and enforcement efficiency.  
Firstly, mistakes or improper descriptions of market manipulation are changed to correct 
the mistakes or to make the identification easier and clearer. On the one hand, the 
subjective element that requires illegitimate interest or passes risks on others is abandoned 
in the 2005 Securities Law. Such subjective requirement is not only very difficult to judge 
in practice, but also useless, as manipulative behaviors will make damages to the securities 
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market and investors no matter the manipulators get benefits or not.
469
 This amendment is 
also in accordance with changes made in the US and the EU.  
On the other hand, impractical or ambiguity provisions have been revised. For example, 
the expression of wash sale before the amendments was “purchase or sell securities that 
do not transfer ownership, considering the buyer or seller himself as the trading object”. 
However, it was impossible to operate in practice, because a person is forbidden to open 
several accounts under his own name according to law. Therefore, in the new Securities 
Law, this expression has been changed into “conducting securities transactions among the 
accounts actually controlled by oneself”. 
Secondly, the sanctioning regime of market manipulation has been improved. 
Manipulators are subject to more serious punishment than before. In the situation of 
market manipulation made by legal person, both the legal person and the person directly in 
charge of the unit as well as the other persons directly responsible are subject to 
punishment. In addition, the level of sanctions has been increased according to the new 
rules. For example, manipulators could be punished up to 10 years of imprisonment, 
which is five years more than before.
470
 Furthermore, investors who suffer lost from 




And finally, some technical rules concerning the identification or punishment of market 
manipulation are provided. These rules are mainly included in two regulations. One is the 
Indication for the Identification of Securities Market Manipulation published by CSRC in 
2007. Although this indication does not have binding effects, it provides a guideline for 
determining market manipulation. Eight types of manipulation are clearly interpreted, 
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three of which (successive trading, matched orders, and wash sale) are the same with those 
stipulated in the Securities Law, and the other five new types (scalping, fictitious orders, 
marking the end, trading on certain time or price, manipulation based on false or 
misleading information) are complements to the 2005 Securities Law, and help the 
supervisor with the identification of market manipulation.  
The other important regulation is the Joint Supplement Regulation of the Supreme People's 
Procuratorate and ministry of public security on the prosecute standard of criminal 
offences concerning financial affair, which provides a detailed standard for determining 
“serious” that is a necessary element to apply criminal liability.  
To sum up, there is not a single specific legislation for the regulation of market 
manipulation. The Chinese market manipulation regime is provided in related laws and 
administrative regulations. The main legal resources of market manipulation includes the 
Securities Law (Article 5, 77, and 203), the Criminal Law (Article 182), the Interim 
Provisions on the Administration of the Issuing and Trading of Stocks (Article 74), and the 
soft law, Indication for the Identification of Securities Market Manipulation. These rules 
constitute an imperfect market manipulation regime, and a lot of changes should be made 
in the further to ensure an efficient regime for combating market manipulation.  
6.3.2 Determination of market manipulation in China 
Since judicial precedent does not have a binding effect in China, determination of market 
manipulation is strictly stick to the law. Although there were regulations that tried to 
provide a general definition of market manipulation,
472
 it is avoided by the 2005 
Securities Law, which only describes some typical examples. 
6.3.2.1 The subject and subjective element of market manipulation 
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Article 77 of the 2005 Securities Law clearly provides that “No one is allowed to 
manipulate the securities markets”. Since a person who perpetrates this illegal behaviour 
could be nature person, legal person, or other entities that have legal personality, market 
manipulation prohibition, therefore, targets all the subjects that mentioned.  
With regard to subjective element, the requirement that manipulation is done for getting 
illegitimate interest or passing risks on others, which was provided in the 1998 Securities 
Law has been deleted in the 2005 version. However, this does not naturally mean that 
intention is not a necessary element to determine market manipulation as the EU 
effect-based definition. In practice, intent is still a required condition according to some 
published judgments.
473
 As a result, further interpretation is needed to clear this 
confusion.  
6.3.2.2 Typical types of market manipulation provided in the law  
Wash Sale is one of the most commonly used means in the Chinese securities market. It is 
being prohibited by Article 77(3) of the 2005 Securities Law, Article 183(3) of the 
Criminal Law, and Article 74(4) of the Interim Provisions on the Administration of the 
Issuing and Trading of Stocks. In pursuit of related rules, wash sale is perpetrated by 
conducting securities transactions among the accounts actually controlled by oneself. The 
accounts controlled by manipulators could be the account opened in his name or other 
person, and they also cover accounts controlled by manipulator through investment, 
agreement or other means that a manipulator has the actual right to manage, use or 
dispose.
474
 In recent years, wash sale is becoming more difficult to detect, considering that, 
on the one side, the number of nominal accounts used by manipulator are extremely 
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 and on the other side, the relationship between nominal accounts and their actual 
controller is becoming weaker.
476
  
Improper matched orders are another expressly provided form of market manipulation.
477
 
It is made by “conducting bidirectional securities transactions in collusion with another 
person by following previously fixed timing, price and manner, thus affecting the price or 
volume of securities trading”478. Three elements are required to determine improper 
matched orders: 1) manipulators should be in collusion with each other; 2) carrying out 
bidirectional securities transactions by following previously fixed timing, price and 
manner; 3) affecting the price or volume of securities transition.
479
 However, the detection 
of such form of manipulation is very difficult in practice, and the most difficult part is to 
prove the existing of a conspiracy or a prior contract between manipulators, because 
trading record solo is not enough.  
And the last clearly provided type of market manipulation is manipulation by actual 
purchases, which is stipulated in Article 77(1) of the Securities Law, Article 182(1) of the 
Criminal Law, and Article 74(3) of the Interim Provisions on the Administration of the 
Issuing and Trading of Stocks. It is described as manipulating the securities market by 
conducting allied or incessant purchasing and selling individually or in conspiracy with 
another person by building up an ascendancy of funds or shareholdings or taking 
advantage of information.  
Manipulation by actual purchases has always been the most commonly used method by 
perpetrators in the Chinese securities market, and cases concerned usually involve a large 
number of fund, stocks or persons. However, the law does not provide a clear rule for its 
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judgment. In order to determine a manipulation by actual purchases, an advantage, which 
could be funds, shareholding, information or a combination, should be existed. But the 
criterial of such advantage is not included in the legislations.  
Except these three types of manipulation that are expressly described in the law, a catch-all 
provision is also provided by Article 77(4) of the 2005 securities law and Article 182(4) of 
the Criminal Law, aiming to cover manipulation by other means. According the practical 
experiences, the Indication for the Identification of Securities Market Manipulation (2007) 
lists five new forms of market manipulation as a supplement of the related legislation, 
including manipulation by disseminating false or misleading information, scalping, 
fictitious orders, marking the close and trading at the fixed time and price. In particular, 
fictitious orders took up about 37.5% of the administrative sanctions made by CSRC from 
2007 to the middle 2011.
480
  
Nevertheless, China is a country of continental law system, CSRC and the courts must 
strictly follow, not surpass to tamper, the law when deciding a case. Therefore, the 
supervisor and courts always hesitate to apply the catch-all provision, and judgment 
applying this provision will always raise serious arguments.  
6.3.3 The sanctioning regime of market manipulation in China 
Market manipulation is subject to civil, administrative and criminal liabilities in China. 
These three types of liabilities could be used independently or at the same time, but 
administrative liability is preferable by the legislators and supervisors, while civil liability 
is not applicable in practice.  
6.3.3.1 Administrative liability of market manipulation 
Administrative liability is an effective measure for the deterrence of market manipulation 
considering its efficiency and regulators’ professional knowledge. It is absolutely the most 
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commonly used form of punishment for market manipulation in China. However, the rules 
concerned are too general and lack of operational technical details, which leads to 
inefficient enforcement.  
In terms of the types of administrative liability of market manipulation, they only includes 
divesting illegally held securities, confiscating illegal gains, pecuniary fine (1-5 times of 
the illegal gains), addressing a warning. There are two points that are worth mentioning: 
one is in the situation where there are no illegal gains or the illegal gains are less than 
300,000 RMB (about 40,000 Euro), it shall be fined no less than 300,000 RMB but no 
more than 3,000,000 RMB. In case of manipulation made by legal person, the person 
directly in charge of the entity and the other persons directly responsible should be 
punished at the same the time.
481
  
In terms of the constructive elements of administrative liability of market manipulation, 
there are no clear or commonly agreed rules, no matter in the aspect of legislation or 
theories.
482
 Although three typical forms of market manipulation and a catch-all provision 
are provided in the securities law, the rules are just a simple description of the methods that 
manipulators used, lacking important details that needs to determine a manipulation. 
Questions, such as whether intent is a necessary element, what is the role of the change of 
trading price and volume, and who has the burden of proof, could not find explicit 
answer.
483
 These loopholes in such aspects will affect the objectivity, uniformity and 
authority of the sanction decisions as well as enforcement efficiency of supervisors.  
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Furthermore, there are not rules with regard to factors considered when imposing 
sanctions in the market manipulation regulation in China. So the level of sanctions 
imposed heavily depends on the supervisors, and this may cause diversities for similar 
cases, especially when sanctions for illegal behaviours are significantly influenced by the 
policy. For example, the sanctions imposed on manipulators will be heavier if they are 
made during a period that combating market manipulation is stressed by the supervisory 
authority  
6.3.3.2 Criminal liability of market manipulation 
Market manipulation was not punishable according to the 1979 Criminal Law. It was until 
1997, after an amendment made to the Criminal Law, that criminal sanctions are 
applicable to manipulative offences in the securities market. Then in 1999, market 
manipulation in the future markets could be punished of criminal sanctions in the same 
way with those in the securities market. Further, the level of sanctions to manipulators has 
been increased by the sixth amendment to the Criminal Law in 2006, in order to enhance 
the deterrence effect of market manipulation.  
Currently, criminal liability of market manipulation is mainly provided in Article 182 of 
the Criminal Law. The same three types of manipulation, as provided in the 2005 
Securities Law, are subject to criminal punishment. Identically, a catch-all rule is also 
stipulated in Article 182(4) of the Criminal Law, aiming to dealing with the new coming 
types of manipulation employed in the practice.  
For sanctioning market manipulation, certain conditions should be satisfied. Firstly, a 
manipulative behaviour should be perpetrated with intent, while it does not matter whether 
illegal profits or other interests are realised or not. Secondly, not all manipulative offences 
provided in the Securities Law are criminal punishable, but only cases of seriousness. And 
the standard to determine “serious” could refer to Article 39 of the Notice of the Supreme 
People's Procuratorate and the Ministry of Public Security on Issuing the Supplementary 
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Provisions to the Provisions (II) of the Supreme People's Procuratorate and the Ministry 
of Public Security on the Standards for Filing Criminal Cases under the Jurisdiction of the 
Public Security Organs for Investigation and Prosecution (hereinafter the Notice)
484
.  
In the case of wash sale or improper matched orders, the accumulated trading volume of 
the speculated securities or futures in successive 20 trading days should not be less than 20% 
the total trading volume; in case of manipulation by actual purchases, the manipulator 
should be in possession of or control at least 30% of the tradable securities which are 
subject to speculation, and the trading volume of manipulated subject in 20 successive 
trading days should not be less than 30% of the total trading volume; and manipulation 
perpetrated by directors, supervisors, managers, or controlling shareholders of the listed 
companies, securities companies, securities investment advisors, professional 
intermediary institutions and their employees should be considered as serious.
485
  
In addition, both nature person and legal person are punishable for the commitment of 
market manipulation. When the perpetrator is a nature person, he could be sentenced to a 
fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years or criminal detention and shall, in 
addition, or shall only, be fined; and if the circumstances are especially serious, he shall be 
sentenced to a fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years but not more than ten 
years and shall, in addition, be fined. When the perpetrator is a legal person, not only the 
legal person per se shall be fined, but also the person directly in charge or the other persons 
directly responsible shall be punished according to the rules for nature person.  
Nevertheless, similar issues exist in the criminal sanctioning regime for market 
manipulation with that in the administrative sanctioning regime. One is concerning the 
application of the catch-all provision. This rule aims to avoid the situation where new 
forms of market manipulation are not covered by the law. However, its uses sometimes 
cause arguments relating to the principle of “conviction and penalty according to law”, 
                                                 
484
 No. 47 [2011] of the Ministry of Public Security 
485
 Article 39 of the Notice 
        
164 
and judges, therefore, are unwilling to apply it in practice.
486
 The other one is with regard 
to factors considered when making a criminal decision. Since the Criminal Law does not 
provide the factors which influence the type or level of the criminal sanctions, judges 
enjoy more discretion over sanctions for market manipulation, and this may lead to 
unequal judgments for similar cases.
487
  
6.3.3.3 Civil liability of market manipulation 
The initial provision concerning civil liability of market manipulation is stipulated in 
Article 77 of the Interim Provisions on the Administration of the Issuing and Trading of 
Stocks, which provides that “Any person, who breaches the rules in this regulation and 
causes damages to other person, should be liable for the compensation liability.” 
However, as no implementing rules were accompanied, the civil liability regime is just 
hollow words. Then during the draft of 1998 Securities Law, although civil compensation 
was proposed by some experts to ensure the rights of investors in the securities market 
except from administrative and criminal liabilities, it was still not approved in the final 
version.  
Investors who suffer from market manipulation are finally allowed to request civil 
compensation according to the 2005 Securities Law, while this rule is still literal in China 
taking into account the lack of rules with regard to constructive elements, the scope of 
subject, the identification of damages, the amount and scope of the compensation. For 
example, in the first case of reparation for damages of market manipulation, two 
defendants (Cheng Wenshui and Liu Yanze) were judged to manipulate the securities 
market by CSRC in April 2009. After the publication of administrative decision, 18 retail 
investors seek to ask compensation for damages suffered from their manipulative 
behaviours in July 2009. Unfortunately, both the intermediate court and the Higher 
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Peoples’ Court in Beijing denied the application of investors in 2011 on the basis that there 
were no clear and definite legal provisions or judicial interpretations for this case and the 
causation between the losses of investors and manipulative behaviours could not be 
determined.
488
 Similar situation happened to the case of Wang Jianzhong.
489
 
Despite legislations and judicial practices concerning civil liability are not ideal, most of 
the scholars are making efforts to improve this regime in China. It is commonly agreed by 
experts that granting investors the right to bring the case before the court for seeking 
compensation caused by market manipulation is an efficient way to prevent market 




Although the provisions in the Securities Law are not applicable, experts conclude the 
constructive elements of civil liability for market manipulation according to the civil law 
theory, which include: a) manipulators should be responsible for the compensation; b) an 
intention to acquire illegal profits or to pass risks to other investors is required; c) there 
should be an causation between the manipulative behaviours and the damages suffered; d) 
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6.3.4 Issues of Chinese characters concerning market manipulation regulation  
The current Chinese market manipulation regulation is far from efficiency according to 
previous analysis. And this could partially explained by some reasons of Chinese 
character.  
Firstly, false ideas are hold by the legislators and supervisors. The Chinese legislators 
always try to make a law, which could cover all the possible problems in the securities 
market. However, this is quasi an impossible aim to realize. Therefore, as a replacement, 
catch-all provisions are commonly seen in the law. While China is a country of continental 
law system, judges and supervisors are required to make decisions strictly in pursuit to the 
legislation. As a result, the catch-all provisions, which are general descriptions without 
further implementing details, are rarely applied in practice in order to avoid arguments 
concerning their decisions. And because of such fears, legislative or supervisory gaps still 
exists when dealing with new coming cases. 
Secondly, current market manipulation rules are short of operational details. The 
provisions in the Securities Law does not provide clear answers to the constructive 
elements of market manipulation, such as, whether subjective element manipulator is 
required or not, or whether a result of changes of the trading price or volume of a security 
is needed. Consequently, supervisors do not have a clear legal basis to reply on during 
their work, which significantly affects the enforcement of market manipulation regulation.  
Thirdly, the double role of CSRC becomes an obstacle for combating market manipulation 
in China. CSRC is the supervisor of securities market, while she is also responsible for the 
development of the market. Such double identities lead to a situation where CSRC, in 
particular its regional inspections, is reluctant to investigate manipulators, who have large 
influence on the securities market, because, the breaking down of these manipulators 
(usually important enterprises), may destroy some of the achievements made in the 
securities market. 
        
167 
And lastly, administrative intervene and other powers from the authority threats the 
enforcement of market manipulation regulation. According to practical experiences, 
manipulation cases investigated by the CSRC are usually of great influence, and 
manipulators also contribute to regional economy or even national economy. Therefore, 
local governments sometimes are unwilling to cooperate with the supervisors or to provide 
helps with market manipulation investigation, considering that the result might lead to a 
fall back of local economy at least in a short term. This is also a quite specific reason of 
China for the inefficient enforcement.
492
  
6.5 Improving the market manipulation regime in China: drawing on EU’s 
experiences 
Although there are some differences with regard to market manipulation in the financial 
markets between EU and China, most of the key issues are commonly shared, such as the 
definition and determination of market manipulation, sanctions, and preventive measures. 
The EU market manipulation regulation provides a good mechanism concerning the 
prevention and detection of cross-border market manipulation, which is of extremely 
importance for the Chinese market manipulation regime, considering the close 
relationship between the Chinese mainland securities markets and Hong Kong securities 
but different regulatory an supervisory systems. Therefore, it will contribute to the 
improvement of Chinese market manipulation regime by studying EU experiences.  
6.5.1 Creating multiple level of legal resources for market manipulation regulation 
The legal resources of market manipulation regulation in China are too simple, which are 
only composed of two articles of the securities law, one article of the criminal law and 
three articles of an administrative regulation. Further, the contents of these articles are 
quite similar with each other. It is undebatable that such few articles could not constitute 
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an effective regime for regulating the complex situation of manipulation in the securities 
market, not mentioning the new coming types of manipulation with the development of 
financial products and new technologies. Besides, China is not a case law system, so the 
judgments of the courts concerning market manipulation cannot be used to complete the 
loopholes of laws concerning market manipulation. As a result, many issues concerning 
the regulation of market manipulation are still blank, which need further legislation.  
Comparatively, the legal resources of EU market manipulation regulation are more 
sophisticated. They could be divided into several levels: The principle framework is 
provided in the regulation and directive, technical standards are stipulated in the 
Commission implementing directives or regulations, and further details of some specific 
rules are explained in the soft law published by ESMA to ensure a uniform enforcement. 
Such structure of legal resources could on the one hand avoiding unclear provisions which 
might lead to hesitation during enforcement, and decreasing the possibility that the 
regulation of new coming issues are lack of legal basis, on the other hand.  
Consequently, it would be better to create multilevel legal resources for market 
manipulation regulation for ensuring efficient enforcement. To be specific, on the basis of 
Article 77 of the Securities Law, the State Council should issue an administrative 
regulation, providing further details concerning the determination and sanctions of market 
manipulation. In addition, CSRC could publish some soft law, through which making 
explanation of arguable rules in the legislation to ensure the clarity and operationalism. 
Furthermore, it would greatly increase the enforcement of market manipulation regulation 
and supervision if related judgments have binding effects.
493
  
                                                 
493
 He Jibao, Xu Hongtao, “A Comparative Study of the Constructive Elements of Administrative Liability 
for Market Manipulation”, Shen Zhen Stock Exchange, available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/flb/lfzl/jnlfssyzn/yjyd/200701/t20070130_77325.html, last visit at 04 
Feb 2015. 
        
169 
6.5.2 Providing a clear definition of market manipulation 
As a matter of course, a clear definition of market manipulation would highly benefit its 
regulation and supervision. The definition also has a special meaning for the Chinese 
securities market, as it could help market participants to have a better understanding of the 
illegitimate nature and damages of market manipulation, as well as legal liabilities, and 
then to reduce this common seen wrong-doing.  
Although the Interim Provision of the Prohibition of Securities Frauds of the State 
Council (1993) and the Announcement on the Prohibition of Market Manipulation (1996) 
published by CSRC had tried to define market manipulation, these two definitions did not 
successfully pointed out the nature of market manipulation, and narrowed the scope of 
market manipulation only to the behaviours taking advantages of capital or information. 
However, the definition issue is avoided by the Securities Law, which only describes three 
typical forms of market manipulation, and the key elements of are also not well provided. 
For example, there are no clear rule concerning the subjective elements of manipulator and 
the objective elements are lack of operative details. 
The EU Market Abuse Directive is recognized as the first legislation that defining market 
manipulation formally. In particular after the reform, the definition of market 
manipulation provided not only provides a general description of the characters of market 
manipulation, but also stipulates several typical forms and detailed indications, which 
ensures, to the highest degree, clarity and generality of the definition. This kind of method 
to define market manipulation is highly recommended in China. On the one hand, a 
general definition will avoid regulatory gaps when new forms of market manipulation 
comes out; on the other hand, sub-definitions of typical manipulation and indications will 
reduce the discretion and hesitation in the judicial practices. 
494
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Therefore, in the future legislation concerning the definition of market manipulation, not 
only a general definition should be provided, but also should pay attention to the typical 
forms. In terms of typical forms of market manipulation, the number listed in the law is too 
limited, so more types should be added, in particular the information based manipulation 
and cross-markets manipulation.   
6.5.3 Adding derogations to market manipulation 
Considering the complexity of market manipulation and the blur borderline of legal 
trading and manipulative transitions, it is a common rule to provide derogations to the 
market manipulation in many important countries and districts. Buy-back programmes 
and stabilization are two derogations to market manipulation provided in the EU market 
manipulation regulation. However, the Securities Law in China does not expressly provide 
this regime.  
In terms of buy-back programmes, it is allowed in the securities market according to 
Article 142 of the Companies Law of the People's Republic of China (2014), restrict to the 
four specific aims,
495 and these shares bought by the company should be transferred 
within designated dates, so it is almost impossible to perpetrate manipulative behaviours 
during the buy-back program. For example, as treasury stock regime does not exist in 
China, the shares bought by the company will be either transferred to the staff or employee, 
or being cancelled within certain times, and this greatly reduce the space for market 
manipulation. However, buy-back programme is not mentioned in the securities law as 
safe harbour to market manipulation. For the clarity, it is better to provide that buy-back 
programme is an express derogation to market manipulation.  
In terms of stabilization, it is prohibited in the Chinese securities market according to the 
related legislation. For a long time, the new issued stocks are always short of supply, so 
                                                 
495
 These four aims include reducing registered capital, merging with another company that holds its shares, 
rewarding the staff and workers of the company with its shares, or requesting the company to purchase his 
shares because he holds objections to the resolution on the merger or division of the company adopted by the 
shareholders general assembly. 
        
171 
there is no worry of the failure to issuing stocks. However, with the reform of issuing 
regime and usage of inquiry system, the price of stock issued sometimes is lower than 
issuing price, which may result in failure of issue. Therefore, the stabilization regime, 
aiming to ensure the success of issuing, will be necessary for the Chinese securities market 
in the future. 
Further, if derogations are provided in the future securities, they should follow the 
example of EU market manipulation regime, which provides technical standard rules 
concerning conditions, limitations and procedure with regard to the application of 
buy-back programmes and stabilization.  
6.5.4 Emphasizing preventive measures of market manipulation 
Preventing is better than curing. One of the most important changes made in the EU 
market manipulation regulation reform, is encouraging suspicious transition reports. It is 
proved in practice that whistle-blowing regime is an efficient and economic measure for 
the detection of market manipulation, particularly in complex cases. Nevertheless, the 
important preventive measure does not raise enough attention in China, and there is no law 
concerning it.  
In practice, a person could report the transitions that are suspicious of involving market 
manipulation to the CSRC, either through letters or telephone. Despite these reports 
contribute to about 25% of the detection of market manipulation cases, many issues have 
also been exposed: firstly, the reporters usually are outsiders, and information provided 
does not include higher percent of useful information; secondly, the procedure of dealing 
with reports is not transparent, and reporters could not know the result of his report; and 
thirdly, there are no clear protection for the identity or other private information of the 
reporter, even though the report could be made anonymously.  
As a result, there should be adequate protections for the whistle-blowers in order to 
encourage the application of this preventive regime. The protective measures should at 
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least conclude that identities of reporters and other private information should be kept 
confident by the law, and monetary awards could be used to encourage more people to 
provide useful information. Meanwhile, certain conditions and punishments, as stipulated 
in the EU rules, should also be provided in order to avoid report with bad intention.  
6.5.5 Refining the liability regime of market manipulation 
Although administrative, criminal and civil liabilities for market manipulation are all 
provided in the related legislation, enforcement of market manipulation regulation is not 
efficient, and there are many issues relating to these three sanctioning regimes in China.  
Firstly, the regulators in China heavily relies administrative sanctions to punish 
manipulators, criminal sanctions are used less, and civil compensation is still not 
applicable in practice. However, the related legislations do not provide a mature 
sanctioning regime of market manipulation, the constructive elements of which are still 
not clear, no matter in legislation or in theory. In order to increase enforcement efficiency, 
market manipulation regulation should provide a clear answer to questions whether the 
result of changes of stock price is needed or not, whether intention is a necessary element 
or not and so on. 
Secondly, increasing the types of sanctions for market manipulation is another important 
way to refine the liability regime. In the EU market manipulation regulation, pecuniary 
sanction and non-pecuniary sanctions are equally important. Non-pecuniary sanctions, 
such as warning, temporary or permanent prohibition to provide service, judicial 
supervision, play an important role in preventing repeated offences. None the less, the 
types of sanctions for market manipulation are quite limited in China, which could not 
ensure the efficiency of enforcement. The administrative sanctions only include 
confiscating illegal profits, fine and addressing a warning. So providing multiple types of 
sanctions as provided in the EU regulation could ensure proper punishment is imposed on 
different cases. 
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6.5.6 Enhancing supervisory cooperation  
With the globalization of international financial markets, the number of cross-markets and 
cross-broader manipulation are increasing. Manipulators could get giant illegal profits 
while escape from punishment because of poor supervisory cooperation among various 
supervisors. So in the EU market manipulation reform, strengthening the cooperation 
system of supervisors in Member States and third countries is one of the key areas that 
amendments made.  
This gives a warning to China. On the one hand, the influence between the securities 
market and the futures market, as well as commodities market are getting closer, as the 
creation of multi-level capital markets in China,. And manipulation case cross securities 
market and future markets has come into sight in China. On the other side, cross-border 
securities transitions become more and more frequent in China in the wake of 
globalization of financial markets. In particular, the interaction between securities markets 
in the mainland of China and Hong Kong is quite significant. For instance, many Chinese 
companies choose to list on the stock exchange in Hong Kong, and investors make 
transitions on both sides of the markets. However, the regulatory and supervisory systems 
are very different, which provides opportunities for manipulators to take advantage of 
such differences.  
Therefore, the problem concerning regulatory arbitrage in the EU is also a concern for the 
Chinese securities market, and improvement should be made to ensure effective 
prevention of cross-border manipulation. According to the EU experiences, the Chinese 
market manipulation regime should also establish an efficient cooperation system between 
CSRC and supervisors in other sections and in other countries, especially in respect of 
information exchange and investigation cooperation.  
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Conclusion of Chapter 6 
The Chinese securities market develops quite late while with a high developing speed. 
Since the very beginning of its establishment, market manipulation has been one major 
issue of the securities market in China. It is no exaggeration to state that the Chinese 
securities market is a giant casino for investors.  
The reason why market manipulation has become such a serious problem for the smooth 
functioning of securities market and protection of investors in China could be explain 
from two aspects. One is special reasons concerning Chinese characters, including the 
wrong ideas of legislators and supervisors concerning catch-all provisions and their 
application; double role of supervisors; and non-cooperation of local government or 
authorities because of specific interests. The other reason is with regard to failure of 
market manipulation regime, which could benefit from studying EU experiences relating 
to market manipulation regulation.  
With 20 years’ effort, the Chinese market manipulation regime has been established, 
which, however, is far from mature. Therefore, studying from the success example, the 
EU market manipulation regime, will help to refine the regime in China. In terms of 
legislative structure, multi-level legal resources of market manipulation regulation 
should be created, in order to uniformity and flexibility of the regime. In terms of the 
prohibition and identification of market manipulation, a clear definition and supporting 
administrative rules concerning indications, signals and typical examples should be 
provided to enhance market understanding of relate activities. Besides, in conformity 
with international regulation, derogations, like buy-back programmes and stabilization, 
are supposed to be added into the Chinese market manipulation regime, avoiding that 
legitimate behaviours are caught by wide scope of prohibitions.  
Further, reform should also be made to enhance supervision and enforcement. Preventive 
measures, particularly whistle-blowing regime, will be effective measures that help 
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regulators to detect and investigate suspicious manipulation. And another emergent 
regime that needs to refine is the sanctioning regime, the constructive elements of which 
should be clearly provided, so as to achieve the objective of efficient enforcement. 
Finally, in response to an increasing number of cross-border and cross-markets cases of 
market manipulation, it will be necessary for CSRC to establish effective supervisory 
cooperation system with regulators in other districts (notably Hong Kong) and countries.  
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Conclusion 
Market manipulation is an illegal practice that enables a person to profit from practices 
that artificially raise or lower the prices of an instrument in the financial markets. It makes 
damages to the smooth functioning of financial market by distorting its price formation 
mechanism, and also destroys investors’ confidence. Therefore, market manipulation is 
commonly banned in the main countries, basing on the rationales of supporting market 
efficiency, lowering the cost of capital and protecting morality.  
The prohibition of market manipulation typically addresses the dissemination of false or 
misleading information, behaviors that distort the trading price or trading volume of a 
security, and misuse of material information (supplement to rules of insider dealing).
496
 
However, there are difficulties to efficiently tackle market manipulation taking into 
account its complexity. Manipulative activities can be perpetrated not only by fraudulent 
misrepresentations that are relatively straightforward, but also by highly complex and 
difficult-to-detect trading practices. Further, market manipulation is continually evolves 
with the development of new financial products and high technologies.
497
  
The EU market manipulation regime is established by the 2003 Market Abuse Directive, 
which was the first FSAP measure to adopt under the then novel Lamfalussy process.
498
 
And this regime is supported by four Commission administrative rules and three sets of 
CESR guidance. Despite weakness in implementation and supervisory consistency 
emerged from the very beginning, the market manipulation regime under Market Abuse 
Directive was broadly considered as a big success, which has achieved the main 
objectives of enhancing financial market integrity and public confidence in the EU 
financial markets.  
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The market manipulation regime under Market Abuse Directive provides a clear 
definition of market manipulation, supplementing by possible signals and typical 
examples. Since the effect-based approach is adopted, the prohibition covers a broad 
scope of activities, so two safe harbours, buy-back programmes and stabilisation and 
AMPs are stipulated to avoid overly prohibition. For better supervision and enforcement, 
competent authorities are conferred with a minimum list powers that Member States 
should ensure. In terms of administrative liability of market manipulation, constituent 
elements are also elaborated. Furthermore, a couple of preventive measures in the market 
manipulation regime, especially suspicious transaction reports, contribute to the 
deterrence of illegal behaviours in the financial market.  
Review of the current market manipulation regime is made benefiting from post-FSAP 
commitment to Better Regulation, and this review soon became incorporated within the 
wider EU crisis-era reform programme.
499
 A number of weaknesses have been identified 
on the basis of contributions collected from public consultations and expert reports, 
which include regulatory gaps in the terms of trading venues and of financial instruments, 
notably market manipulation in commodity derivatives and related spot markets; legal 
uncertainty caused by AMPs; inefficient enforcement linked to limited national 
competent authority powers and cooperation system among EU securities regulators; and 
regulatory arbitrage as a result of sanctioning divergences.
500
  
Therefore, a new regulatory package of market manipulation has been adopted to refine 
the current market manipulation regime. Market Abuse Regulation and Directive on 
criminal sanctions for market abuse will repeal Market Abuse Directive as well as its 
related supporting administrative rules, and a deeper harmonisation at EU level is made. 
On the one hand, a structure reform is taken with regulation replacing directive to be the 
cornerstone of market manipulation regulation, which will ensure a higher definite and 
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directly binding legislative system, and significantly reduce divergences during 
enforcement of Member States.  
On the other hand, substantial reform is at the centre place of the reform, aiming to 
efficiently prevent market manipulation in the EU financial markets, in particular 
cross-border and cross-markets cases. The new market manipulation regime will expand 
beyond an original prohibition on a range of manipulative behaviours, extending the 
regime to include manipulation relate to commodity derivatives, HFT, emission 
allowance, and benchmarks. And a better definition of market manipulation will be 
provided by that Market Abuse Regulation bring indicators, signals and typical examples 
of market manipulation, which are currently provide in supporting administrative rules of 
Market Abuse Directive, into the Regulation and its Annex.  
Meanwhile, attempted market manipulation is added as a new prohibition, in order to 
catch behaviours that do not successfully realize the result of speculating the price, the 
supply or demand of an instrument. Further, the AMP regime will be further harmonised 
with greater scrutiny of ESMA to reduce divergences among Member States.  
Market Abuse Regulation also tries to enhance its efficiency of supervision and 
enforcement. A broader minimum list of powers that should be conferred on national 
regulators is provided to add or strengthen powers of competent authorities, in order to 
support effective intra-Member State and cross-border supervision. And the supervisory 
cooperation has been extended by covering a wider scope of information and subjects. 
More significantly, ESMA is not limited to the role of mediator, but also could impose 
directly binding decisions on national competent authorities, or even market participants, 
when settling disagreements between national regulators.  
Further, preventive measures of market manipulation, particularly whistle-blowing, have 
been refined, reflecting international trends as well as similar measures in other crisis-era 
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securities and markets measures.
501
 Protections of blowers and procedure for receipt of 
reports and follow-up are specified in the new regime. Financial incentives may be also 
granted, which depends on the choice of national law.  
And finally, more changes are made to ensure efficient enforcement. Administrative 
sanctions has been specified through providing a minimum list of the types and levels of 
measure and sanction available, publishing sanctioning decisions, and imposing 
reporting obligations on national competent authorities and ESMA to enhance 
monitoring and support convergences.
502
 And criminal sanctions regime is introduced 
into the new market manipulation regulation. Directive on criminal sanctions for market 
abuse has made a minimum harmonisation to criminal sanctions of market manipulation, 
and Member States could choose retain or impose stricter rules.  
In general, the new EU market manipulation regime will not only significantly enhance 
the efficiency of supervision and enforcement, but also will reduce divergences in 
Member States, contributing to the establishment of a uniform market abuse regime at 
the EU level. However, some issues, such as, interpretation of “reasonable suspicion”, 
the criteria to decide “seriousness”, need to be further interpreted to achieve this 
objective.  
In addition, fundamental rights should be respected in the implementation of regulations 
of market manipulation. And an assessment relating to balancing the prohibition of 
market manipulation and protection of fundamental rights should be made in practice. 
Three types of fundamental rights are of particular relevance to the market manipulation 
prohibition, including freedom of expression; the right to private and family and the right 
to protect personal data; and the fundamental rights concerning justice. The new EU 
market manipulation regime has set out conditions to avoid abusive powers of competent 
authorities and measures to ensure procedure rights of suspected persons who commit 
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manipulative offences. However, the success will highly depend on Member States, who 
are obliged to ensure proper measures are provided in the national law.  
At last, the EU market manipulation regime could be of significant reference to China. 
Market manipulation has been a serious problem for the smooth functioning of securities 
market and protection of investors since the very beginning. And the current Chinese 
market manipulation regime is far from mature. A number of measures that could study 
from the EU market manipulation regime to refine the Chinese one, which include 
creating multi-level legal resources of market manipulation regulation to guarantee 
uniformity and flexibility of the regime, providing clear definition and supporting 
administrative rules concerning indications, signals and typical examples to enhance 
market understanding of relate activities, establishing safe harbours (buy-back 
programmes and stabilization) to avoid that legitimate behaviours are caught by wide 
scope of prohibitions, strengthening whistle-blowing regime, enhancing cross-border 
supervisory cooperation and providing clear constructive elements of sanctions to market 
manipulation to guarantee efficient enforcement.  
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